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CBF NSS CHINA FOCUS CHINA BUSINESS FOCUS

THE INDEX

Companies, organizations and people in this issue are indexed based on the first page number of the article in which they appear

P03 The Six Little Dragons of Hangzhou

P04SixKeySignalsReleased in the2025GovernmentWorkReport

P12HowtoReform thePre-saleSystemof Commercial Housing

P17 Appeal UpholdsDeath Sentence forBai Tianhui,1.1 Billion RMB inBribes

P22University ProfessorsDeclareAll Al-Generated EssaysAwarded ZeroMarks

P28PropertyFeesDrop Over 50% in Multiple Cities: What's Next?

P32Bond MarketDeclinePushesBankWealthManagementBelow 2%

P38How is Zhejiang Shaoxing?

P43Shanghaineseand Local Shanghaidialect

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Mar.&Apr.2025No.301

CHAIRMAN/PUBLISHER David L. Zhang EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Dr. Lu Zhang EXECUTIVEEDITOR Stone Shi
DEPUTYCHIEFEDITOR Alice Jiang SECTION EDITOR Mark Cheryl Yue Zhu ARTEDITOR WindyYao

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03FromtheEditor

P03 The SixLittle Dragons of Hangzhou

04 Assembly of Experts

P04SixKeySignalsReleasedinthe2025Government Work Report
P12 How to Reform thePre-sale System of Commercial Housing

17CurrentAffairs

P17Appeal UpholdsDeathSentence forBai Tianhui,1.1 BillionRMBinBribes

22Educ.ThinkTank

P22UniversityProfessorsDeclare AllAl-Generated Essays Awarded Zero Marks

28 Special Report

P28 Property Fees Drop Over 50% in Multiple Cities: What's Next?

32FinancialResearch&Analysis

P32Bond MarketDeclinePushesBankWealth ManagementBelow 2%

38 Modern City P38 How is Zhejiang Shaoxing?

43CultureColumn

P43 Shanghainese and Local Shanghai dialect

The Six Little Dragons of Hangzhou

Almost overnight, the term "Six Little Dragons of Hangzhou" took over the internet, creating a dazzling super whirlwind.

The "Six Little Dragons of Hangzhou" refers to six cutting-edge technology companies from Hangzhou that have recently gained widespread attention. These include the globally impactful artificial intelligence company "DeepQuest," the game development company "Game Science" known for the viral game Black Myth: Wukong, brain-computer interface company "Qiang Brain Technology," spatial intelligence company "Qunuo Technology," as well as robotics companies "Yushu Technology" and "Yunshen Technology."

These are representatives of young entrepreneurs born in the late 80s and 90s, all of whom are part of China's emerging industries and technological stars. Their companies are headquartered in Hangzhou. The simultaneous rise of the"Six Little Dragons of Hangzhou" has brought this historic city back into the spotlight.

When people think of Hangzhou, they often think of the picturesque West Lake and its scenic beauty. But this time, unexpectedly, it has become the cradle of emerging techcompanies and theincubationhubfor new productive forces, sparking great curiosity: How did Hangzhou achieve this?

For a city to stand out in the long course of social development,there must be something distinctive about it. Hangzhou, already renowned as the e-commerce capital, has heavily supported tech talent, built a perfect business environment,and established a comprehensive upstream and downstreamindustrial chain.All of these factorshavecreatedfavorableconditionsforthebirth of tech startups.

What is particularly remarkable is that Hangzhou, often called the "first city of private enterprises," has been especially noteworthy in its support of private businesses. The local government adopts a "nannystyle" service approach, ensuring that "every request is answered, and no unnecessary interruptions are made." They not only connect companies with resources but also regularly consolidate business needs from various parties and send them to enterprises. Companies moving into Hangzhou “don't have to eat a meal, drink a cup of tea, or send a single cigarette." The government takes a long-term view on scientific research and innovation, being patient and committed to the philosophy of “"ten years of silence before a remarkable breakthrough."

Hangzhou's leadership is eager to attract talent, offering those recognized as high-level professionals the opportunity to settle in the city and receive housing, rental, and living subsidies ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of yuan.

All of these factors contribute to Hangzhou's successful transformation from an e-commerce hub to a technological powerhouse.As some regions grapple with current economic downturns, they could take inspiration from Hangzhou's approach and, by applying it to their own contexts, open up new horizons elsewhere.CBF

Six Key Signals Released in the 2025 Government Work Report

By Emily

C Third Session of n March 5, 2025,the the 14th National People's Congress was held in Beijing. What signals were released in this year's Government Work Report? How will policies be implemented? How does it differ from previous years?

This year's report contains many new points:

In terms of assessing future trends and risks, the report highlights that the external environment is becoming increasingly complex and severe. The domestic economic recovery remains unstable, with insufficient effective demand, especially weak consumption.Some enterprises are facing operational difficulties, and overdue payments remain a prominent issue. However, it also points out China’s advantages in systems, markets, industries, and talent, indicating that Overall, strategic opportunities and challenges coexist, but the long-term trend remains positive.

Regarding economic goals, the report maintains the“around 5%^{\prime\prime} GDP growth target for the third consecutive year. The CPI growth target has been adjusted from “around 3%^{39} to “around 2% ” effectively shifting the focus from an inflation ceiling to a price level goal, accelerating the reasonable recovery of prices. In summary, the report signals nine key points.

Growth Target Maintained, Price Target Lowered

This year marks the conclusion of the“14th Five-Year Plan."In terms of external conditions, the report indicates that the external environment is becoming “increasingly complex and severe,” which may have a greater impact on China’s trade, technology, and other sectors. Specific manifestations include: insufficient global economic growth momentum, an increase in unilateralism and protectionism,disruptions to the multilateral trade system, a rise in tariff barriers, and a destabilizing effect on global supply chains, which hinders the international economic circulation.

Domestically, there are numerous short-term challenges and issues. The report notes that “the foundation for economic recovery remains unstable," with challenges in “public welfare areas”" “resolving social contradictions and preventing risks,” and “government effectiveness and the ability to administer according to law?" Specific problems include: insuffcient effective demand, particularly weak consumption; difficulties for some enterprises in production and operation, with overdue payments still being a prominent issue; pressure on employment and income for the public; and slow policy implementation with results falling short of expectations. However, in the long run, the report emphasizes that

China has significant advantages, such as institutional strengths, a super-large market, a complete industrial system, and a rich labor force, ensuring that the long-term trend remains positive. But at present, we must “acknowledge the difficulties and remain confident.?"

The GDP growth target for 2025 is set at around 5% unchanged since 2023. We believe that 2025, being the final year of the “14th Five-Year Plan, will also see the Central Committee propose recommendations for the“15th Five-Year Plan?" This year represents an important transition point, and the decision to maintain the GDP growth target aims to guide expectations and ensure stable economic growth. Additionally, it supports policy sustainability to align with the goals for the first year of the “15th FiveYear Plan."

The CPI growth target for 2025 is set at around 2% ,marking the first downwardadjustment since it has remained at 3% since 2015. For comparison, the last time the CPI growth target was below 3% was from 2001 to 2003. In 2001, the national price growth rate was negative, and it was only through sustained policy efforts that the economy Overcame deflationary pressures. In 2024, the CPI increased by 0.2% , and the PPI declined by 2.2% , both falling below the target growth rate for the year. We believe that the adjustment of the CPI target this year does not indicate a desire to reduce inflation but instead reflects the decision-making body's continued preference for moderate price increases. This means that active policy measures will likely continue, and further incremental adjustments are expected.

Additionally, the employment target for 2025 remains the same, while the energy consumption target has been slightly increased. Other expected targets for

CPI增速：政府預期目標和實際情況（%）

資料來源：WIND，中國政府網(wǎng)，新華社，海通證券研究所

2025 include: urban new employment of Over 12 million, with the urban surveyed unemployment rate around 5.5% both in line with the 2024 targets. The target for energy consumption per unit of GDP in 2025 is a 3% reduction, and the target for grain production is around 1.4 trillion jin, both slightly adjusted upward compared to the 2024 targets, with a 0.5 percentage point increase for energy consumption and a 1,000 jin increase for grain production.

In the face of short-term difficulties and challenges, policies must be tailored to address the specific issues. Therefore, in terms of policy orientation, the report emphasizes the following:“Maintain stability while seeking progress, promote stability through progress, uphold integrity and innovation, prioritize establishment before disruption, integrate systems and cooperate effectively, enrich and improve the policy toolbox, dynamically adjust policies based on changing circumstances, and enhance the foresight, relevance, and effectiveness of macroeconomic regulation. Focus on goal guidance, grasp policy direction, pay attention to timing and intensity, strengthen systems thinking, and improve the effectiveness of macro policy implementation.

Policy Focus: Increased Deficit, Loose Monetary Policy, Stable Exchange Rate.

Regarding macroeconomic policies, the report highlights three main features. First, there is a need for “coordination". The report suggests “enhancing the alignment of policy goals, tools, timing, intensity, and pace.” Second, the focus should be “early action.” The report emphasizes that “policies should be implemented as early as possible—-better early than late—-to capture time ahead of various uncertainties, and when the right time comes, provide a comprehensive and sufficient response to improve policy effectiveness" Third, “positive expectations" are crucial. The report stresses the importance of “l(fā)istening to market voices, collaborating on policy implementation, and guiding expectations to shape positive social anticipation."

In summary, we believe this year's macroeconomic policies are becoming more proactive, which will be beneficial in achieving the high-quality completion of the 14th Five-Year Plan goals and laying a solid foundation for a strong start to the 15th Five-Year Plan. However, it is important to note that the push for growth will be focused on “high-quality development’? and will not involve largescale stimulus measures.

Proactive Fiscal Deficit Adjustment and Increased Government Debt

The government aims to “implement more proactive fiscal policies", a shift from last year's “appropriate strengthening of fiscal policies, with a focus on improving quality and efficiency?” This is reflected in the fiscal targets for 2025:

1.Fiscal Deficit:The fiscal deficit ratio is planned at around 4% , an increase of 1 percentage point compared to the previous year.The fiscal deficit will be 5.66 trillion yuan, up 1.6 trillion yuan from last year.

2.Special Bonds: The issuance of ultra-long-term special government bonds will be 1.3 trillion yuan, an increase of 300 billion yuan from last year.

3.Government Debt: The issuance of special government bonds will amount to 500 billion yuan to support the capital replenishment of state-owned commercial banks.

4.Local Government Bonds:Local governmentsare settoissue4.4trillion 資料來源：WIND，中國政府網(wǎng)，新華社，海通證券研究所 yuan in special bonds, up 500 billion yuan from last year.

政府預期目標：財政赤字和地方專項債

美元指數(shù)和人民幣匯率

資料來源：WIND，海通證券研究所

社融和M2增速 (%) 1

資料來源：WIND，海通證券研究所

In total, the government's new debt issuance this year will amount to 11.86 trillion yuan, an increase of 2.9 trillion yuan compared to the previous year. Our calculations indicate that fiscal expenditure intensity will significantly increase.

Accelerated Fiscal Rhythm with Focus on Expanding Domestic Demand, Stabilizing the Property Market, and Improving People's Livelihoods

The report suggests “accelerating the allocation and disbursement of funds to quickly generate actual expenditures," indicating a front-loaded fiscal rhythm this year. The fiscal policy will focus on three main areas:

1.Ultra-long-term Special Bonds: The bonds will increase investments in the “Two New"”and “Two Heavy” sectors, as well as capital replenishment for banks.

2.Use of Special Bonds: There will be increased use of special bonds for land reserve and real estate-related fields. The report highlights that new special bonds will “"focus on investment construction, land reserve, and purchasing existing commercial housing, as well as clearing local governments’ overdue payments to enterprises."

3.New Mechanism for Special Bond Management: The report proposes a new management mechanism for special bonds, potentially increasing infrastructure support for emerging industries.

Additionally, we believe that the government will retain sufficient policy space. If growth remains under pressure in the second half of the year, there may be a possibility of temporarily increasing fiscal support.

Moderately Loose Monetary Policy, Balancing the

Rhythm of Exchange Rates

The government report proposes "implementing a moderately loose monetary policy”, which is a more proactive stance compared to last year's statement of “a prudent monetary policy that is flexible, moderate, and effective”. Additionally, it mentions “timely cuts in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) and interest rates to maintain ample liquidity” and “aligning the growth of social financing scale and money supply with economic growth and the expected price level." In my view, the direction of monetary policy remains clearly focused on prudent yet moderate easing.

The report introduces the new phrase “timely RRR and interest rate cuts" In the short term, given the positive economic performance since the fourth quarter of last year, the likelihood of interest rate cuts seems low. Moreover, considering the strengthening of the U.S. dollar and increasing global uncertainty, the central bank's key goal will be to prevent excessive exchange rate fuctuations. The government report also emphasizes “maintaining the basic stability of the RMB exchange rate at a reasonable and balanced level."

In the medium term, the direction of monetary easing remains clear, but it is unlikely to involve large-scale stimulus. The pace of RRR and interest rate cuts is expected to be gradual and incremental.

On the direction of monetary policy, there is a focus on supporting the real economy and key sectors. Notably, the government report highlights “greater efforts to promote the healthy development of the real estate and stock markets, along with increased support for technological innovation, green development, consumption, and private and small enterprises."

This suggests that while the government intends to provide targeted support to various sectors, the policy will be strategic and focused, aiming to foster sustainable growth in these key areas.

WorkTasks:Expanding Domestic Demand First, "Two New" Policies Expanding, "Two Major" Areas Intensified

The report outlines ten major tasks, with some key highlights: First, “expanding domestic demand”has moved from third place last year to the top priority. The report emphasizes “vigorously boosting consumption, improving investment efficiency, and comprehensively expanding domestic demand." Second, “accelerating the implementation of landmark reform measures”' is a new addition compared to last year. Third, in terms of ecology, “reducing carbon emissions, pollution, and expanding green growth" is more clearly defined than in previous years, which is worth noting. Expanding domestic demand is the top priority, with consumption being a key element. Therefore, the report proposes “implementing special actions to boost consumption."

Specific Measures Focus on Two Aspects:

Enhancing consumption capacity and promoting income growth: The report suggests “facilitating income growth through multiple channels, promoting income increases and tax reductions for middle- and low-income groups, and improving the mechanism for normal wage growth."

Dual focus on both supply and demand: On the demand side, the main line focuses on “expanding the scope of Two New? policies to include digital products" and “intensifying the Two Major’ policies to focus on urban renewal."

First, “expanding the “Two New” policies": The report proposes “arranging 300 billion yuan in ultra-long-term special national bonds to support the replacement of old consumer goods” an increase of 150 billion yuan compared to last year. Considering the overall increase in the size of ultra-long-term special bonds by 300 billion yuan, we expect the funding for equipment updates to increase by about 150 billion yuan compared to last year. According to the National Development and Reform Commission's deployment, in 2025, the scope of equipment updates will be expanded to fields such as electronic information, safety production, and facility agriculture. Subsidies will be provided to individual consumers for purchasing mobile phones, tablets, smartwatches, and smart bands.

Additionally, on the supply side, the report suggests “expanding the supply of diversified services such as healthcare, elderly care, childcare, and domestic services. Innovating and enriching consumption scenarios, and accelerating the development of new types of consumption such as digital, green, and intelligent consumption."

Expanding domestic demand requires a balance between investment and consumption. We believe there are two major highlights on the investment side:

This year, the central budget investment is expected to be 735 billion yuan, an increase from last year's 700 billion yuan. It also emphasizes “resolutely preventing inefficient and ineffective investment”’ to ensure the successful completion of major projects in the “14th FiveYear Plan."

The report highlights “making good use of ultra-long-term special national bonds"” and “supporting “Two Major’ constructions with greater effort." This year, we expect "Two Major?" construction projects to focus on urban infrastructure such as gas, drainage, and underground pipelines, as well as urban renewal projects like the renovation of old urban communities and villages within cities.

In terms of stabilizing foreign investment, the report highlights “expanding the opening of the service industry?" It proposes “promoting orderly opening in sectors such as the internet, culture, telecommunications, healthcare, and education” along with “strengthening services and guarantees for foreignfunded enterprises.” Additionally, the report aims to “improve and enhance the free trade zone, expand the authorization of reform tasks, and accelerate the implementation of core policies for the Hainan Free Trade Port.?

Real Estate: Focus on Stabilizing the Market, Attention to Turning Points in Volume and Price

In terms of real estate, the report emphasizes “continuing efforts to stabilize the real estate market and stop its decline." We believe that the real estate policy will continue to focus on stabilizing the market, with the key being the effective implementation of existing policies.

On the one hand, the report proposes “activating existing land and commercial properties, promoting the purchase of unsold properties” and giving local governments more autonomy in “acquiring property, determining prices, and deciding the purpose of the properties." It also suggests “expanding the scope of special loans for affordable housing.” On the other hand, the report emphasizes "tailoring policies to cities and adjusting restrictive measures.”’ We anticipate that major cities may further relax restrictions on real estate. For example, policies such as “cancelling or reducing restrictions on commodity housing, optimizing housing provident fund policies, increasing housing subsidies for talent, and promoting real estate market transactions” could be implemented.

Additionally, the report suggests “"reasonably controlling the supply of new real estate land." Notably, since the beginning of the year, the new housing market in many regions has shown a continued recovery, and the second-hand housing market is showing signs of stabilization.

Looking ahead, the turning points in real estate volume and price may play a crucial role in supporting the economic recovery.

Supply-side Adjustments: Addressing "lnvolutionary"Competition

We believe that the supply-side adjustments should focus on two main areas.

First, comprehensive regulation of "“involutionary” competition. In some industries and sectors in China, “involutionary” competition has emerged, characterized by disorderly competition within the industry, significant homogenization, and a prevalence of lowprice competition models. Compared to the past, we believe that this round of reform differs in that it relies more on market-driven actions rather than administrative regulations. For example, using market-based and legal methods to promote the healthy development of industries such as new energy vehicles, lithium batteries, and photovoltaic products (often referred to as the “new three staples").

Second, as this year marks the conclusion of the 14th Five-Year Plan, energy conservation and carbon reduction efforts are expected to continue. The 14th Five-Year Plan targets a reduction of 13.5% in energy consumption per unit of GDP and a reduction of 18% in carbon dioxide emissions. The report proposes that energy consumption per unit of GDP be reduced by around 3% in 2025. We believe that the “coordinated promotion of carbon reduction, pollution control, and green growth” will continue to advance, with the goal being achievable.

Deepening Reform andIndustrialPolicy: Key Focus Areas

There are several notable reforms to watch. In 2025, the goal is to achieve high-quality completion of the 14th Five-Year Plan tasks and lay a solid foundation for a good start to the 15th FiveYear Plan. As a pivotal year, the report emphasizes the need to “accelerate the implementation of landmark reforms and better leverage the guiding role of economic system reforms,” which is a new point compared to last year.

Fiscal Policy Focus on Zero-Based Budgeting Reform

The report mentions the “pilot program of zero-based budgeting for central departments and support for local governments to deepen zero-based budgeting reforms." This could free up financial resources to strengthen fiscal support for major strategic tasks and essential public welfare. Additionally, the report highlights the acceleration of some excise tax collections being moved to local governments.

Financial Policy Highlights: Promoting Long-Term

Capital Inflows

A key focus in the financial sector is "promoting the entry of long-term capital into the market.” According to recent policy deployments, public funds holding A-shares circulating market value are expected to increase by at least 10% annually for the next three years. Large stateowned insurance companies are also encouraged to invest 30% of their new premium income into A-shares starting from 2025. This trend is expected to further solidify, improving capital market funding and structure, which could result in a boost in capital inflows into A-shares.

Industry Policy Focus on TechnologicalInnovationand New Economy

Three main areas of focus in industrial policy are:

1.Leveraging the advantages of the new national system to strengthen the development of critical core technologies and frontier, disruptive technological research. There will be an emphasis on speeding up the organization and earlystage planning of major scientific and technological projects.

2.Optimizing the layout of national strategic scientific and technological forces by reforming research institutions, exploring new types of national laboratory models, and enhancing the ability of international and regional innovation centers to drive development.

3.Shifting more technological spending toward basic research, improving competitive and stable support mechanisms, and increasing the organization of basic research efforts.

Focus on Public Welfare: Universal Elderly Care and Childcare Services

In terms of public welfare, the report highlights the expansion of universal elderly care and childcare services:

·The minimum base pension standard for urban and rural residents will increase by 20 yuan. There will also be a modest increase in basic pensions for retirees.

·The report calls for an increase in support for meals for the elderly, the purchase and rental of rehabilitation aids, and expanding universal elderly care services, as well as the promotion of rural elderly care services.

·Long-term care insurance systems will be accelerated.

·The implementation of policies to encourage childbirth, such as providing childbirth subsidies, and the development of integrated childcare services will be a focus, aiming to expand universal childcare services.

·Gradual adjustments to the legal retirement age will be made in a careful, step-by-step manner.CBF

How to Reform the Presale System of Commercial Housing

By Emily

A China have yet to be completed, which means that the country's real estate crisis will not be resolved anytime soon.

Analysis points out that this number is even higher than Germany's total housing stock in 2021, posing a direct threat to the income of Chinese real estate developers, as homebuyers may tend to avoid purchasing newly developed pre-sale projects and instead opt for completed properties or secondhand homes.

International rating agency Moody's has further downgraded the debt rating of China's well-known property developer, Vanke,to “junk grade." Earlier, two other rating agencies, Standard & Poor's and Fitch, also gave Vanke a junk rating, which has increased the selling pressure on Vanke's stocks and bonds.

From 2000 tothe firsthalf of this year, the completed housing area in China decreased by 8.4 billion square meters, about 38% of the total cumulative sales. The ratio of unfinished housing to annual sales increased from 17% before 2015 to 47% from 2015 to 2024.

The report states that Chinese homebuyers′ preferences are undergoing a fundamental shift. For the first time ever, second-hand home sales surpassed new home sales last year. The report shows that in the first half of 2024, sales of existing homes accounted for 27% of new home sales, up from just 10% in 2021.

The pre-sale system for commercial housing has played a crucial role in the steady development of China's real estate market over the past 20 years. It not only addressed the funding needs during the rapid development phase of the real estate market but also significantly promoted the improvement of the living standards of the general public. However, it is undeniable that risks hidden behind the pre-sale system do exist. According to Xinhua News Agency, several leading real estate companies such as Fusheng, Taihe, Huaxia Xingfu, and Xiexin have encountered debt crises since last year, with their projects in various parts of the country facing the risk of being abandoned or unfinished. In this context, the issue of how to reform China’s pre-sale system for commercial housing has once again been brought to the forefront. Niu Sanyuan, a research fellow at the Institute of Market Economy, Development Research Center of the State Council, published a column on the topic of the pre-sale system, and this article provides a summary and abridged version of the column's content.

The pre-sale system for commercial housing is widely practiced internationally and continues to evolve.

Housing is a large commodity with high construction costs and long production cycles. Developers generally need to invest significant funds during the construction process and bear financing costs. If sales are sluggish after the property is completed, they will face substantial losses. The presale system for commercial housing effectively mitigates development risks, making it a common practice globally.

As the real estate market continues to evolve, the pre-sale system for commercial housing has also developed and changed. Hong Kong is a typical example. In the 1950s,Hong Kong's population grew at an average annual rate of over 4.6% ,and housing issues became prominent. Hong Kong businessman Ho Ying Tung pioneered the “floor-by-floor sale ^+ pre-sale of apartments ^+ sales brochures” model, breaking away from the traditional real estate transaction practice of “buying the entire building with full payment.?' This innovation significantly lowered the homeownership threshold for low- and middle-income people and promoted the rapid development of the real estate market. However, the imperfections in the pre-sale system later exposed a series of problems. In 1960, the Fu Kwai Building in Tai Kok Tsui was suspended due to cost overruns, becoming the first “unfinished building” in Hong Kong. In the 1990s, Hong Kong's real estate prices soared, with speculative trading of pre-sold apartments being the main cause. In 2004, two projects of the Hong Kongbased company, Kai Shing Group, became unfinished due to senior executives forging payment certificates to misappropriate regulatory funds. Over the years, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government has made multiple “patches” to the pre-sale system, but during downturns in the real estate market, such as during financial crises, it has also relaxed presale conditions to stimulate the market.

ThePerfectPre-sale System for Commercial Housing HasFour Core Mechanisms

A review of international practices related to pre-sale systems for commercial housing reveals that reasonable pre-sale conditions, appropriate loan arrangements, effective fund management, and comprehensive protection of rights are common features and core mechanisms of pre-sale systems in major economies.

1.Reasonable Pre-sale Conditions as the Foundation of the Pre-sale System

Internationally, major economies generally set regulations for pre-sale standards, though the specific requirements and timelines differ. South Korea's Housing Supply Regulations stipulate pre-sale conditions based on different stages of project completion, with varying requirements for each stage. Japan's Building Transaction Act allows the pre-sale of apartments once the government issues a building permit, provided that “deposit protection measures” are in place to reduce buyer risk. In Western countries, presale standards are relatively relaxed, such as in the United States, where properties can be pre-sold during the planning phase, or in Germany, where developers can pre-sell once a project is approved. In Hong Kong, the focus of pre-sale approval is to ensure developers have the financial capacity to complete the entire project, with proof provided through bank loans, guarantees for project completion, or unsecured loan contracts.

2.Appropriate Loan Arrangements as the Core of thePre-sale System

In mainland China, the criteria for applying for development loans are tied to land use rights, various permits, and equity ratios, and mortgage loans can be applied for once the pre-sale starts. However, internationally, development loans are generally tied to the pre-sale ratio, and mortgage loans are disbursed only after the property is delivered. This not only helps reduce financial risks in the banking system but also prevents development risks from being prematurely transferred to consumers.

For developers, the issuance of development loans and guarantees is directly linked to the pre-sale ratio. Successful pre-sales form the basis for developers to obtain loans. In North America, financial institutions typically require developers to have presold a certain percentage of units before issuing development loans, ensuring that sufficient sales revenue is available to repay loans upon maturity. To avoid speculative trading, many countries impose requirements on the proportion of homes that must be owner-occupied. For instance, in the U.S., Fannie Mae requires 51%-70% of units to be pre-sold before issuing a development loan, while Freddie Mac requires at least 70% to be sold to owner-occupants of their first or second homes. Similarly, in Canada, banks require 60%-75% of apartments to be pre-sold before granting development loans, and the total receivables from pre-sold units must cover 75%80% of the loan amount. In South Korea, developers must secure a loan through a joint guarantee from a construction company, with formal construction beginning only after a pre-sale rate of 50%-70% ， ensuring that sales proceeds are sufficient to repay the bank loan and alleviate the risk for the guarantor.

For homebuyers, mortgage loans are issued only after the property is officially delivered. In the U.S., banks issue mortgages after government inspections of completed homes and issuance of occupancy certificates. In Brazil, homebuyers apply for mortgages after the project is completed, using the home as collateral and paying the remaining 50% of the property cost to the developer. In Hong Kong, mortgage loans can generally be applied for three months before the delivery of the property.

3.Effective Fund Management as a Key to the Pre-sale System

Effective regulation of pre-sale funds is essential to prevent developers from using the pre-sale system as a financing channel and shifting risks onto homebuyers. Internationally, the management system for pre-sale funds can be divided into three aspects: "what to regulate, who regulates it, and how to regulate it."

4.Comprehensive Protection of Rights as a Guarantee for the Pre-sale System

The primary risks of the pre-sale system are the failure to deliver homes on time or with poor quality, and developers face the risk of homebuyers abandoning their purchases. Internationally, mechanisms are in place to address these risks and fully protect the rights of both parties, particularly those of the more vulnerable homebuyers. These mechanisms include:

· Protecting the initial right to choose through deposits and a “cooling-off period"; ·Enhancing the disclosure of property information to reduce information asymmetry; ·Establishing risk-sharing and default guarantee mechanisms; · Providing ongoing warranty after home delivery.

International Insights and Lessons for Improving the Pre-sale System for Commercial Housing

From the practices of major economies, it is clear that the pre-sale system is necessary for commercial housing, which is a high-value, long-cycle product. Compared to international practices, the pre-sale system in mainland China still needs improvement in four key areas: pre-sale conditions, loan arrangements, fund management, and rights protection. In the medium to long term, China should actively improve these key mechanisms, weaken the financing function of the pre-sale system, return it to its original purpose of mitigating development risks, and fully protect the legitimate rights of homebuyers.

1.Optimize the Real Estate Financial Support Model

The timeline for applying for development loans should be scheduled after obtaining a pre-sale certificate, and the loan amount and interest rate should be determined based on the progress of construction and pre-sale. In mainland China, banks approve development loans based on project equity, land acquisition, and “four certificates,” whereas internationally, they are usually directly linked to presale ratios. During periods of market downturns, if pre-sale performance is poor, real estate projects abroad may be terminated at the planning stage due to difficulties in obtaining financing, which helps banks and homebuyers avoid risks early. In China, banks only arrange phase-specific repayments during the post-loan management stage, with insufficient risk control before loan approval. China should continuously optimize the real estate financial support model by supporting real estate enterprises to go public, refinance, and issue corporate bonds, and ensure that development loan amounts and interest rates are appropriately tied to pre-sale conditions to avoid sales risks being transferred to the banking system.

2.Explore Delaying the Application and Issuance of Personal Mortgage Loans Until After Property Delivery

Currently, in mainland China, homebuyers can apply for mortgages after the pre-sale, but internationally, mortgages are generally issued only after construction completion and property delivery. This difference causes Chinese homebuyers to get involved too early in the dual financing relationship between developers and banks, with personal credit becoming part of the developer's financing channel, transferring project risks to buyers. The pre-sale contract and mortgage loan contract are separate legal relations, which results in homebuyers continuing to repay loans even when a project is left unfinished. China should explore issuing personal mortgage loans only after property delivery to avoid developers obtaining “development loans ^+ mortgage loans"” and relying excessively on bank financing, thus prematurely transferring risks to homebuyers.

3.Leverage Third-party Legal Services and Supervision Institutions for Project Progress Confirmation and Fund Auditing

Although many cities in mainland China introduced pre-sale fund management regulations around 2010, developers commonly engage in fraudulent practices, such as falsifying progress reports to extract regulatory funds. Banks, as regulators, face moral risks, while government agencies are limited in professional capacity and service ability. China should learn from practices in Hong Kong and other regions by further involving third-party law firms and supervisory agencies in project progress confirmation,fund auditing, and resolving legal disputes.

4.Strengthen Protection of Homebuyers’ Rights through Insurance Mechanisms and Dispute Resolution Agencies

Currently, there is no insurance mechanism in mainland China's presale contracts for deposits or payments made by consumers. After property delivery, temporary project companies are unable to bear civil liability for default compensation or disputes and cannot guarantee housing quality long-term. Additionally, the extraction and use of housing maintenance funds is difficult, and the issue of funds being absent or ineffectively accumulated is severe. An insurance mechanism should be introduced to ensure the safety of homebuyers’funds and quality, and dedicated dispute resolution agencies should be established to mitigate risks and fully protect the legal rights of homebuyers.

Niu Sanyuan emphasized that given the current downturn in the real estate market and the strained financial situation of property developers, significant adjustments to the pre-sale system should not be made in the short term.CBF

Appeal Upholds Death Sentence for Bai Tianhui, 1.1 Billion RMB in Bribes

By Jiayi

A People's Court publicly announced its second-instance ruling in the bribery case of Bai Tianhui, former general manager of China Huarong International Holdings Ltd. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the death sentence, and the case has been submitted to the Supreme People's Court for approval.

It is worth noting that Bai Tianhui was a subordinate of Lai Xiaomin, the former party secretary and chairman of China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd.

In a TV documentary aired in early 2020, \*National Supervision\*, Bai Tianhui revealed that he had helped Lai Xiaomin complete projects for his friends,with the evaluation and risk control of these projects being largely formal. On January 29,2021,with approval from the Supreme People's Court, the Tianjin Second Intermediate People's Court carried out the death sentence for Lai Xiaomin, who had accepted over 1.7 billion RMB in bribes.

IllegalBriberyExceeds1.1BillionRMB Bai Tianhui'sDeath SentenceUpheld in Second Trial

In May of last year, the Tianjin Second Intermediate People's Court publicly announced its first-instance verdict in the bribery case of Bai Tianhui, former general manager of China Huarong International Holdings Ltd. The court sentenced Bai Tianhui to death for bribery, deprived him of political rights for life, and ordered the confiscation of all his personal property.

Bai Tianhui had served as the deputy secretary of the party committee,a board director, and the general manager of China Huarong International Holdings Ltd. In January 2019, the Tianjin People's Procuratorate announced that Bai Tianhui was under investigation for

G 中國華融 CHINA HUAARONC

bribery by the Tianjin Municipal Supervision Commission, and the case was transferred to the procuratorate for prosecution. The case was then transferred to the Second Branch of the Tianjin People's Procuratorate for investigation and prosecution. The Second Branch of the Tianjin People's Procuratorate formally arrested Bai Tianhui.

In the first trial,the court found that from 2014 to 2018,Bai Tianhui, in his roles as head of the business expansion department, general manager, managing director of the investment banking department, capital operations director, assistant general manager, and vice general manager at China Huarong International Holdings Ltd.,used his official positions to help relevant organizations with project acquisitions and corporate financing, illegally accepting bribes totaling over 1.1 billion RMB.

The Tianjin Second Intermediate People's Court ruled in the first trial that Bai Tianhui's actions constituted bribery. His bribery amounted to a particularly large sum,with extremely serious criminal circumstances,a particularly severe social impact, and significant losses to the interests of the state and the people. His crimes were extremely serious, and a death sentence was warranted under the law.While Bai Tianhui provided crucial intelligence leading to the exposure of other major crimes, and his cooperation was verified to be of significant value, the court concluded that the severity of his bribery offenses, their nature, and the degree of harm to society were not sufficient to warrant a reduced sentence. The court thus upheld the death sentence.

Former Subordinate of "Financial Tiger” Lai Xiaomin Confessed on TV for Helping Complete His Friends' Projects

In early 2020, Bai Tianhui appeared in the second episode of the TV documentary National Supervision titled Comprehensive Supervision,where he revealed some of the misconduct and illegal actions he was involved in with Lai Xiaomin.

The documentary highlighted Lai Xiaomin's pursuit of personal gain at the expense of national interests. It explained that China Huarong, a state-owned non-bank financial institution controlled by the Ministry of Finance, was established to manage and dispose of non-performing assets from state-owned banks. However,

Lai's aggressive management and rapid expansion led to the creation of numerous subsidiaries, transforming Huarong into a massive financial conglomerate with licenses in banking, securities, trusts, investment, futures, and financial services. This expansion deviated from the company's main business and even violated national policies, as they became involved in projects that were forbidden for stateowned financial institutions.

In the documentary, Bai Tianhui explained,“Lai was focused on achieving short-term performance; he didn't care about the long-term risks. As long as you could show scale and short-term profits, he was satisfied. Whether the project would face risks in three to five years, he didn't care. To achieve his short-term goals, we ended up investing in high-risk projects, such as real estate and stocks."

Why theDeathSentence Was Upheld

From a domestic perspective, it is clear that the use of the death penalty has been gradually decreasing in China. In general, the death penalty is reserved for the most serious crimes, where the social harm is immense, the evidence is overwhelming, and the law mandates its imposition. Specifically, in corruption cases, according to criminal law and judicial interpretations from the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the death penalty for corrupt officials should only be applied under the “four special conditions." These conditions are: a particularly enormous amount of criminal proceeds,particularly severe criminal circumstances, a particularly harmful social impact, and causing particularly significant losses.

The documentary further stated that while pursuing political achievements, Lai Xiaomin also sought personal profit, directly intervening in Huarong's decision-making. He directed the company to provide significant funding to private enterprises with which he had personal connections. These projects were often approved based on Lai's personal decisions, with project evaluations and risk control being superficial.

Bai Tianhui recounted, “Many projects were directly assigned by Lai, often involving his friends. To fulfill the tasks given by leadership, we ignored or beautified factors that should have been considered from a market perspective.”He added that Lai often claimed that if risks occurred, Huarong could simply “dispose of the bad assets"” without using proper techniques or operations, instead throwing more money into the hole to cover up the issues, leading to a vicious cycle of risk accumulation.

On April 17, 2018, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervision Commission announced that Lai Xiaomin was under investigation for serious violations of discipline and the law. In October of the same year, Lai was expelled from the Party and removed from his public office. On January 5, 2021, the Tianjin Second Intermediate People's Court publicly sentenced Lai to death for bribery, embezzlement, and bigamy, depriving him of political rights for life and confiscating all his personal assets. On January 21, 2021, the Tianjin High People's Court upheld the verdict in the second trial.

On January 29, 2021,with approval from the Supreme People's Court, the Tianjin Second Intermediate People's Court executed Lai Xiaomin's death sentence according to legal procedures.

Although Bai Tianhui exposed major criminal activities of others and provided key information that helped solve other cases, which were verified as true and which contributed significantly to investigations, the court concluded that, considering the facts, nature, and social harm caused by his bribery crimes, his actions were not sufficient to merit a lighter sentence. Therefore, the court upheld the original death sentence.

The death penalty is not a theoretical or rarely used measure, but a real criminal justice system tool. It is only when it is genuinely applied in judicial practice, reaching the public through individual cases, that it can make its way into the minds of officials and warn those who may think they can escape the law: any behavior that challenges the bottom line of the law will be severely punished. The fundamental requirement of the rule of law is that no official or power should be above the law. Strictly applying the death penalty to corrupt officials who meet the “four special conditions" is in line with the public's basic expectations of justice and will help strengthen confidence in the fight against corruption. On the other hand, it will reduce the social injustice caused by corruption,help alleviate social conflicts, and enhance social stability and harmony.

The death penalty sends a strong message against corruption,while institutional development aims to prevent corruption, and moral education focuses on the desire to avoid it. These three aspects—"not daring to corrupt,”“not being able to corrupt,”" and “not wanting to corrupt"—are not mutually exclusive, but together form a comprehensive framework for integrity. Any missing piece will result in corruption breaking through the framework. The legal evaluation and appropriate punishment of Bai Tianhui's crimes respond to the public's demand for fairness and justice. While some opinions in the public debate argue that “not being able to corrupt" negates “not daring to corrupt,” this view is misguided. The shortcomings in institutional development should be addressed at the institutional level and closed in a timely manner. Anticorruption efforts are never instantaneous, and individual action cannot solve the problem of corruption.Systematic governance requires that “not daring to corrupt, not being able to corrupt, and not wanting to corrupt" must proceed simultaneously.

This case has sparked widespread public attention, with many netizens expressing that the verdict is a “great relief? In recent years, there has been a surge in major corruption cases, escalating from “million-level" to "billion-level," with increasing calls for judicial punishment. The final judgment in the Bai Tianhui case is not only a severe punishment for him personally but also sends a powerful deterrent message to potential corrupt individuals,reaffirming the bottom line of the rule of law:“Do not reach out; if you do, you will be caught."

The case is now in the phase of approval by the Supreme People's Court. If approved, it will become another landmark event in the history of financial anti-corruption in China.CBF

University Professors Declare All Al-Generated Essays Awarded Zero Marks

By Emily

R ecently, DeepSeek has become a sensation, and the popularity of artificial intelligence (AI) has reached a new high. In universities, students are increasingly using AI tools to assist in writing papers. Compared to flipping through heavy books or searching for information on the internet, using AI tools makes writing papers much more convenient. However, in a survey, reporters found that some university students have become overly reliant on AI tools, and improper use is on the rise.

With just a few keystrokes and entering commands in the chat box, one can quickly obtain a paper that looks decent. Nowadays,with the rise of AI tools, they have become a “magic tool” for many university students to complete reports and papers. This is an announcement from a freshman English assignment group at a certain university, stating that the teacher will give a zero score for any essays directly generated using AI tools.

Nearly 30%Used for Writing Papers or Assignments

According to a survey conducted by the third-party organization “Mycos" with over 3,000 university teachers and students, nearly 60% of them use generative AI tools daily or multiple times a week.Among university students using generative AI, nearly 30% mainly use it for writing papers or assignments. In interviews, some students admitted that when writing reports or papers, they would directly copy and paste the content generated by AI.

Beijing Technology and Business University student: “When time is tight, I sometimes just copy and paste the AI-generated content and submit it."

Zhejiang University of Media and Communications student:“When completing assignments, I gradually became very reliant on AI tools."

duct Raises Concerns

Academic Miscon

Some university teachers and experts told reporters that, in addition to using generative AI to directly generate text for papers and assignments, inappropriate or academic misconduct behaviors among a small number of students, such as using AI to fabricate research data, edit

Universities Set Rules for Al Tool Usage

AI can be an empowering tool and a helpful assistant for learning, but it should never become a shortcut for laziness, nor should it become a “ghostwriter” for university students. Recently, many universities, including Fudan University, have introduced guidelines for the use of AI tools, clearly defining what is allowed and what is prohibited.

Not long ago, Fudan University released the “Regulations on the Use of AI Tools in Undergraduate Thesis (Design)(Trial),”which clearly listed areas where the use of AI tools is prohibited. These include research design and data analysis, collection of raw data, creation of result images and important illustrations, paper writing, defense and checks, and any content involving confidentiality— six areas that are related to originality, innovation, and key aspects of undergraduate education assessment.

experimental images, or replace independent design, have also raised concerns.

Ding Junpeng, Research Assistant at the Ministry of Education's Information Network Engineering Research Center: “From what I understand,the worst cases involve using AI tools to automatically generate papers.Nowadays,there are more cases of using generative AI to fabricate images, or even images that have been edited by AI. AI technology significantly lowers the cost of falsification."

In early 2024, a team from the School of Education at Zhejiang University, led by Huang Yating, conducted a survey in three phases on the use of AI tools by university students in China. The survey involved over 3,800 undergraduate students and more than 4,200 graduate students from more than 20 universities.

The survey found that improper use of generative AI among students does exist, and the proportion is not small. Some students also admitted to being “accustomed to relying on AI to complete tasks" and have developed a dependency on it.

Huang Yating, Researcher at the School of Education, Zhejiang University: “In our survey, about 40% of engineering graduate students said they are aware that over-reliance on AI negatively affects their research, causing mental laziness and inhibiting creativity. This shows that they have already recognized the issue. There are two main reasons behind the improper use of AI. On one hand, it's because they don't have a deep understanding of academic norms and ethics. On the other hand, some knowingly engage in academic misconduct, choosing to plagiarize."

Fudan University: Clear Guidelines onWhat Al Tools Canand CannotBe Used For

The areas where AI tools are allowed include tasks such as literature retrieval, code debugging, and statistical analysis. However, it is required that students review and obtain approval from their supervising teachers to ensure the authenticity and reliability of the content generated by AI.

In cases of severe violations, the thesis will be considered unsatisfactory, affecting the student's ability to obtain their degree.

Lin Wei, Director of the Academic Affairs Office at Fudan University: "Through the creation of this document, we hope to clarify which skills must be emphasized. We aim to make clear what is not allowed,what can be helpful, and also to establish clear integrity principles with defined boundaries."

Students are required to sign a declaration confirming whether they have used AI during the writing process and whether they have crossed any boundaries or violated any principles.

Tianjin University

of Science and Technology: AlGenerated Content in Papers Should Not Exceed 40%

Last year, Tianjin University of Science and Technology issued the "Notice on Plagiarism and AIGC Detectionfor 2024 Undergraduate Graduation Design (Thesis),” requiring all undergraduate graduation theses to undergo detection for AIgenerated content. The university stipulates that the proportion of AIgenerated content in student theses should not exceed 40% . This requirement will continue in the 2025~un dergraduate graduation thesis work.

Kong Lintao, Deputy Director of the Academic Affairs Office at Tianjin University of Science and Technology: "We encourage students to use AI tools to quickly complete some basic tasks,but the actual comprehensive and creative work should still be done by the students themselves. Therefore, this proportion is meant to guide students in making full use of advanced tools, while also reminding them not to over-rely on AI. The core parts should still be completed on their own."

It is understood that many universities, including Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Communication University of China, North China Electric Power University, Hubei University,Fuzhou University, and Nanjing University of Technology, are either testing or implementing relevant regulations to regulate students’use of AI in thesis Writing.

Identifying Al-Generated Content Developing a Research'Integrity Detection System

With the rapid development of AI technology, preventing its misuse in student learning has become crucial, and recognition technology is an essential tool. Currently, many research teams in China are pushing forward the development of AI-generated content detection technologies using technical governance.

As AI generation technology advances, academic misconduct, such as plagiarism, is no longer just a matter of simple copying. Some plagiarism detection systems have become outdated. At Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Professor E Haihong's team, which specializes in multimodal big data processing and understanding technologies,has been entrusted by the Ministry of Science and Technology and other departments to develop research integrity detection services, particularly focusing on counteracting behaviors such as image falsification in scientific experiments using AI tools.

Professor E Haihong, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications: “Currently, we have partnered with Wanfang Database to create an image comparison database of over 60 million images from more than 4 million SCI journal papers. When submitted for detection, the content will be compared with the database. If your paper reuses other researchers′ work, such as altering experimental results or editing someone else's academic images through algorithms, our system can automatically detect it."

The Accuracy of Al-Generated Content May Also Have Defects

It is understood that multiple teams in China are currently working in different directions to conduct research on AI-generated content detection and anti-recognition.Experts suggest that with the iteration and updates of AI technology, anti-recognition technologies must also accelerate their updates to continuously serve as a deterrent against academic fraud.

In interviews, some students and experts also pointed out that AI tools perform intelligent analysis based on the vast amount of information they capture, but the authenticity and accuracy of this information may have defects, which can lead to incorrect conclusions.

Wang Hanyuan,a student at Tsinghua University: “Sometimes, it generates very wrong answers, ones that are obviously absurd. The quality of the generated content really varies."

Zhou Aimin,Director of the ShanghaiInstitute of Intelligent Education at East China Normal University: “In educational settings, the hallucination problem with generative AI is something we need to pay special attention to. Generative AI generates content based on probability, and there are certain technical challenges in determining the quality of the generated content. For example, when we use large models to generate academic papers, these papers haven't actually been checked against journals, so they are likely to be untruthful. AI should serve as an assistant to humans. We should work in human-AI collaboration to solve problems. In daily life, AI can be very helpful in completing tasks, but in specialized research fields, we should remain the primary decision-makers, fully utilizing our imagination, initiative, and creativity."

Creating an Academic Integrity Environment Ensuring Al Tools Are Used Correctly

Experts say that, in addition to technical measures, regulating the use of AI tools in academic fields should also involve efforts to improve the evaluation system, enhance AI literacy, and adopt a multi-faceted approach.

Huang Yating, a researcher at the School of Education, Zhejiang University:“An important issue is that we need to optimize and reform our evaluation mechanism. What will AI replace? It will replace repetitive, standardized tasks. Therefore, our assessment should place more emphasis on higher-order abilities, competency-based, and processoriented evaluations. For example, when teachers assign homework, the assignments should involve tasks that are not easily replaced by AI, tasks that require collaboration with AI to complete."

Universities Offer Mandatory Al Courses Enhancing Al Literacy for Teachers and Students

Experts believe that, rather than restricting AI use, it is more effective to improve the AI literacy of both teachers and students. The recently released “Education Power Construction Plan Outline (2024-2035)" specifically emphasizes the need to establish and improve digital literacy standards for teachers and students, as well as to strengthen the use of AI to enhance teacher workforce development. In recent years, many universities have made AI a mandatory general education course, continuously promoting the enhancement of AI literacy among teachers and students.

Zheng Chunyan, Director of the Teaching and Research Department, Undergraduate School, Zhejiang University: “"We have introduced three levels of AI courses—AI ABC—for students across the entire university, targeting students from different academic backgrounds and disciplines. Our primary goal is for students to learn how to effectively collaborate with machines, forming the best human-AI working model.

"In this process, we aim to build students’ knowledge frameworks and stimulate creativity.We hope that every Zhejiang University teacher establishes some basic rules for AI usage in their classrooms, guiding students to understand what machines can help them with, while also recognizing the limitations and shortcomings of AI."

During interviews, reporters also found that many university students received advertisements on their social media platforms, such as "Secretly Learn AI to Publish SCI Papers" and “One-stop Solution for Graduate and PhD Students’Personalized Needs.” Experts point out that, beyond universities, regulatory bodies and platform operators should be vigilant against malicious marketing and fraud activities, such as those promoting “AI-written papers,” and enforce strict governance.CBF

(Originally published on <CCTV News App> on February 27, 2025)

Property Fees Drop Over 50% in Multiple Cities: What's Next?

By Fan

HSEE owners argue that property fees are high but services are inadequate, creating a “poor value for money” situation. On the other hand, property companies face mounting pressure from rising labor costs. Finding a balance between service prices, quality, and homeowner satisfaction is not easy.

Recently, several cities, including Chongqing and Yinchuan, have introduced new property fee regulations. For example, in central Chongqing, residential buildings with elevators are now subject to four different fee standards, with the highest being 1.9 yuan per square meter per month, lower than the current fees in many local neighborhoods.

Property Fees Cut by Over 50% in Wuhan, Chongqing: What Changes Ahead

On March 1, 2025, a new regulation from the Changsha Development and Reform Commission and other departments took effect, outlining a tiered discount system for vacant properties. Starting from the month after a property is delivered, for properties that remain vacant for up to 24 months, owners will pay 70% of the standard property fee. From the 25th month of vacancy, the fee will rise to 90% until the property is occupied.

This isn't just happening in Changsha. More than ten cities across China,including Suzhou,Wuxi,and Yantai, have announced property fee discounts for vacant properties. For example, in Lanzhou New Area, owners of vacant properties for more than six months can apply for a 50% fee reduction.

The reduction in property fees for vacant properties is largely driven by government action, aiming to reduce the threshold for property ownership and stimulate market activity. However, some property companies have also voluntarily lowered their fees in response to the fuctuating real estate market.

In cities like Chongqing, Wuhan, Nanchang, and Yinchuan, many residential projects have seen property fee reductions. Since the second half of 2024, nearly 100 communities in Wuhan, including luxury and entry-level housing projects, have successfully reduced property fees.

These reductions involve various types of properties, fromhigh-endresidentialareas toolder communities.According to reports, most reductions started at 10% ，with some exceeding 50% . For example, in Wuhan and Chongqing, some communities saw property fees drop by more than 50% In Chongqing, a villa's fee dropped from 4.5 yuan to 2.09 yuan, a reduction of more than 50% . In Wuhan, a high-end property's fee fell from 7.6 yuan to 3.8 yuan, and another dropped from 2.5 yuan to 1.1 yuan, a reduction of 56% ：

This nationwide wave of property fee reductions is a result of joint efforts from homeowners, property companies, and local governments. Homeowners have been the main drivers, often banding together to request reductions, with property companies, under pressure, negotiating mutually acceptable solutions. The shift in market dynamics, with Owners gaining stronger bargaining power, has played a key role in this reduction trend.

According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, by the end of 2023, China had 8.54 million people employed in property management, with 375,000 property management companies, and assets totaling 53.02 trillion yuan, generating 1.7 trillion yuan in revenue.

Jiang Han, a senior researcher at the Pango Think Tank, stated that as the real estate market changes, property companies face significant challenges. Traditionally, property companies relied on high property prices and fees for profits, but as market demand saturates and consumers demand better value for money, this model is becoming unsustainable. Property companies must adapt by shifting from a broad management model to a more refined approach, focusing on service quality, cost control, and sustainable development.

Three Truths Behind the Price Collapse

As over 60% of residential communities across the country are caught in this price storm, the issue is more than just a numbers game. It represents a survival struggle in a trillion-yuan market reconstruction. The property price collapse—who is tearing apart the mask of property companies? high profits? What seems like a simple price adjustment actually hides deeper implications for China's social governance and market economy.

1. Administrative Forces Reshaping Industry Rules

Since 2024, cities like Wuhan, Qingdao, and Yinchuan have introduced new property fee regulations, setting government price caps that directly squeeze property companies? profit margins. For example, Wuhan's Xinjia District imposed a maximum reduction of 33% in property fees, while Qingdao requires excess fees to be refunded to owners. These policies act like a “scalpel,” cutting excessive profits and forcing companies to focus on service quality.

2. Rights Awareness Sparked Collective Action

Frustrated by “aggressive fee collection and poor services” homeowners have shifted from fighting individually to bargaining collectively. In Chongqing's Fenghua Tree community, 20% of homeowners petitioned for a fee reduction, leading to a drop from 1.8\yuan/m^{2} to 1.3\yuan/m^{2} In

Wuhan,homeowners’collective pressure reduced fees from 3 yuan to 1.6 yuan. Though the Civil Code prohibits withholding property fees, an increase in collective lawsuits over “"price-service mismatch” has forced companies to compromise.

3. Real Estate Winter Survival Strategies

In the real estate downturn, property companies face dual pressures: shrinking market size due to fewer new homes and less than 80% collection rates in existing communities. For instance, Liuzhou Weimei Property offers “zero property fees"” by compensating through community group buying and domestic services; Changzhou's Huayu Xinyuan community promised to invest in a million-yuan renovation after a price reduction, using “discounts to secure renewals." Behind the price war is the brutal transformation of the industry from “easy profits”’ to “desperate survival."

Indeed, price cuts directly reduce living costs for homeowners. For example, a 100~m^{2} home in Wuhan saves 2880 yuan annually, equivalent to two months of grocery costs for an average family. The 30% discount for vacant properties also helps investment homeowners avoid “paying without benefit.” More fundamentally, implementing the “priceservice match” principle pushes the industry from “monopoly dominance”’ to “service excellence,” with high-quality property management emerging through fine-tuned operations while poor performers are eliminated by the market.

However, it is undeniable that price cuts could lead to the “bad money driving out the good.” Some property companies, in order to maintain profits, cut cleaning frequencies and delay equipment repairs, worsening the environment. In Zhengzhou, a homeowner was sued for refusing to pay property fees, reflecting the deadlock of “high fees—poor service—more refusal to pay.” More critically, the industry's average profit margin has dropped from 12% in 2019 to 5% in 2024. If companies cannot balance costs and services, it may trigger a larger-scale exit from the market.

A "Coming-of-Age” Ceremony in the Urbanization Process

The essence of this price reduction wave is a refection of China’s shift from “scale expansion” to “governance refinement." In the past, property companies dominated through information asymmetry and contractual monopolies. Today, homeowners form a counterbalance through owners’ committees, litigation, and social media. In the case of Chongqing's Jinyue Mountain Villa, where homeowners forced a reduction in property fees from 4.5 yuan to 2.09 yuan, the act of “voting with feet” has replaced “silent endurance” as the new norm. This also signals a transition in the property industry from just “"collecting fees and guarding gates” to “community operations.”For example, Liuzhou Weimei Property’s “zero-fee model’ reconstructs its profit logic through value-added services, while Changzhou's Huayu Xinyuan community is investing a million yuan to upgrade facilities in exchange for homeowner loyalty. The future of property management may evolve into “community service integrators," linking various services such as housekeeping, elderly care, and education.

However, this price reduction wave is not a nationwide, uniform trend. While most cities in Jiangsu have participated, cities like Nanjing and Suzhou have remained unaffected. Furthermore, first-tier cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen have seen little impact. In fact, in some of these areas, property fees have even increased. For instance, in a project outside Beijing's Sixth Ring Road, the property fee has risen to 3.98 yuan per square meter per month. In Shanghai, newly launched projects have an average property fee of 7.46 yuan, with areas like Huangpu, Jing'an, and Yangpu exceeding 17.5 yuan.

Experts have raised concerns about whether service quality will keep pace with price reductions. After all, the normal operation of a community requires significant financial investment, especially for older neighborhoods with higher maintenance costs. In Shanghai, many older communities charge property fees of only 0.6-0.8 yuan. With less money, services inevitably suffer. Aging facilities remain unrepaired, trash piles up in hallways, and residents become increasingly dissatisfied. This situation has also occurred in Chongqing, where a community reduced property fees by half, only to see cleaning frequencies decrease and security patrols become ineffective, prompting homeowners to regret their decision.

This “price reduction for quality” dilemma could trap more communities in a vicious cycle. Reduced property fees lead to a decline in service quality, further decreasing homeowner satisfaction, and ultimately resulting in more residents refusing to pay property fees.

Ultimately, price reduction is not the end but the beginning of a new order. The drastic reduction in property fees is not just a simple number game; it exposes the old wounds of “power imbalance”in urbanization and gives birth to new possibilities for “co-construction and cogovernance.” As homeowners learn to defend their rights with contracts,as companies are forced to win the market through service, and as policies shift from “price capping" to“empowerment,”this silent revolution will eventually make everyone realize that true secure living is not a compromise on price, but the awakening of rights and shared responsibilities.BF

Bond Market Decline Pushes Bank Wealth Management Below 2%

R ecently,the bond market has continued to decline, leading to a drop in the returns
of low-risk fixed-income wealth man
agement products. Against this back
drop, some bank wealth management
subsidiaries have frequently lowered
the performance benchmarks of their
products, with the lower limit of some
products falling below 2% ：

According to incomplete statistics from reporters, since the beginning of this year, more than a dozen wealth management subsidiaries, including Bank of China Wealth Management, China Merchants Bank Wealth Management, Pudong Development Bank Wealth Management,Huaxia Wealth Management, and China Minsheng Bank Wealth Management, as well as some small and medium-sized banks, have adjusted the performance benchmarks of multiple products.

Industry insiders analyze that the recent fluctuations in bank wealth management product returns are mainly infuenced by the adjustment in the bond market. The adjustment of performance benchmarks by wealth management institutions to lower investor expectations is a response to market changes. Looking ahead, the lower limit of performance benchmarks for newly issued wealth management products may further decrease.

MultipleInstitutions Lower Performance Benchmarks

Since the beginning of 2025, several wealth management companies, including China Minsheng Bank Wealth Management, China Merchants Bank Wealth Management, Huaxia

Wealth Management, and Bank of China Wealth Management, have issued announcements to lower the performance benchmarks of certain products. Among them, some products have seen a reduction of over 100 basis points, and the lower limit of the performance benchmark for many products has dropped below 2% ：

On February 25, China Merchants Bank Wealth Management announced the performance benchmark for the 13th investment cycle of its “Zhaorui Retail Qingkui Series Semi-Annual Fixed Income Wealth Management Plan 5° .The announcement stated that due to changes in the returns of various assets in the current market, the performance benchmark for this cycle has been adjusted to 1.35%-2.85% ， In the previous investment cycle, the benchmark was 1.75%-3.15% .After the adjustment, the lower limit of the performance benchmark decreased by 40 basis points (bps).

On the evening of February 21, Guiyang Bank announced that, due to the current market situation, it would adjust the performance benchmarks of some products in its “Shuangyin Wealth” series starting in March 2025. After the adjustment, the lower limits of the performance benchmarks for the “Shuangyin Wealth-Zhou Zhou Bao,” “Shuangyin Wealth-Shuangzuan Monthly Open 2,” and “Shuangyin Wealth-Shuangzuan Monthly Open" products were reduced to 1.8% 。 1.9% and 1.9% , respectively, marking the first time these benchmarks fell below 2% ：

On the same day, Hangzhou Bank WealthManagement issued 68 announcements regarding performance benchmark adjustments,stating that starting March 5, the new performance benchmark range would be officially implemented. After this concentrated adjustment, the performance benchmarks for the mentioned products were generally lowered by 0.1 percentage points, with some products’ lower limits falling from 2% to the “1" range. The announcement indicated that the performance benchmark for these wealth management plans was calculated based on factors such as the manager's investment scope, strategies, and market conditions.

Additionally, reporters noticed that many wealth management products in the “presale” phase also had performance benchmarks falling below 2% .For example, China Postal Wealth Management's fixed-income product "Flexible ** Hongyun Short-Term Holding 90 Days 6,’ had performance benchmarks for all three types of shares set between 1.65% and 3.65% ，

Similarly, the six latest wealth management products issued by Everbright Wealth Management had performance benchmarks with lower limits between 1.80% and 1.90% .Among these, the "Sunshine Jin Zeng Li Steady Daily Open Customized 2° and “Sunshine Jin Zeng Li Steady Daily Open Customized 4^{,,} products, as well as the "Sunshine Jin Tian Tian Ying 13,” all had a performance benchmark lower limit of 1.8% ，

During interviews, several wealth management professionals mentioned that in the current low-interest-rate environment, the returns on fixed-income products have generally decreased. Since many wealth management products primarily invest in bonds and other fixed-income products, as market interest rates decline, the expected returns of these products also decrease, leading to a reduction in the performance benchmarks.

"Considering that wealth management returns are likely to continue facing downward pressure in 2025, and the net asset value fuctuations of products may increase, wealth management companies are lowering performance benchmarks in a timely manner to avoid a significant deviation between the actual returns and the benchmarks, thus adjusting investors’ return expectations,” said Wang Yifeng, Chief Analyst of Financial Industry at Everbright Securities.

Affected by the decline in bond yields and the adjustment of peer deposit rates, it is expected that performance benchmarks for wealth management products will further decline in 2025. According to Kong Xiang, a financial industry analyst at Guoxin Securities, the average performance benchmark lower limit for newly issued products is likely to drop by 40-50 basis points, falling below 2% ：

FluctuationsinUnderlyingAssetYields

For some time, the bond market has seen a sustained decline in yields, causing wealth management products to lose the strong support of high coupon income. According to industry experts, the recent adjustment of performance benchmarks for bank wealth management products is a timely response to the low-interest-rate environment.

Dong Dan Nong, a researcher at Puyi Standard,pointed out that the yield on 10-year government bonds has continued to decline recently, leading to a significant decrease in the overall yield of bond assets. Since bonds are one of the main asset classes for wealth management products, the drop in bond yields has made it difficult for these products to maintain their previous high return levels. Therefore, wealth management companies have had to adjust performance benchmarks to adapt to the current market changes.

Recently, fuctuations in the underlying assets have already impacted the performance of fixed-income wealth management products. Data from Puyi Standard shows that,atthe end of December 2024, the average 1-year yield of open-ended fixed-income wealth management products was 2.98% .By the end of January 2025, this yield had decreased to 2.86% ,refecting the ongoing decline in wealth management returns in the short term.

“In 2024, the 0verall performance of wealth management products showed a downward trend.The decline in bond market yields led to a general decline in wealth management product returns. By December 2024, the average return of wealth management products had dropped to 2.65% ， a decrease of 29 basis points compared to the beginning of the year and a 15 basis-point drop compared to midyear,”the fixed-income team at Minsheng Securities pointed out in a research report.

This trend continued into 2025. According to Puyi Standard's latest monitoring data,from February 17 to February 23,the average performance benchmark for open-ended wealth management products issued by wealth management subsidiaries was 2.25% 6 a decrease of 0.08 percentage points compared to the previous period. The annualized yields of cash management wealth products across the market also declined over the past 7 days and the past month, standing at 1.54% and 1.63% ,respectively.

Looking ahead, industry experts believe that, influenced by bond market fuctuations, the yield advantage of wealth management products over other financial products may further narrow. The low-interest-rate environment is expected to persist for a long time, meaning that performance benchmarks for wealth management products may continue to stay at low levels.

"Wealth management returns in 2025 will continue to decline,” said Yang Yewei, Chief Fixed-Income Analyst at Guosheng Securities. With the continued decline in bond yields and the gradual implementation of selfdiscipline mechanisms for peer deposits, the returns on wealth management products may experience a trend of downward adjustment. Moreover, high-yield assets previously invested in will soon mature, which will further increase the downward pressure on wealth management yields.

For investors, Lou Feipeng, a researcher at China Postal Savings Bank, suggests that on one hand, investors should rationally recognize that the market is transitioning from higher yields to more reasonable yields. On the other hand, investors need to acknowledge the changes in yields and choose long-term or short-term investments based on their actual situation. Long-term investments focus more on pursuing stable returns over time, while short-term investments better meet temporary liquidity needs.

\*\*Actively Responding to Market Changes\*\*

The overall performance benchmark of wealth management products reflects the expected returns for clients. So, what is the future trend of the performance benchmarks for wealth management products?

According to an analysis by Huayuan Securities, since the beginning of 2022,the average performance benchmark of new RMB fixed-income wealth management products issued by wealth management companies has fluctuated downward. This trend is linked to the significant decline in bond yields and multiple cuts in deposit rates. In December 2024, the upper limit of the performance benchmark for newly issued RMB fixed-income wealthmanagement products was 3.05% ,and the lower limit was 2.45% with the range between the upper and lower limits widening. Due to the significant decline in bond yields for various types of domestic bonds since November 2024, it is expected that the performance benchmark for wealth management products will continue to fall sharply. The lower limit of the average performance benchmark for newly issued wealth management products in 2025 may drop below 2%

The reduction in performance benchmarks for wealth management products has certain impacts on both wealth management companies and investors.

For wealth management companies, Zheng Lei believes, “A reduction in the performance benchmark may lead to lower returns for wealth management companies, but it also means they need to focus more on risk control and asset allocation, improving the stability and profitability of their investment portfolios."

For investors, Zheng Lei suggests, "The reduction in the performance benchmark may affect their expected investment returns. However, this also means investors need to pay more attention to risk control, rationally deal with market fluctuations, and avoid blindly pursuing high returns while ignoring risks."

Zheng Lei advises investors to actively respond to market changes:

1. ^{**} Rationally handle marketfuctuations.\*\* Investors need to recognize that market fluctuations are normal and avoid blindly pursuing high returns while ignoring risks.

2. ** Proper asset allocation.\*\* Investors should allocate different types of wealth management products, such as fixed-income products and equity products, according to their risk tolerance and investment goals.

3. ^{**} Stay informed about the market.\*\* Investors should follow market news and trends to make more informed investment decisions.

4. ^{**} Diversify investments.\*\* Investors should consider diversifying their investments across different wealth management products to reduce the risk of relying on a single product.

5. ^{**} Regularly evaluate the investment portfolio.\*\* Investors should periodically assess their investment portfolios, understand their performance and risk levels, and adjust based On market changes.

In response to market fuctuations, Gao Chengfei believes that investors should remain calm and rational. "Firstly, investors should strengthen their financial knowledge by continuously learning and researching different types of investment products and market dynamics. Secondly, investors can consider diversified investments, spreading their funds across stocks, bonds, funds, and other areas to reduce overall risk. At the same time, investors need to keep a close eye on market trends and policy changes to adjust their investment strategies promptly. Finally, investors should appropriately rely on the advice of financial advisors to ensure the scientific nature of their investment decisions."

Given that the performance benchmarks for wealth management products may show different trends in the short term and medium-to-long term, Li Zhenyu suggests that in the short term, investors should maintain a cautious attitude toward high-risk assets like stocks and financial derivatives. While the yields on fixed-income assets are currently low, their performance is relatively more stable. Additionally, medium-to-long-term wealth management products can leverage their longer investment horizons to gain more opportunities in long-term debt assets. Inthe currentenvironmentwithfewer investment opportunities, medium-tolong-term wealth management can offer relatively higher returns, so it is recommended to focus more on mediumto-long-term wealth management.BF

How is Zhejiang Shaoxing? By Emily

H

China has many historic and cultural cities. But if we exclude the grandeur of imperial capitals, those that still maintain a high cultural standard are few and far between.

Among these, if we further require that this non-imperial, high-standard culture is densely concentrated, then only two or three cities remain.

If we narrow it down further, requiring that this cultural concentration extendsinto modern times,to theXinhai Revolution and the May Fourth New Culture Movement, then only one city remains.

That city is Shaoxing — the city of Wang Xizhi, Lu You, Xu Wei, Qiu Jin, and Lu Xun.

Every time I visit Shaoxing, I am always amazed at how such a small city can carry such a profound historical spirit, remaining vibrant after thousands of years. How can these southern alleys exude such a powerful Chinese pride, attracting attention from all over the world?

Shaoxing remains silent, humbly preserving its quiet and ancient courtyards, allowing visitors to interpret them on their own. Shaoxing only offers deep footprints, not difficult answers. Shaoxing doesn't understand that these footprints left from here require the wisdom of the entire nation to trace.

The Xu Wei Chapter

The GreenVine Studio(青藤書屋)，arguably the smallest celebrity former residence in Shaoxing, is nestled in a humble alley. With a pond, a house, a courtyard, half a hillock, and a grove of bamboo—nothing more—it has been designated as a national key cultural relic protection unit. For over four centuries, literati have meticulously preserved it,remaining largely untouched except during the Cultural Revolution23.Yet Xu Wei (徐渭),the studio's owner, lived a life of profound desolation. In his Self-Written Epitaph, he lamented owning only “"thousands of books, two resonant stones, a few inkstones, swords, paintings, and self-composed poems".

Xu Wei began his literary pursuits in youth, later delving into philosophy, Wang Yangming's School of Mind, Zen Buddhism, and the Eight-Legged Essay (\股文). Despite his brilliance, he failed the imperial exams eight times. His fortunes shifted when Hu Zongxian (胡宗憲),a high-ranking official, recruited him as a Shaoxing legal advisor. Though a scholar, Xu displayed an innate grasp of military strategy earning lavish rewards—gold, mansions, and acclaim26. Yet at the peak of his success, he attempted suicide:

Drove a 10-cm nail into his left ear \rightarrow survived.

Stabbedhis ear canalwith aniron awl \rightarrow survived.

Crushed his testicles with a hammer \rightarrow survived.

Plunged into madness, he killed his wife in paranoid delusion, was sentenced to death, then pardoned after seven years in prison26. Post-release, he wandered——from Nanjing to Liaodong—teaching military tactics to Li Rusong and Li Rubai, sons of General Li Chengliang. These strategies later defeated Japanese forces in the Imjin War (1592-1598).

Xu Wei's Genius & Madness

The History of Ming hailed him as a “peerless literary genius."” Yuan Hongdao (袁宏道) treasured his manuscripts; Bada Shanren （八大山人）revered him; Zheng Banqiao (鄭 板橋)wished to“behis dog”;Qi Baishi (齊白石) longed to “grind ink for him"2. Yet Xu's refusal to conform doomed him. He rejected societal norms, even as his childhood friend Zhang Yuanbian (張元忄) urged compromise. When Zhang died, Xu mourned openly—-unrecognized, weeping at the

coffin, then vanishing.

Xu's painting Pomegranate (榴實圖), displayed in Nanjing's museum, depicts a lone, rootless fruit. His inscription reads:

"In deep mountains, ripe pomegranates split open toward the sun; / Unseen, their jewel-like seeds scatter."

This mirrors his defiance: creating not for acclaim, but for the cosmos itself.

His studio, renamed after the green vines he cherished, spans 478~m^{2} Its layout centers on the study, fanked by gardens, a celestial pool (天池), and bamboo groves. Ming-era relics like the“自在巖”rock inscription and Chen Hongshou's (陳洪綬) calligraphy endure57.

Xu Wei's life echoes Soseki's Kokoro: “I endure today's solitude to escape greater solitude tomorrow." He chose authenticity over fame—a mad genius whose shadow still looms.

The Lu You Chapter

The Yunmen Temple in the suburbs of Shaoxing was once the former residence of Wang Xianzhi. In the Song Dynasty, it was renovated by Lu You into a thatched cottage for his residence. Lu You must have deeply empathized with Wang Xianzhi, as he, too, was torn apart from his beloved wife, Tang Wan. The lines “wrong, wrong, wrong; don't, don't, don't’ from \*Chaitoufeng\* are heart-wrenching, but when Lu You was seventy-four, he wrote \*Shenyuan\*, which stirs a deep sense of melancholy:

He wrote:

"The setting sun on the city wall casts a sad cry of the trumpet,

The Shen Garden is no longer the old pool and terrace.

The sorrowful bridge under the spring's green waves,

Once, a startled swan's shadow would come."

Though Lu You lived to eighty-five, his heart had died when he was just over twenty. What remained was only his longing.

Having lost his love, he buried his sorrow deep within and turned his focus to his country. He traveled far and wide, constantly thinking of how to serve his nation.He vigorously advocated for a northern expedition against the Jin Dynasty, becoming a strategist and advisor to Fan Chengda. However, when his behavior became somewhat indulgent, people around him criticized him for being undisciplined, unruly, and unfamiliar with the formalities of the court. Lu You, however, proudly called himself “Fangweng" (the Wanderer), with a “"this is who I am, what can you do about it?"" attitude.

In his later years, Lu You, unsuccessful in his ambitions, retreated to his hometown in Shaoxing. His heart remained in the Tianshan Mountains, while his body grew old in Cangzhou. Helpless, he could only write “When offering sacrifices at home, do not forget to inform my ancestors,”to console himself.

Having not received the nourishment of love, unable to witness the revival of his country, what remained was only his shattered dream of serving his nation, yet his unchanging devotion. Is he human? A monster? A ghost? He is Lu You.

The Lu Xu Chapter

If Lu You could still settle in the Southern Song Dynasty, then Lu Xun, having witnessed the annual loss of national territory, had long grown accustomed to the retreat of his country step by step. When his homeland was on the verge of defeat, he had no words left to say. He could only refect, only preserve, and only continue to preserve, continue to reflect.

Only those who deeply love China can discard the weeds and keep the essence.

I once stood solemnly in front of Lu Xun’s tomb at Lu Xun Park in Shanghai. The weather was hot, the pine and cypress trees unmoving, and I stood still as well. I thought, where did Lu Xun find the willpower to persist? Where did he find the confidence to say “I forgive none"? How did he manage to say, “The endless distance, the countless people, all are related to me'"? How could he also say, “"The joys and sorrows of humanity are not connected, I only find them noisy"? Why, like Mencius, did he feel compelled to argue? Why did he raise a dagger and throw a spear, coldly hunting down all the foolish common people and the self-proclaimed wise nobles? He was just a frail scholar, so why was his backbone so firm?

Lu Xun, like Zhuangzi, had a heart full of warmth and eyes full of coldness.

In \*Wild Grass\*, there is an essay, inspired by Zhuangzi's story of {}^{*}Q\dot{1} Wu Lun\*, called \*The Farewell of the Shadow\*: "I travel alone. Not only are you not with me, but there is no other shadow in the darkness. Only I am submerged in darkness, and the whole world belongs to myself." He persisted in wandering into the darkness with no ground beneath his feet. The road he chose, he would ultimately walk to the end. This was a lonely road, Lu Xun! I anxiously said to him.

But Lu Xun had already answered this in his documentary \*Homecoming\* when he returned to Shaoxing: \*"There is no road in the world at first, but when many people walk on it, it becomes a road." So that's how it is! He had already decided to take the first step and made every effort to widen this road to the point where it could no longer be ignored, making it impossible for future generations to overlook such a path.

As a result, the vile people began to distort Lu Xun, seizing upon his few words, exploiting the mutability of language, and twisting his writings into the voice of the vile.

But light can never be extinguished by darkness. Because it is light, it becomes even more distinct in the darkness.

Wangxizhi and Wangxianzhi Chapter

The Lanting and Wang Xizhi's residence are both in ShaOxing, and Wang Xianzhi was even born there. The ink pool in front of his former residence still exists, and I stood there, staring at the ink pool in the dark night, unable to say a word. It was like facing a dream I had longed for, yet not daring to touch it, fearing it would turn out to be false.

However, Wang Xizhi actually did not care about the opinions of later generations. He was very handsome, and people at the time praised his appearance, saying: “"Floating like a drifting cloud, graceful like a startled dragon." These eight words were later also used to describe his calligraphy. The stories about him carving deeply into wood, exchanging his writings for white geese, marrying a princess, and hosting the Orchid Pavilion gathering are widely known and need not be repeated here. But I want to talk about one of his letters.

Currently, there are no original works of Wang Xizhi's calligraphy in the world, only copies, and there are about twenty pieces in total. Among them,the \*Feng Ju Tie\*(Letter of Sending Oranges), housed in the Taipei National Palace Museum, is particularly intriguing despite its few characters. It was simply a letter in which Wang Xizhi asked his servant to pick a basket of ripe, orange-colored oranges from his family's orchard. After counting them roughly, there were about 300. This was mid-October, before the first frost, so the oranges weren't especially sweet, but still quite good, so he didn't pick too many. Wang Xizhi simply couldn't wait to let his friend taste them.

After arranging for the oranges to be sent, Wang Xizhi took a piece of silk paper and, using a fine brush, wrote: "Sending 300 oranges, before the frost has arrived, they are not easy to come by?" There was no signature, no mention of the recipient's name. I send them, you receive them, and both of us know. Simple and unpretentious, yet it transcended 1,700 years.

Wang Xianzhi was Wang Xizhi's seventh son, a man of few words, which made him highly appreciated by Xie An. He was calm and composed. Once, there was a fire, and his fifth brother Wang Huizhi (who famously visited Dai in a snowstorm, always accompanied by bamboo) rushed to escape without even putting on his shoes. But Wang Xianzhi remained calm, leaving slowly. Another time, when he was sleeping in his study, a thief came. He watched the thief steal everything from his home but only said, "That rug is an heirloom passed down by my ancestors, leave it." The thief was so scared that he fed.

Such a man, when on his deathbed, with his family helpless, prayed to the gods for forgiveness for his wrongdoings, said, “I do not recall any major regrets, except for parting with the Qi family.” A life of integrity and openness, yet without a happy ending.

What he could not forget even at the moment of his death was a tragic love story. He deeply loved his first wife, Qi Daomao, but the emperor also favored him and forcibly separated the couple, marrying him to a princess. Faced with the pressure from the imperial family and the survival of both the Qi and Wang clans, he had no choice but to endure silently, weeping in secret. He died at the age of 43.

In the \*Chunhua Ge Tie\* compiled by Song scholars, there are several pieces of Wang Xianzhi's calligraphy. In the past, I simply viewed them as works of art, but after carefully reading the text, I felt a deep sense of sorrow. One of the pieces, the \*Feng Dui Tie\* (Letter of Sending Oranges), reads: “I originally wanted to grow old with my sister (Qi Daomao, according to the family tree, was his cousin), but how could I have known that things would develop so differently! My heart is full of mixed emotions, but I cannot express them. How can I ever see you again? Tossing and turning, crying in sorrow, unable to stop, I can only wait for death."” (\*I once wished to grow old with my sister, never expecting our separation to end up this way. My heart is full of sorrow, and I can no longer find a way to see her again. I turn and weep, unable to stop. Only death can end it.\*)

Another piece, \*The Letter of Longing\*, reads: “Longing knows no bounds. When I see you, I am overcome with sadness, unable to speak. I don't know when I will see you again! What can express my heart? (\*Longing knows no bounds. Seeing you, I am overwhelmed with sorrow! I do not know when I will see you again! How can I express this heart?\*)

These words, each one dripping with blood, speak of love that cannot be together, of possessing and yet losing, of yearning unfulflled, of the pain of separation and resentment, of torment and suffering, of time passing like years.

How can one avoid it? How can one escape it?

As I wandered through Shaoxing, there was a sense of unrest in my chest, as though the righteous men, scholars, and literary giants of the past were alive once more, only to quietly depart, leaving behind an ethereal, magnificent spirit that fills the heavens and earth.

Life is like a journey against the current; we walk through it whether in madness or in dreams, whether in plainness or in longing, whether in obsession or in the dark of night. Like the fire passing from one spark to the next, what we seek is not what has already passed, but that which will never fade away. This is all, and it is enough.CBF

Shanghainese and Local Shanghai dialect

DEE day life. Hu Shi once said in the preface to \*The Chronicles of Shanghai Flowers^{*} (1930): ^"The value of dialect literature lies precisely in the fact that dialects best express the essence of a person. While colloquial language is certainly far superior to classical Chinese, it is still not as effective as dialect in conveying the speaker's emotions and tone. The characters in classical Chinese are like dead people, the characters in colloquial Mandarin are artificial and unnatural, while the characters in dialects are naturally expressive."

Liu Bannong said: "What we cannot escape from, and what we are able to elevate to the highest and truest level, is the language spoken by our mothersthe language that moves us most deeply and feels especially intimate and meaningful." Dialects carry “a regional favor" and “always retain a mysterious effect."

Shanghainese is the epitome of this city's inclusiveness and diverse culture. It is also the most vivid and lively aspect of the urban atmosphere. Listening to a sentence of Shanghainese truly immerses you in the city's history, its present, and the genuine human connections of the people of Shanghai.

When a Shanghainese person speaks to you, they might start in Mandarin, suddenly switch to Shanghainese halfway, and then throw in a few English words. A native Shanghai girl might speak with a strong Ningbo accent as soon as she opens her mouth. Shanghainese and Suzhou people often have delightful conversations, even agreeing to enjoy “Suzhou Pingtan” together. However, when encountering someone from the local Fengxian area, you might not understand a single word. Shanghai's place names and idioms can leave you puzzled —— for instance, Shanghai doesn't have “Hui Mountain,” but there is a “Hui Mountain

Wharf";Shanghai doesn't have “Anhe Temple,” but there is an “Anhe Temple Road,”now known as the famous Xinhua Road; the “tiger” in “tiger windows"” doesn't refer to an actual tiger, and the term “13 dian" (13 points) that Shanghai people often use to insult others doesn't have anything to do with the number “13"”

To understand these mysteries of Shanghainese, one must first look at the mixed structure of the Shanghainese dialect system.

The Abandoned Shanghainese

As is widely known, Shanghai people have long referred to themselves as “可 拉”(Ala).However, when you visit the suburban areas of Shanghai, you will find that the locals never say “阿拉””but instead use“偶哩”(Oli).When“阿拉” meets“偶哩”an interesting situation Occurs.“阿拉”immediately takes on a superior attitude, glancing down at “偶 哩”with a sneer,calling them“鄉(xiāng)巴佬” (country bumpkin).

What is even more surprising is that “阿拉”is not originally Shanghainese. It evolved from the “Ningbo Ah Niang" dialect, which was once exclusive to the people of Ningbo. In fact, Shanghainese is a dialect that was shaped by immigrants.

As an immigrant city, Shanghai's history as an international metropolis is relatively short. Before it became a port in 1843, Shanghai was just a small, obscure county. “Sixty-six Chinese miles east to west, less than eighty-four miles north to south.” At that time, Shanghai was part of the Jiangnan cultural circle centered around Suzhou and Hangzhou, and did not have its own distinct culture.

The native Shanghainese dialect belongs to the Wu dialect's Taihu branch, specifically the Su-Hu-Jia subgroup. Compared to other branches of Wu, its development was slow and retained more traces of ancient Wu-Yue language. After Shanghai opened as a port, people from various places came to Shanghai to make a living. They crowded under the same roof, and the so-called “Seventy-Two Households” gradually assimilated. The dialects of people from Suzhou, northern Jiangsu, Ningbo, and Hangzhou were incorporated into the Shanghainese system, hybridizing into the new Shanghainese dialect.

For example, the Shanghainese word “嗲” (Dia) evolved from Suzhou's “哆妹 妹” (Dia Meimei). “贊” (Zan) in Shanghainese has its roots in the Yangzhou dialect:“ 《Water Margin》is a bunch of 贊貨(Zan goods)”“哪能”(Na neng) in Shanghainese is a variation of the provocative phrase“哪亨”(Na heng) from Suzhou..

In the bustling, cosmopolitan Shanghai, everyone takes pride in speaking the new Shanghainese dialect, using it as a symbol of identity. The original local Shanghainese is gradually being abandoned and forgotten, relegated to the less developed suburban areas, and has become synonymous with“country folk"

Arrogance and Prejudice

"Language relationships are always relationships of symbolic power. Through this relationship, the power dynamics between the speaker and the various groups they belong to are reflected in a disguised manner.” — Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu

In 1843, Shanghai opened its port, and a massive influx of immigrants poured in from 19 provinces across China, including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Anhui, Fujian, and Shanxi. Among them, the largest group was from northern Jiangsu, making up 45% of the total population. With such a diverse mix of immigrant dialects, why did Shanghainese end up being most infuenced by

Ningbo and Suzhou? Was it merely due to geographical proximity or the shared roots of the Wu language family? Not exactly.

The construction of the new Shanghainese dialect system was closely linked to the social status of the immigrant groups at the time. Among the early immigrants in Shanghai, people from Guangdong were mainly engaged in commerce and industry; Ningbo people controlled banks, money houses, medicine, and hardware businesses, and were the earliest to delve into heavy industries such as mechanical shipbuilding; Suzhou people were mostly concentrated in government and cultural or entertainment sectors.

In comparison to these middle and upper-class immigrants, those from northern Jiangsu, who came to Shanghai fleeing floods, famines, and wars, had a much harsher experience. They lived in poor, unsanitary shantytowns and worked as manual laborers. So, although the largest portion of Shanghai's population came from northern Jiangsu, their low social status meant that their accent and dialect were looked down upon by the gentry and elites.

The northern Jiangsu accent, naturally, could not blend into the Shanghainese dialect system. The arrogant gentry and elites, on the other hand, favored and admired the modern, foreign-sounding accents. They even began to incorporate English pronunciations directly into their vocabulary, which contributed to the development of the influential “Yangjingbang" (Shanghai Pidgin).

Why "Tiger Windows"?

When you walk into an old Shikumen residential area in Shanghai, you will often notice small windows protruding from the rooftops. These are the famous "tiger windows"” in Shanghai.

You might wonder, how does this have anything to do with tigers?

In Shikumen houses, there is generally an upper floor beneath the roof, often used for storage. Some resourceful Shanghainese people converted these low, third-story spaces into living quarters or rented them out. To allow for ventilation and light, they would cut windows into the slanted roof, referred to as“Roof Windows,” which in Shanghainese is pronounced similarly to “tiger windows" (老虎窗, l?o hu chuang).

The confusing names mentioned earlier are also the result of homophonic transformations.In 1845,the British McIver & Co. built a floating dock on the Huangpu River. Since it was located by the roadside, it was called “wayside wharf,” which, in Shanghai dialect, sounds like“HuishanWharf”（匯山碼 頭) and is still called that today.

In 1925, the concession authorities, in memory of the British ship“Lord Amherst”（阿美士德勛爵號)，which first discovered the value of Shanghai in 1832,named a new street “Road Amherst." The Shanghai dialect's homophone for this became “Anhesi Road" (安和寺路).People mistakenlybelieved there was a temple called Anhesi on Xinhua Road, but they had fallen into the pit of Shanghai dialect's confusing homophones.

The mixing of Chinese and foreign elements in Shanghainese is a product of the Shanghai concession culture, closely related to the “"Yangjingbang English”(洋涇浜英語)that was popular in Shanghai at the time. Yangjingbang was originally a river running east-west in Shanghai during the Ming Dynasty, formed by the excavation of the Huangpu River, which was later divided into two segments. The eastern section was renamed Ding Shui Bang, and the western section retained the name Yangjingbang In 1914-1915, the Yangjingbang was filled and converted into a road, which is now Yan'an East Road.

This road later became the northern boundary of the foreign concessions in Shanghai and became synonymous with Shanghai's foreign concessions and modernized districts. Under the dominance of British infuence in the concession, a hybrid language emerged, blending English vocabulary with Shanghainese, which was known as “Yangjingbang English":

“Come is 康姆, go is 谷; read four pieces of foreign coins, eat the fortune of society, call, but not call, take.."?

After the opening of the foreign concessions, with commerce as the leader, all industries fourished. As a result, a group of merchants, shopkeepers, and service workers who had the most frequent interactions with foreigners but had not received formal English education, started using “Yangjingbang English." It became so widespread that even small shop owners and rickshaw pullers would speak it.

Over time, “Yangjingbang English" naturally integrated into everyday life. Terms like “tiger windows”(老 虎窗)，“13 points”(society),and “red guy” (cheat) all became part of the "Yangjingbang Pidgin." Faced with the influx of foreign influences, the easiest way to name new things was to use their phonetic sound, refecting the fexibility and adaptability of the old Shanghainese people.

Today, the former Ding Shui Bang has become part of residential communities like Victoria, and only a 200-meter stretch, now turned into a scenic river, still bears the faint traces of its past. Looking from Yan'an East Road to this section of the scenic river, you can imagine the Jiangnan pastoral landscape from hundreds of years ago, with boat sails and fishing lights on the river.

Several Types of Shanghainese

Nowadays, when you walk through the bustling city center, the “Shanghainese”' you hear is actually the version spoken in downtown Shanghai. In a broader sense, “Shanghainese” refers not only to the city dialect but also includes the dialects from surrounding suburban areas such as Chongming, Jiading, Songjiang. Pudong, Jinshan, Lianfang, and even Wujiang in the current Suzhou area. At least seven different dialects exist.

Chongming dialect sounds a lot like English, with phrases such as “OK" (open) and “everybody”’ (don't come, let's go). Jiading dialect has a more refined tone, with words like“德朗”(here) and “安好?” (Is it done?). Pudong dialect is characterized by frequent use of redupli cation, making it sound soft and sweet. For example,“啞亞啞能”(secretly)and“迭 板板”(here)，“伊板板”(there).Jinshan dialect is most famous for the phrase “能噶嗨外呀”(You'rereally awesome), where “海外”means“many”or“amazing"

There are also significant differences in the pronunciation of Shanghainese across generations. With the passage of time, many colloquial expressions and "old sayings"” in Shanghainese have inevitably faded away and become extinct. Today, even among “old Shanghainese"" over the age of 60, it's rare to find someone who speaks authentic, old-fashioned Shanghainese fuently.

Shanghainese is the epitome of the city's inclusivity and diversity. It represents the vibrant, lively atmosphere of Shanghai, a metropolis that has absorbed influences from all over the world. Listening to the phrases in Shanghainese is the best way to truly immerse yourself in the city's history and the most genuine social interactions of Shanghai people.

The decline of Shanghainese has often been attributed to the influx of a large number of people from outside

Shanghai after the reform and opening up, which led to more widespread use of Mandarin in public spaces. However, there are counterexamples to this idea. Language and real-world facts show that the increase in the proportion of nonlocal populations and the greater use of Mandarin did not necessarily lead to a weakening of local dialects. The frequency of use does not have a significant impact on the inheritance of Shanghainese.

As long as someone speaks Shanghainese before the age of 11, their Shanghainese won't weaken as long as they have places to communicate in it. For example, in universities, although Mandarin is the common language, in alleys or at home, people still speak Shanghainese well. "People born in the \Omega°70{s^{\prime{s}}} in Shanghai speak both Mandarin and Shanghainese fuently, and they can switch between them quickly because, before the age of 11, Shanghainese was commonly spoken during recess at school. Even some Shanghai people who went to places like San Francisco or Taiwan in the 1940s and returned 60 years later could still speak Shanghainese fluently.

History proves that during the 1920s and 1930s, when the most foreigners and people from other regions were arriving in Shanghai, Shanghainese was actually at its peak, thriving and fourishing. Just like in human society, languages can undergo hybridization, leading to advantages and diffusion effects. Moreover, there are still millions of people speaking Shanghainese today, meaning it has a strong foundation. The key to preserving Shanghainese is to make sure middle and elementary school students speak it during recess. Since the early 1990s, in Wuspeaking regions, children were required to speak Mandarin during recess, and over time, they began losing their native dialects starting from kindergarten. This is the main reason for the weakening of

Shanghainese after the 1990s.

Factsfrom around theworldshow that simply relying on two generations of elders in the family speaking the dialect to children is insufficient. If peers and children don't speak the dialect among themselves, the vast majority of children won't be able to learn the dialect. Language is a communication tool; it will naturally expand and pass down vOcabulary when used daily. Mistakes will be corrected automatically, and it is in this free communication environment, especially during breaks in school, that children learn Shanghainese. Many children who learn Shanghainese fuently at home before entering kindergarten lose it within a few weeks of starting school, as Mandarin takes over. The optimal time to learn a language is during childhood, and after the age of 11, children generally lose interest in learning it, making speaking Shanghainese a rare activity for only a few.CBF

What western media won't tell you about doing business in China

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