2024 年第6 期（總第18期）95

此外，研究者認(rèn)為，除需求、供應(yīng)和約束因素各自影響著國(guó)際組織達(dá)成合作協(xié)議的可能性以及合作的制度化之外，這些因素也可能在影響合作協(xié)議的設(shè)計(jì)方面相互影響，從而擴(kuò)大或阻礙需求、供應(yīng)或約束因素對(duì)結(jié)果變量的影響。因此，本文通過(guò)歸納方式對(duì)其進(jìn)行討論，使用隨機(jī)效應(yīng)區(qū)間數(shù)據(jù)回歸模型以考察合作協(xié)議設(shè)計(jì)的差異，并為需求、供給和約束因素的每種組合插入雙向交互項(xiàng)以探究其交互相應(yīng)（如圖3 所示）。

96

圖 3 需求、供給和約束因素之間的交互效應(yīng)

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）97

五、結(jié)語(yǔ)

通過(guò)提供關(guān)于組織間合作的新數(shù)據(jù)集并引入需求-供應(yīng)-約束模型，本文認(rèn)為，兩個(gè)重疊的國(guó)際組織(IOs)在高需求、高供給和低約束條件下更有可能建立合作關(guān)系。具體而言，當(dāng)兩個(gè)重疊的 IOs 擁有大量重疊的成員國(guó)和政策權(quán)限，且成員國(guó)對(duì)國(guó)際合作和權(quán)力委托持積極態(tài)度，同時(shí)由于意識(shí)形態(tài)和權(quán)力差異較小，合作受到的限制較少時(shí)，它們更不愿意接受制度復(fù)雜性帶來(lái)的負(fù)面影響。即當(dāng)兩個(gè)國(guó)際組織共享更多的成員國(guó)和政策職能（需求層次），更傾向于接受合作提案（供給層次），以及意識(shí)形態(tài)和權(quán)力差異較小（約束層次）時(shí)，它們更有可能簽訂合作協(xié)議。

此外，需求—供給—約束模型也解釋了合作協(xié)議設(shè)計(jì)制度化的差異性。當(dāng)需求和供給增加且約束因素減少時(shí)，國(guó)際組織傾向于選擇更具制度化的合作設(shè)計(jì)。但各個(gè)因素對(duì)合作協(xié)議制度化的影響不同。需求層次上，共享更多成員國(guó)和政策權(quán)限的國(guó)際組織之間達(dá)成合作協(xié)議往往更為制度化；供給層次上，意識(shí)形態(tài)相似的國(guó)際組織之間也更傾向于選擇制度化程度較高的合作設(shè)計(jì)。當(dāng)國(guó)際組織之間存在較多成員重疊與政策權(quán)限重疊，且成員國(guó)在意識(shí)形態(tài)方面相似性較高，對(duì)待權(quán)力授權(quán)態(tài)度較為寬泛，其達(dá)成的合作協(xié)議最有可能是高度制度化的。然而對(duì)國(guó)際合作的態(tài)度傾向和國(guó)際組織間的權(quán)力差異并未對(duì)合作協(xié)議的制度化水平產(chǎn)生預(yù)期的影響，需要與其他因素配合產(chǎn)生作用。最后，為了彌補(bǔ)該模型的不足，本研究還采用歸納方法探討了三者之間的交互效應(yīng)。結(jié)果表明，高需求和高供給的積極效應(yīng)相互強(qiáng)化，而約束因素削弱了需求的積極效應(yīng)。此外，供給和約束也存在特定的交互效應(yīng)：國(guó)際組織之間意識(shí)形態(tài)或權(quán)力差異越大，授權(quán)對(duì)協(xié)議制度化的積極效應(yīng)越小。 ? 譯者評(píng)述以制度復(fù)雜性的存在與解決方式為出發(fā)點(diǎn)，本文作者采用量化的方式，從需求層次（包括共享成員與重疊政策權(quán)限）、供給層次（包括國(guó)家對(duì)于國(guó)際合作和內(nèi)部授權(quán)的習(xí)慣與態(tài)度）和制約層次（包括國(guó)際組織間的意識(shí)形態(tài)差異和權(quán)力水平差異）三方面對(duì)國(guó)際組織之間存在的合作差異與合作制度化差異進(jìn)行探究。研究表明，具有重疊性的國(guó)際

98

組織在高需求、高供給與低約束的條件下最有可能建立合作關(guān)系。在此基礎(chǔ)上，成員行為體與政策權(quán)限的重合度較高、意識(shí)形態(tài)趨同且對(duì)權(quán)力授權(quán)持寬容態(tài)度的國(guó)際組織之間更傾向于形成高度制度化的合作關(guān)系。值得注意的是，在這三個(gè)層次的互動(dòng)中，高需求與高供給的正向效應(yīng)具有相互強(qiáng)化的作用，而約束因素不僅削弱了高需求的積極效應(yīng)，還與供給因素之間存在一定的交互效應(yīng)。

本文具有重要的理論意義和實(shí)踐價(jià)值。一方面，制度復(fù)雜性已成為國(guó)際關(guān)系研究的關(guān)鍵議題，需求-供給-約束模型的構(gòu)建為學(xué)界提供了一個(gè)新的分析框架，有助于深入理解國(guó)際組織間的合作機(jī)制。另一方面，鑒于區(qū)域性和全球性國(guó)際組織普遍嵌套于制度復(fù)合體之中，該研究具有廣泛的適用性，為探討制度高度復(fù)雜化背景下超越民族國(guó)家的有效治理?xiàng)l件提供了重要啟示，從而在一定程度上為國(guó)際組織及其成員行為體制定更加優(yōu)化的政策選擇提供理論支持。

然而，譯者認(rèn)為，本文亦存在一定的局限性。除文中提及的影響因素外，國(guó)際組織內(nèi)部的權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)同樣是影響其間合作的重要變量。此外，在某些情境下，國(guó)際組織外部的權(quán)力格局及其對(duì)特定國(guó)際組織的態(tài)度與行為可能產(chǎn)生重要影響。進(jìn)一步而言，盡管部分綜合性國(guó)際組織具有廣泛職能，大多數(shù)國(guó)際組織通常專注于特定領(lǐng)域（如經(jīng)濟(jì)、防務(wù)等）的合作。在這種情況下，不同領(lǐng)域?qū)Α皺?quán)力”的界定及其衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)存在顯著差異，這意味著在分析國(guó)際組織間權(quán)力差異時(shí)，可能需要更為精細(xì)和動(dòng)態(tài)的比較方法?！拘?duì)審核：丁偉航】【責(zé)任編輯：張奕?！?/p>

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）99

新刊速遞《國(guó)際安全》（International Security）International Security，Vol.48, No.3, 2024

1. 給烏克蘭的“核保護(hù)傘”？戰(zhàn)后歐洲安全的前例與可能性（A “Nuclear Umbrella”forUkraine? Precedents and Possibilities for Postwar European Security）Matthew Evangelista, 康奈爾大學(xué)康奈爾大學(xué)懷特總統(tǒng)歷史與政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】無(wú)論俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的結(jié)果如何，戰(zhàn)后烏克蘭將需要選擇一種安全政策，以保護(hù)其主權(quán)免受未來(lái)的威脅。其選擇對(duì)整個(gè)歐洲的安全具有影響。一些觀察家建議烏克蘭加入北大西洋公約組織（NATO），從而獲得美國(guó)“核保護(hù)傘”的保護(hù)。其他人則對(duì)“延伸核威懾”——即美國(guó)為其盟國(guó)領(lǐng)土遭受攻擊（包括常規(guī)武器攻擊）時(shí)作出核報(bào)復(fù)的威脅——的有效性表示懷疑。然而，在冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的歐洲，核威懾從未被真正檢驗(yàn)過(guò)，今天，延伸核威懾在面對(duì)俄羅斯入侵時(shí)是一種不可靠且有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的方式。1961年柏林危機(jī)期間核威懾的作用顯示，蘇聯(lián)的軍事戰(zhàn)略對(duì)抗美國(guó)的核武器可能引發(fā)局勢(shì)升級(jí)。而在脆弱的北約領(lǐng)土，如愛(ài)沙尼亞的納爾瓦市，這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)仍然存在。冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的一種核威懾替代方案為烏克蘭提供了非核防御的可能性。諸如基于安全困境和非進(jìn)攻性、信任建設(shè)的防御理念“蜘蛛網(wǎng)”策略等提議，能夠在處于俄羅斯擴(kuò)張威脅中的歐洲為烏克蘭提供安全保障，而不依賴于核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的威脅?！驹摹縒hatever the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War, in its wake Ukraine will need to chooseasecurity policy to defend its sovereignty from future threats. Its choice holds implications for broader

European security. Some observers advocate Ukraine becoming a member in the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), thereby gaining protection from the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” Others doubt theeffectiveness of “extended nuclear deterrence”—the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation for attacks, includingthose carried out with conventional armed forces, on an ally's territory. But nuclear deterrence was never put

to the test in Cold War Europe, and today extended nuclear deterrence is an unreliable and risky approachto《國(guó)際安全》（International Security）發(fā)表有關(guān)當(dāng)代安全問(wèn)題的全面清晰、文獻(xiàn)翔實(shí)的文章。文章涉及戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)與和平的傳統(tǒng)主題，以及安全的最新層面，包括環(huán)境、人口、人道主義問(wèn)題、跨國(guó)網(wǎng)絡(luò)和新興技術(shù)。40 多年來(lái)，《國(guó)際安全》界定了美國(guó)國(guó)家安全政策的爭(zhēng)論，并為國(guó)際安全事務(wù)的研究制定了議程。2024 年該期刊的影響因子為 7.486。

100

Russian aggression. An examination of the role of nuclear deterrence during the 1961 BerlinCrisisdemonstrates that Soviet military strategy against U.S. nuclear weapons posed the risk of escalation. Invulnerable NATO territories, such as the Estonian city of Narva, such a risk still exists. ACold War–eraalternative to nuclear deterrence offers the possibility of a non-nuclear defense for Ukraine. Proposals suchas the “spider in the web” strategy draw on concepts of the security dilemma and non-offensive, confidence-building defense to provide for Ukrainian security in a Europe threatened by Russian expansion, without relying on the threat of nuclear war. 2. 我們都會(huì)倒下：華沙條約組織的解體與東歐冷戰(zhàn)的終結(jié)（We All Fall Down: TheDismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the End of the Cold War in Eastern Europe）Simon Miles, 杜克大學(xué)桑福德公共政策學(xué)院助理教授

【摘要】利用捷克、德國(guó)、匈牙利、波蘭和羅馬尼亞的檔案資料，本文重建了冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束時(shí)東歐外交的情況。這些檔案顯示，推動(dòng)這一關(guān)鍵時(shí)期事件發(fā)展的不僅僅是超級(jí)大國(guó)，華沙條約組織的非蘇聯(lián)成員國(guó)也發(fā)揮了作用。1989 年至 1991 年間，這些國(guó)家意識(shí)到世界正在變化，與蘇聯(lián)的關(guān)系（通過(guò)華沙條約組織政治-軍事聯(lián)盟加以明確）會(huì)妨礙它們?cè)诤罄鋺?zhàn)世界中的成功。東歐決策者決定摧毀束縛它們與蘇聯(lián)關(guān)系的華沙條約，并決定與西歐結(jié)盟。他們還試圖將蘇聯(lián)排除在歐洲安全架構(gòu)之外，包括歐洲安全與合作會(huì)議。他們不僅尋求安全保障，還希望防范蘇聯(lián)發(fā)生強(qiáng)硬派政變；但其主要目標(biāo)是獲取西方的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益。

【 原 文 】 Using new evidence from Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian archives, areconstruction of Eastern European diplomacy at the end of the Cold War shows that it was not just thesuperpowers that shaped events during this pivotal period: the non-Soviet members of the WarsawPact alsohad agency. From 1989 to 1991, these states recognized that the world was changing and that their

relationship with the Soviet Union, codified in the Warsaw Pact politico-military alliance, would impedetheir success in the post–Cold War world. Eastern European policymakers resolved to destroy the WarsawPact that bound them to the Soviet Union, and they decided to align with Western Europe. They alsosought

to exclude the Soviet Union from the European security architecture, including the Conference on Securityand Co-operation in Europe. They sought security and wanted to hedge against a hard-line takeover intheSoviet Union; but their primary aim was to reap the West's economic benefits. 3. 外來(lái)干涉與國(guó)內(nèi)流離失所：戰(zhàn)后貝魯特的城市政治（Foreign InterventionandInternal Displacement: Urban Politics in Postwar Beirut）Amanda Rizkallah, 佩珀代因大學(xué)國(guó)際研究助理教授

【摘要】不均衡的民主化是內(nèi)戰(zhàn)遺留的一個(gè)常見(jiàn)但不太為人所知的現(xiàn)象。黎巴嫩內(nèi)戰(zhàn)（1975-1990）結(jié)束后，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中的流離失所過(guò)程與敘利亞的干預(yù)結(jié)合在一起，改變了戰(zhàn)后地方政治秩序。在貝魯特郊區(qū)，武裝分子與流離失所人口之間的聯(lián)系為這些弱勢(shì)群體從地方機(jī)構(gòu)中獲得回應(yīng)性創(chuàng)造了機(jī)會(huì)。然而，流離失所人口在其寄居社區(qū)的權(quán)力取決于當(dāng)?shù)刂鲗?dǎo)武裝分子的命運(yùn)。如果武裝分子是干預(yù)力量的盟友，

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）101

他們可以繼續(xù)控制其據(jù)點(diǎn)，邊緣化傳統(tǒng)的地方精英，同時(shí)賦權(quán)于其核心支持者——流離失所者。相反，如果武裝分子受到干預(yù)力量的打壓，隨之而來(lái)的權(quán)力真空為多元化政黨政治的興起提供了機(jī)會(huì)。傳統(tǒng)的戰(zhàn)前精英重新在地方政治生活中發(fā)揮作用，賦權(quán)于其核心支持者——戰(zhàn)前居民。通過(guò)數(shù)十次對(duì)戰(zhàn)后貝魯特郊區(qū)關(guān)鍵信息提供者的深入訪談，這些研究發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，流離失所如何以超越宗教認(rèn)同的方式改變地方。自 2023 年 10 月 7 日以來(lái)，南黎巴嫩已有超過(guò) 8 萬(wàn)人因戰(zhàn)斗而流離失所。如果真主黨為這些流離失所者提供服務(wù)和安全保障，當(dāng)前的沖突將加強(qiáng)真主黨對(duì)南黎巴嫩的控制，或者在流離失所者定居的南黎巴嫩地區(qū)進(jìn)一步鞏固其影響力。

【原文】Uneven democratization is a common yet poorly understood legacy of civil war. In the aftermathof

the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), wartime processes of displacement interacted with Syria's interventionto transform local postwar political orders. In Beirut's suburbs, the bonds built between armed actors anddisplaced populations created opportunities for displaced people to extract responsiveness fromlocal

institutions, despite their vulnerability. But the power of displaced populations in their host communityhinges on the fate of the locally dominant armed actor. If the armed actor is an ally of the intervening power, it can maintain political control over its strongholds, marginalizing traditional local elites while empoweringits core constituents, displaced people. By contrast, if an armed actor is repressed by the intervening power, the ensuing power vacuum creates an opportunity for pluralistic party politics to emerge. Traditional prewar

elites reassert their role in local political life, empowering their core constituents, the prewar residents. Drawing on dozens of in-depth interviews with key informants in the suburbs of postwar Beirut, the findingsshow how displacement transformed localities in ways that transcend religious identity. Over 80,000peoplehave been displaced from southern Lebanon because of fighting since October 7, 2023. If Hezbollahprovides services and security to these displaced persons, the current conflict will strengthen Hezbollah'sgrip on the south of Lebanon when the displaced populations return, or further consolidate its influenceinthose localities in south Lebanon where displaced populations settle. 4. 馴服叛亂：1830-1929 年南美政治暴力的下降（Reining in Rebellion: The DeclineofPolitical Violence in South America, 1830–1929）

Raúl L. Madrid, 德克薩斯大學(xué)奧斯汀分校文科哈羅德-C.和愛(ài)麗絲-T.-諾林執(zhí)教教授Luis L. Schenoni, 倫敦大學(xué)學(xué)院政治學(xué)系助理教授

【摘要】在 19 世紀(jì)，南美洲飽受內(nèi)部叛亂的困擾，這些叛亂動(dòng)搖了該地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治體系。然而，進(jìn)入 20 世紀(jì)初，整個(gè)地區(qū)的政治暴力水平顯著下降?，F(xiàn)有的研究對(duì)此歷史性轉(zhuǎn)變關(guān)注甚少，部分原因是缺乏叛亂的全面數(shù)據(jù)。通過(guò)對(duì) 1830 年至 1929 年間南美所有叛亂的綜合新數(shù)據(jù)集的分析顯示，這一時(shí)期叛亂的減少在很大程度上源于該地區(qū)軍隊(duì)的擴(kuò)張和職業(yè)化，而這又是由出口繁榮和跨國(guó)沖突威脅所推動(dòng)的。然而，正如一項(xiàng)對(duì)叛亂的原創(chuàng)性分類所示，并非所有類型的叛亂在此期間都急劇減少。雖然該地區(qū)武裝部隊(duì)的加強(qiáng)抑制了非國(guó)家行為者的叛亂，但并沒(méi)有顯著減少來(lái)自國(guó)家內(nèi)部的叛亂，如軍事政變。

102

【原文】During the nineteenth century, South America was plagued by internal rebellions that destabilizedthe region's economies and political systems. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, levels of

political violence throughout the region declined dramatically. Existing scholarship has paid surprisinglylittle attention to this historic transformation, in part because comprehensive data on revolts have beenlacking. Historical narratives and an analysis of a comprehensive new dataset on all revolts inSouthAmerica from 1830 to 1929 show that the decline in revolts stemmed in large part fromthe expansionandprofessionalization of the region's militaries, which were driven by the export boomand the threat of

interstate conflict. Nevertheless, not all types of rebellions declined precipitously during this period, as anoriginal typology of revolts shows. Although the strengthening of the region's armed forces discouragedrevolts by non-state actors, it did not significantly reduce rebellions from within the state apparatus, suchasmilitary coups. 【編譯：柳博文賴永楨】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】International Security，Vol.49, No.4, Summer 2024

1. 鐵骰子：宿命論與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（The Iron Dice: Fatalism and War）Dominic Tierney，斯沃斯莫爾學(xué)院政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】國(guó)際關(guān)系中的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人經(jīng)常表現(xiàn)出宿命論，或者認(rèn)為一些事件是由他們難以控制的力量所驅(qū)使。在某些情況下，宿命論可能反映了現(xiàn)實(shí)，又或是一種提高支持的修辭。但是也有一種重要的心理學(xué)解釋：宿命論可以幫助領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人避免為代價(jià)高昂的結(jié)果負(fù)責(zé)、并保護(hù)他們的自我形象。宿命論更像在如下情景中出現(xiàn)：1.關(guān)于好結(jié)果和壞結(jié)果的選擇；2.當(dāng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)被視為迫在眉睫和遙遠(yuǎn)時(shí)的判斷；3.非民主政權(quán)和民主政權(quán)之間的關(guān)系。宿命論的概念對(duì)哲學(xué)、宗教、醫(yī)學(xué)、社會(huì)學(xué)和心理學(xué)至關(guān)重要，但它一直被國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)者所忽視。宿命論可能是戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的一個(gè)重要原因，尤其當(dāng)它與被感知到的機(jī)會(huì)窗口相結(jié)合時(shí)。這項(xiàng)研究通過(guò)幫助解釋代議制政權(quán)之間缺少戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)來(lái)為民主和平論做出貢獻(xiàn)。如果民選領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人不太容易對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)生極端宿命論，民主國(guó)家在一個(gè)危機(jī)中可能有更多的回旋余地。本文使用第一次世界大戰(zhàn)和第二次世界大戰(zhàn)起源的案例研究來(lái)探討這一論點(diǎn)。

【原文】Leaders in international relations often exhibit fatalism, or the belief that events are guidedbyforces beyond their control. In some cases, fatalism may reflect reality, or be rhetoric to boost support. But

there is also an important psychological explanation: fatalism can help leaders avoid responsibility for costlyoutcomes and protect their self-image. Fatalism is more likely: (1) in regard to bad outcomes versus goodoutcomes; (2) when war is seen as imminent versus far-off; and (3) in nondemocratic regimes versusdemocratic regimes. The concept of fatalism is central to philosophy, religion, medicine, sociology, andpsychology, but has been neglected by scholars in international relations. Fatalism may be an important

cause of war, especially when combined with a perceived window of opportunity. This research contributesto democratic peace theory by helping explain the lack of war between representative regimes. If elected

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）103

leaders are less prone to extreme fatalism about war, democracies may have more roomto maneuver inacrisis. I use case studies of the origins of World War I and World War II to probe the argument. 2. 做與不做都會(huì)變得糟糕：國(guó)際脅迫中的保證困境（Damned If They Do, DamnedIf

They Don't: The Assurance Dilemma in International Coercion ）Reid B. C. Pauly，布朗大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授和核安全與政策院長(zhǎng)助理教授【摘要】為什么有些脅迫性要求成功了，而其他的一些卻失敗了？一個(gè)主導(dǎo)范式通過(guò)指出威脅的可信度和嚴(yán)重性來(lái)解釋脅迫性結(jié)果。脅迫保證（coercive assurance）這一概念在關(guān)于脅迫的文獻(xiàn)中是一種缺乏研究的承諾問(wèn)題。它表明脅迫者必須向脅迫目標(biāo)保證，它的威脅是以目標(biāo)的行為為條件的。許多學(xué)者忽略了脅迫保證，部分原因是因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為這是自動(dòng)的。但是保證是任何脅迫過(guò)程中的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵性要素。當(dāng)脅迫者的保證不再可信時(shí)，即使是高度可信和嚴(yán)重的威脅也可能會(huì)失敗。一種新的理論，即保證困境（assurance dilemma），有助于回答以下問(wèn)題：為什么脅迫目標(biāo)害怕無(wú)條件的痛苦？為什么脅迫者在得到服從后會(huì)進(jìn)行懲罰？脅迫中的威脅和保證之間有什么關(guān)系？脅迫者為提高其威脅可信度而采取的行動(dòng)會(huì)破壞其保證不會(huì)懲罰目標(biāo)的可信度。脅迫對(duì)象擔(dān)心懲罰可能無(wú)法避免，因此在屈服于脅迫者的要求之前會(huì)尋找保證信號(hào)。關(guān)于伊朗核計(jì)劃的脅迫性討價(jià)還價(jià)的案例證明了運(yùn)用這一保證的邏輯和有效性。

【原文】Why do some coercive demands succeed but others fail? A dominant paradigmexplains coerciveoutcomes by pointing to the credibility and severity of threats. The concept of coercive assurance is anunderstudied type of commitment problem in the coercion literature. It suggests that a coercer must assureitstarget that its threats are conditional on the target's behavior. Many scholars overlook coercive assurance, inpart because they assume it is automatic. But assurance is a crucial component of any coercive process. Evenhighly credible and severe threats can fail when the coercer's assurance is not credible. A novel theory, theassurance dilemma, helps to answer the following questions: Why do targets of coercion fear unconditional

pain? Why do coercers punish after receiving compliance? What is the relationship between threats andassurances in coercion? The actions that a coercer can take to bolster the credibility of a threat underminethecredibility of its assurance that it will not punish the target. Targets fear that punishment may be unavoidableand thus look for assuring signals before ceding to the coercer's demands. The case of coercive bargainingover the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates the logic and effectiveness of the use of assurance. 3. 在沒(méi)有維和的干預(yù)下穩(wěn)定內(nèi)戰(zhàn)：來(lái)自南亞的證據(jù)（Stabilizing Civil Wars withoutPeacekeeping: Evidence from South Asia）

Basil Bastaki，耶魯大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士生

Paul Staniland，芝加哥大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授

Bryan Popoola，約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)保羅·尼采高級(jí)國(guó)際研究院理學(xué)碩士和芝加哥大學(xué)文學(xué)學(xué)士

104

【摘要】維和有助于解決內(nèi)戰(zhàn)，但對(duì)于許多沖突來(lái)說(shuō)，維和行動(dòng)或其他國(guó)際和平建設(shè)干預(yù)的機(jī)會(huì)很小。在缺乏有意義的國(guó)際力量介入下，內(nèi)戰(zhàn)局面是如何通向穩(wěn)定的？政府的政治性討價(jià)還價(jià)空間和武裝團(tuán)體的相對(duì)實(shí)力這兩個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素有助于解釋國(guó)家和武裝團(tuán)體之間在何時(shí)有可能達(dá)成穩(wěn)定的合作、或通過(guò)談判達(dá)成和解。本文分析了三種沖突軌跡—“長(zhǎng)期有限合作”措施、國(guó)家合并或裁軍，以及持續(xù)沖突—來(lái)表明通往穩(wěn)定的道路往往在道德上充滿挑戰(zhàn)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)復(fù)雜性，但即使國(guó)際介入不在考慮范圍內(nèi)，也一樣會(huì)存在。本文使用定量和定性數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)研究后殖民時(shí)期南亞大部分地區(qū)在較少或沒(méi)有沖突時(shí)期中的武裝團(tuán)體和政府之間的關(guān)系。了解這些軌跡為政策制定者、分析人士和學(xué)者提供了有用的工具，用于在尋求減少戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的人員成本時(shí)確定政策選擇和政治權(quán)衡。

【原文】Peacekeeping is helpful in resolving civil wars, but there is little chance of peacekeeping operationsor other international peace-building interventions for many conflicts. How do internal wars stabilize intheabsence of meaningful international involvement? Two key factors, the government's political spacefor

bargaining and the relative power of armed groups, help to explain when it is possible to reach either stablecooperation between states and armed groups or negotiated settlements. We analyze three conflict

trajectories—“l(fā)ong-term limited cooperation” arrangements, state incorporation or disarmament, andongoing conflict—to show that the paths to stabilization are often ethically fraught and empiricallycomplicated but exist even when international involvement is off the table. We use quantitative andqualitative data to study the relationships between armed groups and governments in much of post-colonial

South Asia, including during periods of little or no violence. Understanding these trajectories providespolicymakers, analysts, and scholars with useful tools for identifying policy options and political trade-offsas they seek to reduce the human costs of war. 【編譯：林志俊賴永禎】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）105

《國(guó)際組織》（International Organization）International Organization，Vol.78, No.2, 2024

1. 外交政策官僚機(jī)構(gòu)中的種族主題：計(jì)算文本分析（Racial Tropes in the ForeignPolicyBureaucracy: A Computational Text Analysis）

Austin Carson，芝加哥大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

Eric Min，加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校政治學(xué)系副教授

Maya Van Nuys，芝加哥大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士研究生

【摘要】種族刻板印象如何影響外交政策的認(rèn)知？在國(guó)際關(guān)系研究中，種族和種族主義這一話題長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直被邊緣化，但現(xiàn)在卻重新受到關(guān)注。在這篇文章中，我們?cè)u(píng)估了冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期美國(guó)外交政策官僚機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部分原創(chuàng)類評(píng)估中隱性種族偏見(jiàn)的作用。我們使用了基于字典和監(jiān)督的機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)技術(shù)，在一個(gè)獨(dú)特的情報(bào)文件語(yǔ)料庫(kù)中識(shí)別出了四種種族傾向：近 5,000 份發(fā)給肯尼迪、約翰遜、尼克松和福特的總統(tǒng)每日簡(jiǎn)報(bào)。我們論證并發(fā)現(xiàn)，有關(guān)美國(guó)視為 “種族化他者”的國(guó)家的條目--特別是全球南部國(guó)家、新獨(dú)立國(guó)家和一些特定的地區(qū)集團(tuán)--具有特別多的種族主題。有關(guān)這些地方的外國(guó)發(fā)展的條目更有可能出現(xiàn)幼稚化、引用動(dòng)物類比、暗示非理性或好戰(zhàn)的解釋。即使考慮到?jīng)_突的存在、被分析國(guó)家的政權(quán)類型、對(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的引用以及討論的主題，這種關(guān)聯(lián)也是成立的。這篇文章有兩個(gè)主要貢獻(xiàn)。首先，它為重新關(guān)注種族問(wèn)題做出了貢獻(xiàn)，且特別強(qiáng)調(diào)了隱性種族化思維及其在官僚環(huán)境中的表現(xiàn)。其次，我們展示了在外交政策文本中識(shí)別種族偏見(jiàn)和其他形式隱性偏見(jiàn)的新工具的前景?！驹摹縃ow do racial stereotypes affect perceptions in foreign policy? Race and racismas topics have longbeen marginalized in the study of international relations but are receiving renewed attention. In this articlewe assess the role of implicit racial bias in internal, originally classified assessments by the USforeignpolicy bureaucracy during the Cold War. We use a combination of dictionary-based and supervised machinelearning techniques to identify the presence of four racial tropes in a unique corpus of intelligencedocuments: almost 5,000 President's Daily Briefs given to Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford. We argueand find that entries about countries that the US deemed “racialized Others”—specifically, countries intheGlobal South, newly independent states, and some specific regional groupings—feature an especiallylarge《國(guó)際組織》（International Organization）是一份分析政府和非政府組織運(yùn)行的同行評(píng)審學(xué)術(shù)期刊、由 Springer 出版。該刊涵蓋整個(gè)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)領(lǐng)域，重點(diǎn)關(guān)注國(guó)際組織的政策和結(jié)構(gòu)。2022 年該刊影響因子為 7.8，在國(guó)際關(guān)系的96 種期刊中排名第 1。

106

number of racial tropes. Entries about foreign developments in these places are more likely to featureinterpretations that infantilize, invoke animal-based analogies, or imply irrationality or belligerence. Thisassociation holds even when accounting for the presence of conflict, the regime type of the countrybeinganalyzed, the invocation of leaders, and the topics being discussed. The article makes two primarycontributions. First, it adds to the revival of attention to race but gives special emphasis to implicit racializedthinking and its appearance in bureaucratic settings. Second, we show the promise of newtools for

identifying racial and other forms of implicit bias in foreign policy texts. 2. 安全、社會(huì)和對(duì)神圣事物的永恒斗爭(zhēng)：國(guó)際關(guān)系理論中宗教戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的修正（Security, Society, and the Perennial Struggles over the Sacred: Revising the Wars of ReligioninInternational Relations Theory）

Derek Bolton，雷丁大學(xué)政治學(xué)系講師

【摘要】國(guó)際關(guān)系理論傾向于將宗教戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng) (WoR) 建立在如下傳統(tǒng)敘事之上，即認(rèn)為，正是宗教暴力的非理性催生了現(xiàn)代國(guó)際務(wù)實(shí)世俗國(guó)家體系，從而導(dǎo)致了政治的世俗化、理性化和非感情化。相比之下，本文將我們的焦點(diǎn)重新調(diào)整到涂爾干關(guān)于宗教的更具社會(huì)性的認(rèn)知，即宗教是信徒的共同體，以及神圣和共同情感在社會(huì)和政治生活中的持續(xù)作用。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，它研究了現(xiàn)代社群（如國(guó)家）如何仍然由對(duì)神圣概念的共同信仰構(gòu)成，以及相應(yīng)的道德秩序感如何成為持久追求本體安全的核心。因此，本文認(rèn)為，國(guó)際關(guān)系應(yīng)關(guān)注社群所持神圣觀念的長(zhǎng)期斗爭(zhēng)，通過(guò)考察神圣的本體論安全與道德解釋學(xué)之間的持續(xù)相互作用，我們可以更好地理解（“宗教”或“世俗”）暴力傾向——所謂的宗教戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是這一論點(diǎn)的典型案例。歷史研究探索了宗教戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)參與者如何應(yīng)對(duì)這種神圣斗爭(zhēng)，從而使我們能夠探索這些動(dòng)態(tài)，并進(jìn)一步將我們對(duì)現(xiàn)代“世俗”政治中神圣的理解進(jìn)行概念化。本文最后研究了暴力前景如何與政治秩序內(nèi)部和之間關(guān)于神圣的長(zhǎng)期斗爭(zhēng)相互關(guān)聯(lián)——這種情緒凸顯了國(guó)內(nèi)道德兩極分化和國(guó)家間意識(shí)形態(tài)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日益加劇所帶來(lái)的一些危險(xiǎn)隱患。

【原文】International relations theory tends to build on the conventional narrative of the Wars of Religion(WoR), which holds it was the irrationality of religious violence that generated the modern international

system of pragmatic secular states—resulting in the presumed secularized, rational, and unemotive natureof

politics. In contrast, this article reorients our focus to Durkheim's more social view of religionas acommunity of believers and to the continued role of the sacred and shared emotion/affect in social andpolitical life. Specifically, it examines how modern communities (such as nations) remain constitutedbyashared faith in conceptions of the sacred and how the corresponding sense of moral order is central totheenduring pursuit of ontological security. Therefore, it argues that international relations should focus ontheperennial struggles over what communities hold sacred and that we can better understand the propensityfor

(“religious” or “secular”) violence by examining the continual interplay between the sacred, ontological

security, and the hermeneutics of morality—with the so-called WoR being the locus classicus of thisargument. Historical studies exploring how participants in the WoR navigated such struggles over the sacredthus allow us to explore these dynamics and further conceptualize our understanding of the sacredwithinmodern “secular” politics. The article concludes by examining how the prospect for violence is interrelated

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）107

with the perennial struggles over the sacred within, and between, political orders—a sentiment that bringsinto relief some of the hazards accompanying growing intrastate moral polarization and interstate ideological

rivalry. 3. 未來(lái)即歷史：后拿破侖時(shí)代歐洲的恢復(fù)性民族主義與沖突（The Future Is History:Restorative Nationalism and Conflict in Post-Napoleonic Europe）Lars-Erik Cederman，蘇黎世聯(lián)邦理工學(xué)院國(guó)際沖突研究教授

【摘要】正如俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭所表明的那樣，最近民族主義的復(fù)興引發(fā)了修正主義沖突的威脅性回歸。雖然有關(guān)民族主義的文獻(xiàn)顯示了民族主義敘事是如何在社會(huì)中建構(gòu)起來(lái)的，但對(duì)其在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中的后果卻知之甚少。我們認(rèn)真對(duì)待民族主義敘事，研究過(guò)去的 “黃金時(shí)代”如何影響后拿破侖時(shí)代歐洲的領(lǐng)土要求和沖突。我們預(yù)計(jì)，如果民族主義者能將現(xiàn)狀與歷史上所謂更加統(tǒng)一和/或獨(dú)立的政體進(jìn)行對(duì)比，他們就更有可能動(dòng)員起來(lái)并發(fā)起沖突。通過(guò)使用可追溯到 1100 年的歐洲國(guó)家邊界數(shù)據(jù)，并結(jié)合過(guò)去兩個(gè)世紀(jì)民族聚居區(qū)的空間數(shù)據(jù)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，所謂合理的黃金時(shí)代會(huì)增加國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)家間沖突的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，特定的歷史遺產(chǎn)使某些現(xiàn)代民族主義比其他民族主義更具影響力?！驹摹緼s illustrated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the recent revival of nationalismhas triggeredathreatening return of revisionist conflict. While the literature on nationalism shows how nationalist narrativesare socially constructed, much less is known about their real-world consequences. Taking nationalist

narratives seriously, we study how past “golden ages” affect territorial claims and conflict inpost-Napoleonic Europe. We expect nationalists to be more likely to mobilize and initiate conflict if theycancontrast the status quo to a historical polity with supposedly greater national unity and/or independence. Using data on European state borders going back to 1100, combined with spatial data coveringethnicsettlement areas during the past two centuries, we find that the availability of plausible golden ages increasesthe risk of both domestic and interstate conflict. These findings suggest that specific historical legacies makesome modern nationalisms more consequential than others. 4. 美洲人權(quán)法院的監(jiān)督聽(tīng)證、利益攸關(guān)方參與和合規(guī)性（Oversight Hearings, Stakeholder Engagement, and Compliance in the Inter-American Court of HumanRights）Aníbal Pérez-Li?án，圣母大學(xué)政治學(xué)和全球事務(wù)教授

Angie K. Garcia Atehortua，國(guó)際律師

【摘要】本文介紹了對(duì)話式監(jiān)督的概念，即司法機(jī)構(gòu)通過(guò)授權(quán)國(guó)家報(bào)告、第三方參與和監(jiān)督聽(tīng)證會(huì)相結(jié)合的方式對(duì)遵守情況進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的過(guò)程。為了評(píng)估這一策略在國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上的有效性，我們對(duì)美洲人權(quán)法院舉行的監(jiān)督聽(tīng)證會(huì)進(jìn)行了評(píng)估。我們采用傾向分?jǐn)?shù)匹配法、差分估計(jì)法和事件歷史模型，分析了1989 年至 2019 年間法院下令采取的 1878 項(xiàng)賠償措施的遵守情況。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，對(duì)話式監(jiān)督具有適度且積極的效果，每年將國(guó)家遵守規(guī)定的概率提高約 3%（與基線執(zhí)行率相比，效果顯著）。然而，它需要公民社會(huì)的參與才能產(chǎn)生積極的結(jié)果。我們的框架將憲法和國(guó)際組織方面的文獻(xiàn)中的相關(guān)發(fā)現(xiàn)聯(lián)系起來(lái)。

108

【原文】East Asian countries have recently upgraded their regional cooperation for clean air throughtheAcid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia, with elaborate arrangements for monitoringandcapacity-building assistance for multiple pollutants. This represents a departure from the earlier informal

regimes with vague arrangements on acid deposition. However, despite this notable shift, thisformalization in the regional governance for clean air remains largely unexplored in the existing literature. This study fills this gap by analysing the dynamics of formalization through aid fromtheories of regimecomplexity and legalization. It focuses on the decade from 2012 to 2021, employing documentary analysisand interviews. The results reveal that governments actively pursue their state interests by adjustinginstitutional arrangements through regime competition and selection that drive formalization. Sharingcognition of the hazardousness of multiple pollutants achieved through interactions between regional andglobal institutions serves as a catalyst for reaching an agreement on the arrangements. 5. 女性和男性政治家對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的反應(yīng)：來(lái)自烏克蘭的證據(jù)（Women and Men Politicians’Response to War: Evidence from Ukraine）

Taylor Damann，華盛頓圣路易斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)專業(yè)博士研究生

Dahjin Kim，華盛頓圣路易斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)專業(yè)博士研究生

Margit Tavits，華盛頓圣路易斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)專業(yè)博士研究生

【摘要】戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是加深了政治家行為中的性別不平等，還是有助于消除這些不平等？我們借鑒心理學(xué)中的恐怖管理理論，認(rèn)為暴力沖突的爆發(fā)可能會(huì)促使政治家們更強(qiáng)烈地遵從傳統(tǒng)的性別刻板印象，因?yàn)檫@有助于個(gè)人應(yīng)對(duì)生存恐懼。為了驗(yàn)證我們的論點(diǎn)，我們使用了 2022 年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭前后三個(gè)月烏克蘭政治家在社交媒體上的參與數(shù)據(jù)（469 位政治家在 Facebook 上發(fā)布的136455 條帖子）以及間斷時(shí)間序列分析，來(lái)評(píng)估沖突對(duì)政治家行為的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，沖突的爆發(fā)加深了政治家在公眾參與中的性別刻板行為。我們還表明，與我們的論點(diǎn)一致，公眾的性別偏見(jiàn)在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)期間會(huì)被放大。【原文】Does war deepen gender inequalities in politicians’ behavior or help erase them? We drawfromtheterror management theory developed in psychology to argue that the onset of a violent conflict is likelytopush politicians to conform more strongly with traditional gender stereotypes because it helps individualscope with existential fears. To test our argument, we use data on Ukrainian politicians’ engagement onsocial

media (136,455 Facebook posts by 469 politicians) in the three months before and after the 2022 Russianinvasion of Ukraine, and interrupted time series analysis, to assess the effect of conflict on politicians’ behavior. We find that conflict onset deepens gender-stereotypical behavior among politicians in their publicengagement. We also show that, consistent with our argument, gender biases among the public are magnifiedduring war. 【編譯：王涵婧賴永禎】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）109

《和平研究雜志》（Journal of Peace Research）Journal of Peace Research，Vol.61, No.6, 2024

1. 全球貿(mào)易的蝴蝶效應(yīng)：國(guó)際邊界、爭(zhēng)端以及貿(mào)易中斷和轉(zhuǎn)移題目（Butterfly effectsinglobal trade: International borders, disputes, and trade disruption and diversion）Ryan Brutger，加州大學(xué)伯克利分校政治專業(yè)副教授

Tim Marple，加州大學(xué)伯克利分校政治專業(yè)博士研究生

【摘要】本文對(duì)不同類型的跨境國(guó)家間沖突如何影響爭(zhēng)端方之間的貿(mào)易和與第三方的貿(mào)易轉(zhuǎn)移進(jìn)行理論化和檢驗(yàn)?；谶吔缰贫壤碚?，我們區(qū)分了兩種類型的國(guó)際爭(zhēng)端（邊界爭(zhēng)端和升級(jí)的軍事化爭(zhēng)端）的影響，并利用 60 年的貿(mào)易和沖突數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)檢驗(yàn)這些爭(zhēng)端對(duì)雙邊和第三方貿(mào)易流量的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，邊界爭(zhēng)端和軍事化爭(zhēng)端都會(huì)抑制爭(zhēng)端國(guó)之間的貿(mào)易流量。然而，合法的邊界爭(zhēng)端與與非爭(zhēng)端國(guó)的貿(mào)易轉(zhuǎn)移增加有關(guān)，這可能會(huì)完全抵消雙邊貿(mào)易的損失，而軍事化爭(zhēng)端則產(chǎn)生相反的影響。這些結(jié)果表明，從事貿(mào)易的行為體可以通過(guò)擴(kuò)大與未卷入爭(zhēng)端的第三方的貿(mào)易來(lái)抵消邊界爭(zhēng)端造成的雙邊貿(mào)易損失，但抵消軍事化爭(zhēng)端造成的損失卻并非如此。邊界爭(zhēng)端和軍事化爭(zhēng)端對(duì)貿(mào)易轉(zhuǎn)移產(chǎn)生相反的影響，這一事實(shí)凸顯了在研究沖突與貿(mào)易以及評(píng)估國(guó)際貿(mào)易潛在的和平化激勵(lì)措施時(shí)，審查爭(zhēng)端類型和受影響的貿(mào)易流動(dòng)類型的重要性。

【原文】This article theorizes and tests how different types of interstate conflict across borders affect tradebetween disputing parties and trade diversion with third parties. Building on theories of borders asinstitutions, we differentiate the effects of two types of international disputes – border disputes and escalatedmilitarized disputes – and draw on 60 years of trade and conflict data to test the effects of these disputes onbilateral and third-party trade flows. We find that border disputes and militarized disputes each depress tradeflows between the disputing countries. However, legal border disputes are associated with increasedtradediversion with non-disputing countries, which may fully offset the forgone bilateral trade, whereasmilitarized disputes have the opposite effect. These results show that actors engaged in trade canoffset

bilateral trade losses from a border dispute by expanding trade with third parties not involved in the dispute, but the same cannot be said of offsetting the losses from militarized disputes. The fact that border disputes《和平研究雜志》（Journal of Peace Research）是一份跨學(xué)科的、國(guó)際同行評(píng)議的和平研究學(xué)術(shù)雙月刊?！逗推窖芯侩s志》致力于在全球范圍內(nèi)關(guān)注沖突與締造和平。該刊鼓勵(lì)廣泛的和平概念，但重點(diǎn)關(guān)注暴力的起因和沖突的解決。該刊 2022 年影響因子為 3.713，近 5 年影響因子為4.555。

110

and militarized disputes have opposite effects on trade diversion highlights the importance of examiningboth the type of dispute and the type of trade flows that are affected when studying conflict and tradeandevaluating the potentially pacifying incentives of international trade. 2. 致命品牌：恐怖組織的標(biāo)志和暴力（Lethal brands: Terrorist groups’ logos andviolence）

Matteo CM Casiraghi，格羅寧根大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系助理教授

Eugenio Cusumano，梅西納大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授

【摘要】恐怖組織通常被品牌化描述。然而，這些“品牌”最重要的視覺(jué)表現(xiàn)——恐怖組織的標(biāo)志——仍未得到探索。在本文中，我們表明，標(biāo)志是一種信號(hào)裝置，可為使用暴力的傾向提供重要線索。為此，我們對(duì) 562 個(gè)恐怖分子標(biāo)志（2000-16 年）進(jìn)行了編碼和分析。在對(duì)全球恐怖組織使用的主要顏色和符號(hào)進(jìn)行描述性概述后，我們依靠零膨脹負(fù)二項(xiàng)模型來(lái)分析這些組織的視覺(jué)選擇與其致命恐怖活動(dòng)之間的關(guān)系。我們的結(jié)果表明，恐怖組織標(biāo)志中存在暴力、宗教和極端主義符號(hào)，以及使用黑色作為主色調(diào)，與更頻繁和更致命的襲擊有關(guān)。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)具有重要的政策意義，表明標(biāo)志作為行為線索，可以預(yù)測(cè)恐怖組織構(gòu)成的威脅，其有效性不亞于其意識(shí)形態(tài)。通過(guò)強(qiáng)調(diào)徽標(biāo)等視覺(jué)產(chǎn)物的重要性及其對(duì)定量研究的適應(yīng)性，我們的文章還為國(guó)際關(guān)系提供了一種新穎的方法論貢獻(xiàn)，有助于彌合解釋性安全研究和批判性安全研究之間的差距。

【 原 文 】 Terrorist organizations are often described as brands. However, the most important visual

representations of these brands – terrorist groups’ logos – have remained unexplored. In this article, wedemonstrate that logos are signalling devices that provide vital cues on the propensity to use violence. Tothis end, we code and analyse 562 terrorist logos (2000–16). After providing a descriptive overviewof themain colours and symbols used by terrorist groups worldwide, we rely on a zero-inflated negative binomial

model to analyse the relationship between these organizations’ visual choices and their deadly activities. Our

results show that the presence of violent, religious, and extremist symbols in terrorist organizations’ logos, aswell as the use of black as the main colour, correlates with more frequent and deadlier attacks. Thesefindings have important policy implications, demonstrating that logos serve as behavioural cues predictingthe threat posed by terrorist groups not less effectively than their ideology. By highlighting the importanceof

visual artifacts like logos and their amenability to quantitative research, our article also provides a novel

methodological contribution to international relations, helping bridge the gap between explanatoryandcritical security studies. 3. 在 重 新 審 視 內(nèi) 源 性 核 擴(kuò) 散 之 謎 （ Revisiting the puzzle of endogenous nuclearproliferation）

Azusa Katagiri，大阪大學(xué)國(guó)際公館政策學(xué)院副教授

【摘要】核擴(kuò)散文獻(xiàn)通常將影響核武器擴(kuò)散的供給方和需求方因素區(qū)分開(kāi)來(lái)。這些解決擴(kuò)散難題的不同方法提出了以下實(shí)證問(wèn)題：核供應(yīng)是否會(huì)刺激各國(guó)對(duì)核武器的需求？相反，對(duì)核武器的需求是否真

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）111

的有助于獲得核供應(yīng)？如果需求方和供應(yīng)方?jīng)Q定因素之間存在這種內(nèi)生性，那么它將如何導(dǎo)致在估計(jì)它們對(duì)核擴(kuò)散的影響時(shí)出現(xiàn)實(shí)證偏差？本文旨在揭示核擴(kuò)散過(guò)程中核需求和核供應(yīng)的內(nèi)生機(jī)制。特別是，它研究了兩種潛在的內(nèi)生性來(lái)源：（1）各國(guó)核發(fā)展決策與核技術(shù)能力之間的同時(shí)相互作用和（2）核發(fā)展中的選擇偏差。為了解決每個(gè)內(nèi)生性來(lái)源，分別估計(jì)了聯(lián)立方程模型和具有選擇的持續(xù)時(shí)間模型。與最近的供給面文獻(xiàn)所表明的相反，實(shí)證分析表明，各國(guó)的核需求主要由外部安全威脅而非其現(xiàn)有的核技術(shù)驅(qū)動(dòng)，并且它們成功獲得核技術(shù)主要是核發(fā)展努力的結(jié)果，而不一定取決于單個(gè)供給面因素。本文探討了核擴(kuò)散研究中的典型推論問(wèn)題，并有助于我們對(duì)擴(kuò)散機(jī)制的綜合理解?！?原 文 】 Nuclear proliferation literature typically differentiates supply-side and demand-side factorsinfluencing the spread of nuclear weapons. These distinct approaches to the proliferation puzzle raisethefollowing empirical questions: Does nuclear supply stimulate states’ demand for nuclear weapons?Conversely, does the demand for nuclear weapons really facilitate the acquisition of nuclear supply? If suchendogeneity exists between the demand-side and supply-side determinants, how would it cause empirical

bias in the estimation of their effects on nuclear proliferation? This article aims to unpack endogenousmechanisms of nuclear demand and nuclear supply over the course of nuclear proliferation. In particular, it

examines two potential sources of endogeneity: (1) simultaneous interactions between states’ nuclear

development decisions and nuclear technological capability and (2) selection bias in nuclear development. To address each source of endogeneity, simultaneous equation models and the duration models withselection are estimated, respectively. Contrary to what recent supply-side literature suggests, the empirical

analyses reveal that states’ nuclear demand is primarily driven by external security threats instead of their

existing nuclear technology, and that their successful acquisition of nuclear technology mainly follows as theresult of nuclear development efforts but does not necessarily depend on individual supply-side factors. Thisarticle addresses the typical inference issues in nuclear proliferation research and contributes to our syntheticunderstanding of proliferation mechanisms. 4. 后發(fā)國(guó)家的反緊縮騷亂：1977 年埃及面包起義的證據(jù)（Anti-austerity riots inlatedeveloping states: Evidence from the 1977 Egyptian Bread Intifada ）Neil Ketchley，牛津大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授

Ferdinand Eibl，英國(guó)國(guó)王大學(xué)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院副教授

Jeroen Gunning，英國(guó)國(guó)王大學(xué)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院教授

【摘要】在后發(fā)國(guó)家，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)常常由于進(jìn)口替代和以正式就業(yè)人員為中心的政治聯(lián)盟而被分割?；谡谓?jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的內(nèi)部人-外部人框架和道德經(jīng)濟(jì)框架，我們推測(cè)，在這種情況下，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)內(nèi)部人士對(duì)福利提供和公共轉(zhuǎn)移產(chǎn)生了強(qiáng)烈的期望，這使得他們更有可能對(duì)擬議的緊縮措施進(jìn)行暴動(dòng)。我們以 1977 年面包起義期間的埃及為例來(lái)檢驗(yàn)我們的論點(diǎn)，當(dāng)時(shí)宣布削減補(bǔ)貼引發(fā)了全國(guó)性的騷亂。為了進(jìn)行分析，我們將從阿拉伯語(yǔ)來(lái)源匯編的原始事件目錄與分類就業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行匹配。空間模型、豐富的微觀數(shù)據(jù)以及騷亂的突然性和短暫性有助于我們將一個(gè)地區(qū)勞動(dòng)力的重要性與其地理位置和更廣泛的社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)背景區(qū)分開(kāi)來(lái)。正如本文所表明，盡管補(bǔ)貼削減的影響是分散的，但騷亂在勞動(dòng)力市

112

場(chǎng)內(nèi)部人士聚集的地區(qū)尤為集中—這是在考慮了一系列合理的替代解釋之后得出的結(jié)論。結(jié)果表明，勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)分割產(chǎn)生的道德經(jīng)濟(jì)可以有力地構(gòu)建對(duì)緊縮政策的暴力反對(duì)?！驹摹縄n late developing states, labor markets are often segmented as a result of import substitutionandpolitical coalitions centered on the formally employed. Building on insider–outsider and moral economyframeworks from political economy, we theorize that in such contexts labor market insiders developstrongexpectations about welfare provision and public transfers that make them more likely to riot against

proposed austerity measures. We test our argument with the case of Egypt during the 1977 Bread Intifada, when the announcement of subsidy cuts sparked rioting across the country. To conduct our analysis, wematch an original event catalog compiled from Arabic-language sources with disaggregated employment

data. Spatial models, rich micro-level data, and the sudden and short-lived nature of the rioting helpus todisentangle the importance of an area’s labor force from its location and wider socio-economic context. Aswe show, despite the diffuse impact of the subsidy cuts, rioting was especially concentrated in areas withlabor market insiders – and this is after accounting for a range of plausible alternative explanations. Theresults suggest that moral economies arising from labor market segmentation can powerfully structureviolent opposition to austerity. 5. 政權(quán)更迭（Episodes of regime transformation）

Seraphine F Maerz，墨爾本大學(xué)政治學(xué)講師

Amanda B Edgell，阿拉巴馬大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】本文提出了一種新的政權(quán)更迭概念，使學(xué)者們能夠?qū)⒚裰骰蛯Ｖ苹暈橄嚓P(guān)但相互對(duì)立的過(guò)程。我們引入了一個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)集，該數(shù)據(jù)集記錄了 1900 年至 2019 年的 680 起政權(quán)更迭事件(ERT)，并為過(guò)去 120 年的政權(quán)更迭提供了新的見(jiàn)解。與其他方法相比，ERT 有三個(gè)主要優(yōu)勢(shì)。首先，它避免了單位同質(zhì)性、恒定效應(yīng)以及對(duì)稱效應(yīng)的有問(wèn)題的假設(shè)。其次，它通過(guò)將政權(quán)更迭視為一個(gè)漸進(jìn)且不確定的過(guò)程，整合了定性研究的關(guān)鍵見(jiàn)解。第三，ERT 基于一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的框架，用于研究任一方向的政權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)型。該數(shù)據(jù)集區(qū)分了四大類政權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)型：專制國(guó)家的自由化、民主國(guó)家的民主深化以及民主國(guó)家和專制國(guó)家的專制化（民主和專制退化）。它進(jìn)一步區(qū)分了十種具有不同結(jié)果的模式，包括政權(quán)更迭的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)描述（即民主轉(zhuǎn)型或崩潰）。少數(shù) ERT（32%）會(huì)導(dǎo)致政權(quán)更迭，大多數(shù)事件要么在發(fā)生更迭之前就結(jié)束了，要么沒(méi)有發(fā)生更迭的潛力（即民主政權(quán)進(jìn)一步民主化，專制政權(quán)進(jìn)一步專制化）。我們還提供了與其他數(shù)據(jù)集的比較、說(shuō)明性案例研究以證明表面效度，并討論了如何將ERT 框架應(yīng)用于和平研究。

【原文】This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation that allows scholars toaddress democratization and autocratization as related but obverse processes. We introduce a dataset that

captures 680 episodes of regime transformation (ERT) from 1900 to 2019 and offers novel insights intoregime change over the past 120 years. The ERT has three main advantages over other approaches. First, it

avoids problematic assumptions of unit homogeneity and constant as well as symmetric effects. Second, it

integrates key insights from qualitative studies by treating regime change as a gradual and uncertain process.

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）113

Third, the ERT is based on a unified framework for studying regime transformation in either direction. Thedataset differentiates between four broad types of regime transformation: liberalization in autocracies, democratic deepening in democracies, and autocratization in both democracies and autocracies (democraticand autocratic regression). It further distinguishes ten patterns with distinct outcomes, including standarddepictions of regime change (i.e. democratic transition or breakdown). A minority (32%) of ERTs producearegime transition, with the majority of episodes either ending before a transition takes place or not havingthepotential for such a transition (i.e. further democratization in democratic regimes or further autocratizationinautocratic regimes). We also provide comparisons to other datasets, illustrative case studies to demonstrateface validity, and a discussion about how the ERT framework can be applied in peace research. 6. “那些聯(lián)合國(guó)駐剛果穩(wěn)定特派團(tuán)特工在我們懷孕時(shí)就離開(kāi)了”：對(duì)剛果民主共和國(guó)維和人員子女的問(wèn)責(zé)和支持（‘Those MONUSCO agents left while we were still pregnant’:Accountability and support for peacekeeper-fathered children in the DRC）Heather Tasker，戴爾豪斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】剛果民主共和國(guó)是聯(lián)合國(guó)歷史上持續(xù)時(shí)間最長(zhǎng)、規(guī)模最大的維和特派團(tuán)所在地。聯(lián)合國(guó)也考慮到了其軍隊(duì)中的性剝削和性虐待問(wèn)題，并于 2003 年通過(guò)一份公報(bào)認(rèn)識(shí)到了其重要性，該公報(bào)后來(lái)被稱為“零容忍政策”。然而，政策制定者和研究人員很少持續(xù)關(guān)注維和人員所生子女。在本文中，我們分享了我們與與維和人員互動(dòng)的社區(qū)成員進(jìn)行的混合方法 SenseMaker? 研究的結(jié)果，以及對(duì)58名撫養(yǎng)維和人員所生子女的婦女的采訪。盡管聯(lián)合國(guó)制定了相關(guān)政策，但大多數(shù)婦女并未報(bào)告其子女為維和人員所生，也沒(méi)有得到系統(tǒng)性支持。分析顯示，“零容忍政策”的期望與剛果民主共和國(guó)的實(shí)施之間存在巨大差距。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，極度貧困和不安全感既是婦女與維和人員發(fā)生性關(guān)系的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素，也是其結(jié)果，而支持需求在很大程度上未得到滿足。我們認(rèn)為，聯(lián)合國(guó)政策執(zhí)行不力，司法管轄權(quán)復(fù)雜，司法難以獲得，聯(lián)合國(guó)對(duì)維和人員所生子女的調(diào)查和支持方式與母親的期望存在很大差距，導(dǎo)致母親及其子女的生活狀況惡化。

【 原 文 】 The Democratic Republic of Congo hosts the longest-running and largest United Nationspeacekeeping mission in history. The United Nations also has reckoned with sexual exploitation and abuseinits own ranks and, in 2003, recognized its importance with a Bulletin which became known as the ‘zerotolerance policy’. Policymakers and researchers have paid little sustained attention, however, to childrenfathered by peacekeepers. In this article, we share the results of our mixed-methods SenseMaker?researchwith community members who interact with peacekeeping personnel and interviews with 58 women whoareraising children fathered by peacekeepers. Despite the United Nations policies in place, most women didnot

report children fathered by peacekeepers and did not receive systematic support. The analysis reveals a largegap between the aspirations of the ‘zero tolerance policy’ and its operationalization in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo. We uncovered deep poverty and insecurity as both driving and resulting fromwomen’ssexual encounters with peacekeepers, with support needs largely unmet. We argue that there is a lackof

enforcement of the United Nations policies, jurisdictional complexity and inaccessible justice, as well assignificant gaps between the United Nations’ approach to investigating and supporting children fatheredby

114

peacekeepers and the expectations of mothers, resulting in worsened life conditions for mothers andtheir

children. 7. 戰(zhàn)時(shí)性暴力的政治后果：來(lái)自列表實(shí)驗(yàn)的證據(jù)（The political consequences of wartimesexual violence: Evidence from a list experiment ）

Belén González，蘇黎世大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授

Richard Traunmüller，曼海姆大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】性暴力是戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的一個(gè)普遍特征，對(duì)幸存者造成嚴(yán)重的身體、心理和社會(huì)影響。然而，我們對(duì)幸存者在沖突結(jié)束后如何與政治環(huán)境相聯(lián)系的了解有限。我們分析了斯里蘭卡戰(zhàn)后的個(gè)人調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，以評(píng)估戰(zhàn)時(shí)性侵犯是否與政治活動(dòng)有關(guān)。將列表實(shí)驗(yàn)中的非干擾性指標(biāo)與個(gè)別幸存者的政治行動(dòng)聯(lián)系起來(lái)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)個(gè)人性暴力經(jīng)歷會(huì)增加政治參與度。這種影響規(guī)模巨大，適用于制度化和非制度化的政治行動(dòng)，并且對(duì)未觀察到的混雜因素或樣本選擇偏差具有穩(wěn)健性。因果中介分析表明，戰(zhàn)時(shí)性暴力的幸存者通過(guò)參與公民網(wǎng)絡(luò)進(jìn)行政治動(dòng)員。研究結(jié)果強(qiáng)調(diào)了幸存者能動(dòng)性的相關(guān)性，有助于更好地理解戰(zhàn)時(shí)性暴力、民間社會(huì)在沖突后政治中的作用以及人道主義政策。

【 原 文 】 Sexual violence is a prevalent feature of war with severe physical, psychological, andsocial

consequences for survivors. Yet we have a limited understanding of how survivors relate to their political

environment after the conflict ends. Yet we have a limited understanding of how survivors relate totheir

political environment after the conflict ends. We analyze individual-level survey data on postwar Sri Lankato assess whether wartime sexual victimization relates to political activism. Connecting unobtrusivemeasures from a list experiment to individual survivors’ political action, we show that personal experienceof sexual violence increases political participation. This effect is substantial in size, holds for

institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political action, and is robust to unobserved confoundingor sample selection bias. Causal mediation analyses suggest that survivors of wartime sexual violencemobilize politically through their involvement in civic networks. The findings stress the relevanceof

survivors’ agency and contribute to a better understanding of wartime sexual violence, the role of civil

society in post-conflict politics, and of humanitarian policy. 8. 聯(lián)合國(guó)維和行動(dòng)是否幫助被迫流離失所者？（Do UN peace operations helpforciblydisplaced people? ）

Stefano Costalli，佛羅倫薩大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授

Jessica Di Salvatore，華威大學(xué)政治和和平研究副教授

Andrea Ruggeri，牛津大學(xué)政治學(xué)和國(guó)際關(guān)系教授

【摘要】聯(lián)合國(guó)特派團(tuán)是否減少了被迫流離失所的情況？面對(duì)不安全的環(huán)境，平民只有三種選擇：留下來(lái)；搬到更安全的社區(qū)；或者移居國(guó)外。他們遷移的愿望和能力取決于個(gè)人特征和宏觀因素（例如這些人所處的社會(huì)、經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治環(huán)境）。研究表明，聯(lián)合國(guó)特派團(tuán)可以影響和重置因戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)而改變的宏

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）115

觀環(huán)境，特別是在安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域。然而，我們?nèi)狈?shí)證證據(jù)來(lái)證明這種影響是否有助于聯(lián)合國(guó)維和行動(dòng)解決被迫流離失所和返回問(wèn)題。本文首次對(duì)聯(lián)合國(guó)特派團(tuán)是否以及如何在內(nèi)戰(zhàn)期間影響總體人口流動(dòng)進(jìn)行了全球分析。我們將難民和國(guó)內(nèi)流離失所者 (IDP) 的流出和返回?cái)?shù)據(jù)與我們預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)影響人口流動(dòng)的不同聯(lián)合國(guó)特派團(tuán)特征的數(shù)據(jù)（即其特遣隊(duì)的規(guī)模和授權(quán)任務(wù)）相結(jié)合。使用匹配的樣本，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)流出和流入過(guò)程的展開(kāi)受到聯(lián)合國(guó)特派團(tuán)不同特征的影響。大規(guī)模部署減少了國(guó)內(nèi)流離失所者的流動(dòng)并鼓勵(lì)他們返回；另一方面，聯(lián)合國(guó)特派團(tuán)的存在可能會(huì)增加難民外流。此外，具有與流離失所者相關(guān)任務(wù)的特派團(tuán)總體上與減少國(guó)內(nèi)流離失所者流動(dòng)有關(guān)，但他們只會(huì)鼓勵(lì)難民返回?！驹摹緿o UN missions reduce forced displacement? Facing insecure environments, civilians are left withthree choices: staying; moving to a safer community; or moving outside their country. Their aspirationandability to move depend on individual characteristics and macro-level factors, such as the social, economicand political context in which these people live. Research shows that UN missions can impact and reset themacro-level context altered by war, especially in the security and economic domain. However, we lackempirical evidence on whether this impact helps UN peacekeeping tackle forced displacement and returns. This article offers the first global analysis of whether and how UN missions can shape aggregate populationmovements during civil wars. We combine data on outflows and returns of refugees and internally displacedpeople (IDPs) with data on distinct UN missions’ features that we expect to affect population movements, namely the size of their contingents and their mandated tasks. Using matched samples, we find that theunfolding of the outflows and inflows processes are affected by different features of UN missions. Sizeabledeployments decrease IDPs flows and encourage their return; refugee outflows, on the other hand, mayincrease in presence of UN missions. Furthermore, missions with displacement-related mandates areassociated with decreasing IDP flows overall, but only encourage refugees’ returns. 9. 國(guó)家暴力與過(guò)渡時(shí)期司法參與：來(lái)自哥倫比亞的證據(jù)（State violence andparticipation in transitional justice: Evidence from Colombia）Elsa Voytas，達(dá)特茅斯大學(xué)量化研究助理教授

Benjamin Crisman，普林斯頓大學(xué)政治學(xué)博士研究生

【摘要】國(guó)家暴力的遺留問(wèn)題是否會(huì)削弱旨在鞏固沖突后和平的過(guò)渡司法服務(wù)的參與？我們認(rèn)為，在武裝戰(zhàn)斗之后，國(guó)家實(shí)施的暴力導(dǎo)致政府和解政策的接受度降低。我們利用犯罪者對(duì)平民施暴程度的空間和時(shí)間變化，發(fā)現(xiàn)與非國(guó)家團(tuán)體實(shí)施的暴力相比，國(guó)家部隊(duì)對(duì)平民實(shí)施的暴力與哥倫比亞國(guó)家管理的受害者登記冊(cè)中的登記率較低有關(guān)。我們使用調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)復(fù)制了這種關(guān)系，并提出了證據(jù)，將國(guó)家施暴與整體對(duì)政府的信任度降低聯(lián)系起來(lái)。總之，我們的分析表明，分解武裝行為者的身份可以為我們對(duì)和平建設(shè)和沖突后重建的理解提供重大的理論和實(shí)證進(jìn)展。在哥倫比亞的案例中，國(guó)家暴力的遺留問(wèn)題導(dǎo)致某些類型的受害者被系統(tǒng)地排除在過(guò)渡司法之外，并破壞了對(duì)負(fù)責(zé)建立持久和平之路的機(jī)構(gòu)的信任。因此，我們的研究結(jié)果對(duì)于過(guò)渡司法政策的設(shè)計(jì)、沖突遺留問(wèn)題對(duì)政治和社會(huì)結(jié)果的研究以及沖突后建設(shè)和平的進(jìn)程具有重要意義。

116

【原文】Can the legacy of state violence undermine participation in transitional justice services designedtoconsolidate peace after conflict? We argue that, in the aftermath of armed fighting, state-perpetrated violenceleads to reduced uptake of government reconciliation policies. We leverage spatial and temporal variationinlevels of civilian victimization by perpetrator and find that, in contrast to violence committed by non-stategroups, violence carried out by state forces against civilians is associated with lower levels of enlistment inColombia’s state-run victims’ registry. We replicate this relationship using survey data and present evidencelinking victimization by the state to lower levels of trust in the government overall. Together, our analysesdemonstrate that disaggregating the identity of armed actors can provide significant theoretical and empirical

advances in our understanding of peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. In the Colombian case, thelegacy of state violence leads to the systematic exclusion of certain types of victims fromtransitional justiceand undermines trust in the institutions responsible for building durable pathways to peace. Consequently, our findings have implications for the design of transitional justice policies, the study of the legacies of

conflict on political and social outcomes, and processes of post-conflict peacebuilding. 【編譯：王涵婧賴永禎】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】《中國(guó)國(guó)際政治季刊》（The China Journal of International Politics）The China Journal of International Politics，Vol.17, No.3, 2024

1. 國(guó)際關(guān)系理論中是否存在中國(guó)學(xué)派？（Is There a Chinese School of IRTheory?）Peter J Katzenstein，康奈爾大學(xué)政府系國(guó)際研究教授

《中國(guó)國(guó)際政治季刊》（The China Journal of International

Politics）創(chuàng)刊于 2006 年，2012 年進(jìn)入 SSCI，迄今仍是中國(guó)大陸主辦的唯一一份政治學(xué) SSCI 專業(yè)期刊。自創(chuàng)刊以來(lái)，CJIP 堅(jiān)持發(fā)表原創(chuàng)性學(xué)術(shù)研究成果，重點(diǎn)推動(dòng)國(guó)際關(guān)系理論創(chuàng)新和中國(guó)對(duì)外關(guān)系方面的研究，發(fā)表了諸多國(guó)內(nèi)外知名學(xué)者的文章。CJIP 發(fā)表的文章在東亞、歐洲和北美三地學(xué)者間保持了較好的平衡，在促進(jìn)國(guó)際關(guān)系理論多元化發(fā)展方面發(fā)揮了獨(dú)特作用。2022 年該刊影響因子為 2.0，在96 份國(guó)際關(guān)系類 SSCI 期刊中名列第 39，是亞洲地區(qū)排名最高的國(guó)際關(guān)系類 SSCI 期刊。

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）117

【摘要】國(guó)際關(guān)系理論中是否存在中國(guó)學(xué)派？作者對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的回答是矛盾的。盡管國(guó)際關(guān)系理論中沒(méi)有一個(gè)內(nèi)核一致的中國(guó)學(xué)派，卻有一些不同的由中國(guó)學(xué)者提出的國(guó)際關(guān)系理論。如果說(shuō)“物以類聚，人以群分”，那么中國(guó)學(xué)者在研究方法上的差異與他們都是中國(guó)人這一事實(shí)同樣重要。清華學(xué)派/道義現(xiàn)實(shí)主義和古典現(xiàn)實(shí)主義有很多共同之處。文化關(guān)系主義、共生理論和天下觀念提供了很有意思的中國(guó)方法。中國(guó)國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)者和美國(guó)、歐洲以及世界其他地方的學(xué)者一樣，都沉浸于19 世紀(jì)牛頓機(jī)械論的世界觀中，自然科學(xué)中的量子力學(xué)和科學(xué)宇宙論已經(jīng)證實(shí)了牛頓世界觀的局限性。相比之下，人文學(xué)科的世界觀與 20 世紀(jì)的物理學(xué)完全一致。然而，中國(guó)和世界其他地方的社會(huì)科學(xué)和國(guó)際關(guān)系分析家仍然堅(jiān)持牛頓世界觀，這導(dǎo)致無(wú)論是中國(guó)還是西方的國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)者都在管窺蠡測(cè)一般預(yù)測(cè)未來(lái)。從歷史學(xué)和語(yǔ)義學(xué)角度來(lái)看，未來(lái)和過(guò)去一樣始終處于變化之中，歷史總能被再次解釋，未來(lái)也總是不可被預(yù)測(cè)。

【原文】Is there a Chinese School of International Relations (IR) Theory? My answer to this questionisambivalent. Although a Chinese school of IR theory does not exist in the singular, it does exist in the plural. If “birds of a feather flock together,” then the difference in approaches taken by Chinese scholars is asrelevant as is the fact that the scholars are all Chinese. The Tsinghua School and moral realismshare muchwith classical realism. Cultural relationalism also offers a distinctive Chinese approach as doGongsheng/symbiotic and tianxia approaches. That said, Chinese IR scholarship shares with IRscholarshipin America, Europe, and the rest of the world its firm anchor in the Newtonian mechanical worldviewof thelate 19th century. Natural sciences, such as quantum mechanics and scientific cosmology, meanwhileconcluded long ago that Newtonianism offers an often practicable yet constricted viewof the world. Incontrast, the humanities operate with a worldview fully consonant with 20th century physics. It is the social

sciences and the analysis of IR which continues to adhere to the mechanical worldview common in thelate19th century—in China and the rest of the world. In both “China” and “the West” IR, scholars are tappingtheir canes against the pavement, seeking to fathom what will happen next. If historians and semanticmodelers are right, like the future, the past is never distant. Always open to reinterpretation, it is likethefuture—unpredictable. 2. 例外主義的關(guān)系分析：將自由主義與儒家多邊主義和情感相聯(lián)系（ARelational

Analysis of Exceptionalism: Connecting Liberalism with Confucian MultilateralismandEmotion）

石之瑜，同濟(jì)大學(xué)政治與國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)院客座教授、臺(tái)灣大學(xué)政治學(xué)系名譽(yù)教授郭銘傑，臺(tái)灣大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授

【摘要】關(guān)于例外主義的文獻(xiàn)關(guān)注其獨(dú)特的國(guó)家來(lái)源和由此而來(lái)的不同風(fēng)格。因此，例外主義幾乎成了文化和身份的代名詞，而非國(guó)際關(guān)系。本文認(rèn)為，例外主義揭示了一種關(guān)系身份，這種身份在例外主義出現(xiàn)之前既喻示多邊關(guān)系，又受其影響。本文還認(rèn)為，所有關(guān)系系統(tǒng)都在尋求擴(kuò)張和共存?；趯?duì)儒家和自由主義多邊關(guān)系的比較研究，兩者都有類似的參與、轉(zhuǎn)變、脫離和學(xué)習(xí)循環(huán)。然而，多邊關(guān)系中的兩種例外主義有所不同。美國(guó)例外主義信奉一種超越的身份，并以此與其他國(guó)家形成鮮明對(duì)比，因?yàn)槠渌麌?guó)家擁有相同的身份，也應(yīng)該遵循相同的規(guī)則。相反，中國(guó)例外主義設(shè)想了一種優(yōu)越的、

118

仁慈的身份，以確保沒(méi)有共同身份的所有人之間的和諧與和平。本文追溯了儒家思想與自由主義在多邊主義——包容性與基于規(guī)則的治理，仁慈的例外與普遍的權(quán)利——的解釋上的差異，以及由此產(chǎn)生的與陌生人接觸時(shí)的取向。結(jié)論前的最后一部分對(duì)與國(guó)際關(guān)系理論日益關(guān)注的情感因素相對(duì)應(yīng)。這種例外主義與情感之間的理性—情感聯(lián)系進(jìn)一步證明了關(guān)系議程在解釋多元國(guó)際關(guān)系方面的前景?！驹摹縏he literature on exceptionalism is preoccupied with its distinctive national sources and resultantlydiffering styles. Exceptionalism has thus become almost synonymous with culture and identity, rather thaninternational relations (IRs). The paper instead argues that exceptionalism reveals a relational identitythat

both informs and is informed by a multilateral relation prior to the emergence of exceptionalism. It alsoargues that all relational systems seek expansion and coexistence. Based upon a comparative studyof

Confucian and liberal multilateral relationalities, a similar cycle of engagement, conversion, disengagement, and learning is applicable to both. Two exceptionalisms in multilateral relationality differ, however. American exceptionalism embraces a transcendent identity with which to contrast with the rest, whosharethe same identity and are expected to follow the same rules. Chinese exceptionalism contrarily envisionsasuperior, benevolent identity to ensure harmony and peace among all, who share no collective identity. Thepaper traces how Confucianism diverges from liberalism with regard to what accounts for multilateralism—inclusiveness versus rule-based governance, and benevolent exceptions versus universal rights —andtheresulting orientations during encounters with strangers. The last section before the conclusion corresponds tothe growing attention in IRs theorising to the factor of emotion. Such rational–emotional connectivity—between exceptionalism and emotion—can further attest to the promise of the relational agenda in explainingpluriversal IRs. 3. 為什么現(xiàn)在有非西方國(guó)際關(guān)系理論（Why there is Now Non-Western International

Relations Theory）

任曉，北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)區(qū)域與全球治理高等研究院教授，復(fù)旦大學(xué)國(guó)際問(wèn)題研究院教授【摘要】過(guò)去二十年來(lái)，中國(guó)國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)者開(kāi)啟了世界政治的創(chuàng)新思維之旅。這一努力結(jié)出了理論碩果，既是對(duì)現(xiàn)有范式的補(bǔ)充，也有可能形成獨(dú)特的國(guó)際關(guān)系“中國(guó)學(xué)派”。與常見(jiàn)的誤解相反，這一新興學(xué)派并非試圖直接挑戰(zhàn)西方理論霸權(quán)，而是要反映中國(guó)知識(shí)貢獻(xiàn)的有機(jī)演變，不受政府的直接影響。值得注意的是，“共生”等理論在脫離西方國(guó)際關(guān)系框架的情況下已經(jīng)獨(dú)立成熟。因此，“中國(guó)學(xué)派”的出現(xiàn)預(yù)示著向更具包容性的全球國(guó)際關(guān)系計(jì)劃邁出了重要一步?！驹摹縊ver the past two decades, Chinese international relations scholars have embarked on a journeyof

innovative thinking in world politics. The endeavour has borne theoretical fruits that both complement

existing paradigms and potentially constitute a distinct “Chinese school” of international relations. Contraryto common misconceptions, this emerging school seeks not to challenge Western theoretical hegemonyoutright, but rather to reflect the organic evolution of Chinese intellectual contributions, independent of

direct government influence. Notably, such theories as gongsheng/symbiosis have, in divergingfromWestern IR frameworks, matured autonomously. The emergence of a “Chinese school” thus heralds asignificant stride towards a more inclusive Global IR programme.

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）119

4. 論壇：國(guó)際關(guān)系理論中國(guó)學(xué)派之辯（Forum: Debating the Chinese School(s) of IRTheory）

魯鵬，華東政法大學(xué)政府管理學(xué)院教授；任曉，北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)區(qū)域與全球治理高等研究院教授，復(fù)旦大學(xué)國(guó)際問(wèn)題研究院教授；Toni Erskine，澳大利亞國(guó)立大學(xué)亞太事務(wù)學(xué)院教授；Stefano Guzzini，歐洲大學(xué)學(xué)院政治與社會(huì)科學(xué)系教授，日內(nèi)瓦高等學(xué)院國(guó)際關(guān)系與政治學(xué)系兼職教授；Barry Buzan，倫敦政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院國(guó)際關(guān)系系名譽(yù)教授；Beate Jahn，薩塞克斯大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系系名譽(yù)教授；JustinRosenberg，薩塞克斯大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系系名譽(yù)教授

【摘要】本論壇論文與本刊往期和本期連續(xù)發(fā)表的八篇論文共同構(gòu)成了一個(gè)特別的專題研討會(huì)，在國(guó)際關(guān)系理論的“中國(guó)學(xué)派”與“西方”國(guó)際關(guān)系理論之間展開(kāi)對(duì)話。撰稿人既有代表各種西方范式的著名西方理論家，也有來(lái)自“中國(guó)學(xué)派”三個(gè)分支，即“道義現(xiàn)實(shí)主義”“關(guān)系理論”和“共生理論”的中國(guó)頂尖理論家。中國(guó)學(xué)派與西方理論之間的對(duì)話之所以成為可能，是因?yàn)榍罢呓陙?lái)在理論上取得了突破，而后者則在增強(qiáng)理論多樣性方面作出了努力。雙方作者都致力于促進(jìn)平等、全面和建設(shè)性的對(duì)話。西方理論家對(duì)中國(guó)學(xué)派進(jìn)行了整體評(píng)價(jià)，并深入探討了其分支的具體內(nèi)容。他們將中國(guó)學(xué)派與西方理論進(jìn)行比較，強(qiáng)調(diào)異同，反思共同問(wèn)題，指出中國(guó)學(xué)派的貢獻(xiàn)與不足，并為其進(jìn)一步發(fā)展提出解決方案。作為回應(yīng)，中國(guó)學(xué)派學(xué)者重申了他們的理論關(guān)切，并相應(yīng)地完善了其理論立場(chǎng)。此次對(duì)話展示了中西方理論家克服語(yǔ)言和文化障礙，實(shí)現(xiàn)相互理解和寶貴合作的潛力。【原文】The papers in this Forum, along with eight papers consecutively published in previous and current

issues of this journal, constitute a special symposium, which engages in a dialogue between the “ChineseSchool” of International Relations (IR) theory and “Western” IR theories. The contributors are renownedWestern theorists representing various Western paradigms and leading Chinese theorists fromthe threebranches of the Chinese School, namely “moral realism,” “relational theory,” and “symbiosis theory.”Thedialogue between the Chinese School and Western theories has become feasible due to recent theoretical

breakthroughs achieved by the former and the observed efforts to enhance theoretical diversity in the latter. Contributors from both sides are committed to fostering an equal, comprehensive, and constructive dialogue. Western theorists provide an evaluation of the Chinese School as a whole and delve into the specifics of itsbranches. They compare the Chinese School with Western theories, highlighting similarities and differences, reflecting on shared issues, identifying both contributions and shortcomings of the Chinese School, andproposing solutions for its further development. In response, Chinese School scholars reiterate their

theoretical concerns and refine their theoretical stances accordingly. This dialogue demonstrates the potential

for Chinese and Western theorists to overcome language and cultural barriers to achieve mutual

understanding and valuable collaboration. 5. 國(guó)際關(guān)系理論中東亞歷史的使用與誤用（The Use and Misuse of East AsianHistoryin IR Theorizing）

陳拯，復(fù)旦大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系與公共事務(wù)學(xué)院教授

120

【摘要】過(guò)去二十年來(lái)，東亞國(guó)際關(guān)系史研究掀起了一股熱潮。學(xué)者們?cè)噲D拓寬國(guó)際關(guān)系史的參考框架，以驗(yàn)證理論及形成理論。本文回顧這一最新趨勢(shì)，審視其局限性并探討未來(lái)議程。在研究東亞國(guó)際關(guān)系史時(shí)，學(xué)者們對(duì)其研究是支持、補(bǔ)充還是削弱西方主流國(guó)際關(guān)系有著不同的期待。因此，他們的歷史研究之時(shí)空范圍及理論抱負(fù)也大相徑庭。學(xué)者們不再簡(jiǎn)單地將所有東亞歷史視為一個(gè)案例，而是將其視為具有不同模式的多個(gè)案例。他們認(rèn)識(shí)到該系統(tǒng)不僅由中國(guó)組成，還由多個(gè)參與者組成。除了將東亞與西歐進(jìn)行對(duì)比，他們還探討了東亞與其他非西方地區(qū)的相似之處。然而，要推進(jìn)這一議程，學(xué)者們必須謹(jǐn)慎地處理三種張力：“東方”與“西方”之間的張力、歷史與國(guó)際關(guān)系兩個(gè)學(xué)科之間的張力，以及過(guò)去與現(xiàn)在之間的張力。因此，未來(lái)的研究必須拓寬視野以更好地超越民族中心主義和例外論，完善研究方法，既要避免選擇偏差，又要進(jìn)行更復(fù)雜的比較，并與當(dāng)代政治保持適當(dāng)?shù)木嚯x。最重要的是，他們應(yīng)將高質(zhì)量的歷史研究與前沿的國(guó)際關(guān)系理論趨勢(shì)相結(jié)合，構(gòu)建可應(yīng)用于其他地區(qū)的動(dòng)態(tài)理論。

【原文】The past two decades have witnessed a wave of research into the history of East Asian international

relations (IR). Scholars seek to broaden the historical frames of reference in IR for both theory testingandtheory generation. The article reviews this recent trend, examining its limitations and exploringfutureagenda. In studying historical East Asian IR, scholars have different expectations regarding whether their

research would support, complement, or undermine mainstream Western IR. The spatial and temporal scopeof their historical inquiries, as well as theoretical ambitions, therefore, differ significantly. Scholars nolonger treat all East Asian history as simply one case, but as multiple cases with divergent patterns, andtheyrecognize that the system consisted not solely of China but of multiple actors. In addition to contrastingEast

Asia with Western Europe, they explore also the similarities between East Asia and other non-Westernregions. To advance the agenda, however, scholars must scrupulously navigate three tensions. They are: thetension between the “East” and “West”; the tension between the two disciplines of history and IR; andthetension between past and present. Future studies, therefore, must broaden their horizons in order tobetter

transcend ethnocentrism and exceptionalism, refine their methodology both to avoid selection bias andconduct more sophisticated comparisons, and to maintain a proper distance from contemporary politics. Most importantly, they should combine high-quality historical research with cutting-edge IRtheoretical

trends to construct dynamic theories that could be applied to other regions. 【編譯：汪平平張瀟文】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】The China Journal of International Politics，Vol.17, No.4, 2024

1. 中美經(jīng)濟(jì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的討價(jià)還價(jià)理論：區(qū)分貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)與技術(shù)戰(zhàn)（A Bargaining Theoryof US–China Economic Rivalry: Differentiating the Trade and Technology Wars）Cathy Xuauxuan Wu，美國(guó)歐道明大學(xué)政治與地理學(xué)系助理教授

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）121

【摘要】本文探討了中美經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)的爆發(fā)及其持續(xù)性，它包括以報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅為特征的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)和以限制中國(guó)獲取美國(guó)技術(shù)為特征的技術(shù)戰(zhàn)。基于討價(jià)還價(jià)與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的分析框架，本文認(rèn)為經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)的不同組成部分源于不同的原因。貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)的主要原因是信息問(wèn)題，由相互不確定性和缺乏有效溝通導(dǎo)致。技術(shù)戰(zhàn)則主要是承諾問(wèn)題的產(chǎn)物，由現(xiàn)有大國(guó)對(duì)未來(lái)力量平衡可能發(fā)生變化的擔(dān)憂所導(dǎo)致。在對(duì)特朗普?qǐng)?zhí)政時(shí)期的啟動(dòng)階段進(jìn)行分析后，作者進(jìn)一步分析了拜登政府期間的經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)是如何展開(kāi)的。隨著相互不確定性的減少，似乎不太可能爆發(fā)新一輪貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，但隨著貿(mào)易問(wèn)題上的承諾問(wèn)題變得更加關(guān)鍵，現(xiàn)有的關(guān)稅仍然存在。預(yù)計(jì)預(yù)防性技術(shù)戰(zhàn)將持續(xù)，反映出華盛頓對(duì)中國(guó)在技術(shù)領(lǐng)域日益增強(qiáng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的持續(xù)擔(dān)憂。

【原文】This article examines the outbreak and persistence of US–China economic war, which comprisesboth the trade war, featured with retaliatory tariffs, and the technology war, featured with restrictions onChinese access to US technologies. Building on the analytical framework of bargaining and war, I arguethat

different components of the economic war emerged from distinct causes. The outbreak of the trade war wasprimarily driven by the information problem, characterized by mutual uncertainty and the lack of effectivecommunications. The technology war was largely a result of the commitment problem driven by the existingpower’s concern regarding potential future changes in the balance of power. After examining the initiationstage during the Trump era, I further analyze how the economic war has unfolded during the Bidenadministration. While the prospect of a new trade war seems unlikely as mutual uncertainty diminishes, existing tariffs remain as the commitment problem on trade issues has become more critical. The preventivetechnology war is expected to persist, reflecting Washington’s ongoing concerns over China’s growingleadership in technology. 2. 競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者的動(dòng)力？新冠肺炎和國(guó)際組織在財(cái)政援助體制復(fù)合體中的關(guān)系（The

Contender’s Momentum? COVID-19 and IO Relations in the Regime Complex of

Financial Assistance）

Felix Bierman，德國(guó)慕尼黑大學(xué)格施維斯特-肖爾政治學(xué)研究所博士后研究員Benjamin Da?ler，德國(guó)慕尼黑大學(xué)格施維斯特-肖爾政治學(xué)研究所博士后研究員【摘要】危機(jī)如何影響國(guó)際體制復(fù)合體中的權(quán)威結(jié)構(gòu)？國(guó)際秩序的特點(diǎn)是體制復(fù)合體，由越來(lái)越多相互重疊、爭(zhēng)奪權(quán)威的制度組成。大多數(shù)復(fù)合體由已建立的制度組成，面對(duì)的是越來(lái)越多新近成立的制度競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者。我們認(rèn)為，危機(jī)可以改變體制復(fù)合體的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)結(jié)構(gòu)。從國(guó)家的角度來(lái)看，危機(jī)情況可以為新創(chuàng)建的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者（被設(shè)計(jì)為制度替代品）提供相對(duì)于現(xiàn)有制度的功能優(yōu)勢(shì)。歷史悠久的制度往往高度制度化，降低了決策的靈活性和速度。因此，在危機(jī)期間，國(guó)家可能會(huì)將其合作活動(dòng)從惰性機(jī)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)移到新創(chuàng)建的、更靈活的且覆蓋面較小的替代機(jī)構(gòu)。我們通過(guò)研究新冠肺炎危機(jī)對(duì)財(cái)政援助（FA）體制復(fù)合體的影響來(lái)檢驗(yàn)我們主張的合理性。制度危機(jī)應(yīng)對(duì)的定性過(guò)程分析結(jié)果與財(cái)政援助復(fù)合體的比較網(wǎng)絡(luò)分析相結(jié)合，支持了我們的論點(diǎn)。大流行為亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行和新開(kāi)發(fā)銀行提供了機(jī)會(huì)，使其能夠?qū)⒆约憾ㄎ粸榘l(fā)展中國(guó)家應(yīng)對(duì)危機(jī)的可靠替代選擇，取代世界銀行等既有機(jī)構(gòu)。

122

【原文】How do crises affect authority structures in international regime complexes? The international order

is characterized by regime complexes consisting of ever more overlapping institutions competingfor

authority. Most complexes consist of established institutions facing a growing number of more recentlycreated institutional contenders. We argue that crises can alter the competitive structure of regime complexes. From the perspective of states, crisis situations can provide newly created contenders—designedasinstitutional alternatives—with functional advantages over established institutions. Long-establishedinstitutions tend to be highly institutionalized, decreasing flexibility and speed of decision-making. Thus, during crises, states may shift their cooperative activities away from inert institutions and to newly created, more flexible alternatives that are less encompassing. We test the plausibility of our claimby studyingtheeffects of the COVID-19 crisis on the regime complex of financial assistance (FA). The results of aqualitative process analysis of institutional crisis responses combined with a comparative network analysisof the FA complex support our argument. The COVID-19 pandemic provided an opportunity for the AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank to position themselves as crisis-proof

alternatives for developing countries to established institutions like the World Bank. 3. 地緣政治的 造王者：韓國(guó)與菲 律賓在中美競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中的關(guān)鍵角色（Geopolitical

Kingmakers: South Korea and the Philippines as Linchpins amid the China–USCompetition）

Richard J Cook，南開(kāi)大學(xué)周恩來(lái)政府管理學(xué)院國(guó)際關(guān)系系博士后

Maximilian Ohle，德國(guó)圖賓根大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士候選人

韓召穎，南開(kāi)大學(xué)周恩來(lái)政府管理學(xué)院國(guó)際關(guān)系系教授

【摘要】在中美緊張局勢(shì)不斷升級(jí)的情況下，韓國(guó)和菲律賓占據(jù)著關(guān)鍵的地緣政治地位。首爾和馬尼拉都發(fā)現(xiàn)自己陷入了這些大國(guó)之間日益擴(kuò)大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中，在當(dāng)前普遍不穩(wěn)定的地區(qū)現(xiàn)狀中，它們面臨著眾多戰(zhàn)略挑戰(zhàn)。盡管兩國(guó)努力維持微妙的平衡，通常被形容為對(duì)沖行為，但這種操作的空間正在縮小，迫使它們走向危險(xiǎn)的地緣政治聯(lián)盟。因此，本文試圖解決以下問(wèn)題：對(duì)沖空間的縮小如何影響韓國(guó)和菲律賓的結(jié)盟策略？它們的結(jié)盟選擇又如何影響中美戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的地緣政治動(dòng)態(tài)？研究認(rèn)為，隨著這一空間的收縮，它們有能力通過(guò)結(jié)盟顯著影響地區(qū)力量平衡，我們將其定義為造王者的角色以及弱力量悖論。首爾在應(yīng)對(duì)朝鮮半島的復(fù)雜動(dòng)態(tài)時(shí)，必須仔細(xì)權(quán)衡其對(duì)華盛頓和北京的承諾，特別是考慮到與朝鮮的持續(xù)發(fā)展。與此同時(shí)，在杜特爾特政府的結(jié)盟振蕩之后，馬尼拉尋求建立一個(gè)更明確的戰(zhàn)略方向，這在很大程度上受到南海緊張局勢(shì)的影響。如今，兩國(guó)都越來(lái)越努力地向華盛頓尋求安全保證，并承認(rèn)與北京的聯(lián)系存在經(jīng)濟(jì)安全擔(dān)憂。此外，在全球不確定性日益加劇的背景下，它們更加重視維護(hù)以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的國(guó)際秩序。

【原文】South Korea and the Philippines hold pivotal geopolitical positions amidst escalating tensionsbetween the USA and China. Both Seoul and Manila find themselves ensnared in the expanding rivalrybetween these great powers, subjecting them to numerous strategic challenges amid the prevailing regional

status quo of instability. Despite their efforts to maintain a delicate balance, often characterized as hedging

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）123

behavior, the space available for such maneuvering is diminishing, compelling themtoward perilousgeopolitical alignments. Therefore, this paper seeks to address the following questions: Howdoes theshrinking space to hedge influence the alignment strategies of South Korea and the Philippines? Howdotheir alignment choices impact the geopolitical dynamics of the China–US strategic competition? It arguesthat as this space contracts, they possess the capability to significantly influence the regional balanceof

power through their alignment, which we frame as the kingmaker’s role and the power of the weak paradox. Seoul, navigating the complex dynamics of the Korean Peninsula, must carefully weigh its commitments toboth Washington and Beijing, particularly in light of ongoing developments with North Korea. Meanwhile, Manila, in the aftermath of the Duterte administration’s alignment oscillations, has sought to establishaclearer strategic direction largely influenced by tensions in the South China Sea. Both are nowincreasinglytacking hard toward Washington for security assurances and have acknowledged economic security anxietiesconcerning their links with Beijing. Furthermore, they are placing greater emphasis on upholdingtherules-based international order amid growing global uncertainties. 4. 國(guó)際關(guān)系中的解釋技巧（Explanatory Games in International Relations）Enzo Lenine，巴西巴伊亞聯(lián)邦大學(xué)哲學(xué)與人文科學(xué)學(xué)院政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】解釋在國(guó)際關(guān)系（IR）中發(fā)揮著核心作用。然而，由于不同的解釋概念影響著我們?cè)趪?guó)際關(guān)系研究中的實(shí)踐，這一核心地位在學(xué)科內(nèi)遠(yuǎn)未得到確立。這些觀念通常被歸納為廣泛的二元對(duì)立，例如解釋與理解、構(gòu)成性解釋與因果解釋、實(shí)證主義與詮釋論，進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致學(xué)科的長(zhǎng)期分裂感，同時(shí)在這一過(guò)程中模糊了國(guó)際關(guān)系研究特有的解釋多元主義。本文認(rèn)為，國(guó)際關(guān)系中存在多種解釋方法，不同學(xué)者在各種國(guó)際研究領(lǐng)域中進(jìn)行著不同的解釋技巧。解釋技巧的特征在于構(gòu)成規(guī)則、表征規(guī)則、推理規(guī)則和范圍規(guī)則，這些規(guī)則為定制解釋提供了基礎(chǔ)。學(xué)者們根據(jù)其解釋難題選擇最合適的技巧，遵循一套特定的規(guī)則來(lái)驗(yàn)證其解釋形式，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)其研究目標(biāo)。最終，學(xué)科內(nèi)的解釋本質(zhì)上是多元的。因此，考察這種解釋多元主義需要對(duì)我們解釋技巧的規(guī)則進(jìn)行深入研究。

【原文】Explanation plays a central role in international relations (IR). However, as different conceptions of

explanation inform our conduct of practices in IR inquiry, such centrality is far from being a settled matter inthe discipline. These conceptions tend to be subsumed under broad dichotomies—such as explanationvs. understanding, constitutive vs. causal explanation, and positivism vs. interpretivism—which, inturn, generate a sense of a perennially divided discipline, obfuscating in this process the explanatory pluralismthat characterises IR research. In this paper, I argue that different approaches to explanation coexist inIR, with different explanatory games being played by scholars in various fields of international inquiry. Explanatory games are characterised by constitutive rules, rules of representation, rules of inference, andrules of scope, all of which provide the basis for tailoring explanations. Scholars play the game that worksbest for their explanatory puzzles, following a specific set of rules that validate their formof explanationandthus achieve their research goals. Ultimately, explanation in the discipline is inherently plural. Examiningthis explanatory pluralism, therefore, requires investigating the rules of our explanatory games.

124

5. 數(shù)字時(shí)代的聯(lián)盟構(gòu)建與中美競(jìng)爭(zhēng)（Coalition Building and Sino–US Competitioninthe Digital Era）

劉興華，南開(kāi)大學(xué)周恩來(lái)政府管理學(xué)院國(guó)際關(guān)系系副教授

【摘要】在數(shù)字時(shí)代，數(shù)字聯(lián)盟成為美國(guó)與中國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的主要工具，與傳統(tǒng)的聯(lián)盟和軍事同盟有著顯著的不同。有必要超越純粹的大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)視角，通過(guò)聯(lián)盟和主導(dǎo)國(guó)家與聯(lián)盟成員之間的關(guān)系來(lái)探討中美數(shù)字競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。數(shù)字聯(lián)盟是一種具有組織性質(zhì)的國(guó)家聯(lián)合體，其目標(biāo)是針對(duì)數(shù)字戰(zhàn)略、規(guī)范、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、產(chǎn)業(yè)和產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行合作，以共同應(yīng)對(duì)數(shù)字時(shí)代的挑戰(zhàn)。數(shù)字聯(lián)盟的構(gòu)建和維持有兩個(gè)主要決定因素：盟友對(duì)美國(guó)的安全依賴和數(shù)字關(guān)系中的技術(shù)壟斷。安全依賴程度決定了聯(lián)盟構(gòu)建的可能性：依賴程度越高，盟友越愿意響應(yīng)主導(dǎo)國(guó)家的數(shù)字安全敘事和動(dòng)員。構(gòu)建以理念和治理倡議構(gòu)為中心的簡(jiǎn)單數(shù)字聯(lián)盟是可能的。然而，構(gòu)建和維持復(fù)雜的數(shù)字聯(lián)盟則依賴于技術(shù)壟斷和安全依賴的存在。技術(shù)壟斷是指控制對(duì)行業(yè)生存至關(guān)重要的關(guān)鍵技術(shù)的供應(yīng)，迫使盟友犧牲市場(chǎng)利益并參與數(shù)字聯(lián)盟，以確保其行業(yè)的完整性?！靶酒姆铰?lián)盟”和“貿(mào)易和技術(shù)委員會(huì)”是美國(guó)主導(dǎo)的數(shù)字聯(lián)盟的典型例子。【原文】Digital coalitions are the primary tool of the USA to compete with China in the digital ageanddiffer markedly from traditional alliances and military coalitions. It is necessary to go beyond the visionof

pure great power rivalry and probe Sino–US digital competition through the lens of coalitions andtherelationship between the dominant state and coalition members. A digital coalition is a state consortiumwithan organisational nature, confrontational targets, common goals, and the capability to take collective action, formed to deal with the digital strategy, norms, standards, industry, and products. The two main determinantsof the building and maintenance of the digital coalition are the security dependency of allies on the USAandthe technological stranglehold in the digital relationship. Security dependency determines the likelihoodof

coalition construction; the higher the dependency, the more willing allies will be to respond to the dominant

state’s digital security narrative and mobilisation. There is potential for the construction of simple digital

coalitions centred on conceptions and governance initiatives. However, building and maintaining a complexdigital coalition depends on the presence of a technological stranglehold as well as security dependencies. Atechnological stranglehold involves controlling the supply of key technologies critical to the survival of theindustry, and compels allies to sacrifice market interests and participate in a digital coalition to ensuretheintegrity of their industries. The Chip 4 Alliance and Trade and Technology Council are typical examples of

US-led digital coalitions. 6. 論壇：俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和全球南方的反應(yīng)與中美競(jìng)爭(zhēng)（Forum: The Russia–UkraineWarand Reactions from the Global South ）

Vidya Nadkarni，美國(guó)圣地亞哥大學(xué)文理學(xué)院政治學(xué)與國(guó)際關(guān)系系教授

Paul D’Anieri，美國(guó)加州大學(xué)河濱分校政治學(xué)系教授

Sydney Kerr，美國(guó)加州大學(xué)河濱分校政治學(xué)系博士生

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova，英國(guó)倫敦國(guó)王學(xué)院俄羅斯研究所教授

Xiaoyu Pu，美國(guó)內(nèi)華達(dá)大學(xué)里諾分校政治學(xué)系副教授

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）125

Deepa M Ollapally，美國(guó)喬治華盛頓大學(xué)艾略特國(guó)際事務(wù)學(xué)院科研教授

Paulo Velasco Junior，巴西里約熱內(nèi)盧州立大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系系副教授

Candice Moore, 南非金山大學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)學(xué)院高級(jí)講師

Abdolrasool Divsallar，意大利圣心天主教大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與國(guó)際關(guān)系研究生院訪問(wèn)教授【摘要】俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)已成為全球?qū)W者和政策制定者關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。西方國(guó)家對(duì)俄羅斯的入侵行為表示譴責(zé)并實(shí)施了制裁，而全球南方國(guó)家則表現(xiàn)出不同的立場(chǎng)。在本次論壇中，我們將分析戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的起因以及全球南方主要國(guó)家（包括中國(guó)、印度、巴西、南非和伊朗）對(duì)此的反應(yīng)。戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的原因多種多樣，明確這些原因?qū)斫饣謴?fù)和平所需的條件具有重要意義。然而，就戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)原因達(dá)成共識(shí)并非易事。全球南方的大國(guó)和中等強(qiáng)國(guó)拒絕譴責(zé)俄羅斯的入侵，同時(shí)聲稱堅(jiān)持主權(quán)和領(lǐng)土完整的原則。他們的立場(chǎng)受到不同視角及工具性考量與規(guī)范性考量之間權(quán)衡的影響。烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)將全球秩序問(wèn)題推到了世界政治的前沿，提出了國(guó)際體系是否正向后西方秩序轉(zhuǎn)變，或沖突是否加強(qiáng)了西方主導(dǎo)地位等問(wèn)題。此外，全球南方國(guó)家的國(guó)家質(zhì)疑西方主導(dǎo)秩序的合法性。通過(guò)考察全球南方的視角，本論壇旨在為關(guān)于俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)及全球南方在全球秩序變遷中所扮演角色的討論做出貢獻(xiàn)。

【原文】The war between Russia and Ukraine has been a topic of interest for scholars and policymakersworldwide. Western countries have condemned and imposed sanctions on Russia, while countries intheGlobal South have taken varying positions. In this Forum, we will analyse the origins of the war andtheresponses to it of key countries in the Global South, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, andIran. The war has multiple causes, and identifying them has implications for understanding what is necessarytoregain peace. However, reaching a consensus on its causes will not be easy. Great and middle powers intheGlobal South have refused to condemn Russia’s aggression, at the same time claiming to upholdtheprinciples of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Their positions are shaped by different perspectives andtrade-offs between instrumental calculations and normative considerations. The war in Ukraine has brought

the issue of global order to the forefront of world politics. It raises the questions of whether the structureof

the international system is shifting towards a post-Western order or whether the conflict has strengthenedWestern domination. Furthermore, countries in the Global South question the legitimacy of certain aspects of

the Western-dominated order. By examining the perspectives of the Global South, this Forummaycontribute to discussions on the Russia–Ukraine war and the role of the Global South in the shiftingglobal

order. 【編譯：束任翔張瀟文】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】

126

《安全研究》（Security Studies）

Security Studies，Vol.33, No.2, 2024

1. 購(gòu)買生存：為何領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者會(huì)雇傭私人軍隊(duì)？（Buying Survival: Why Do Leaders HireMercenaries?）

Leonardo Gentil-Fernandes，馬里蘭大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士后

Kelly Morrison, 田納西大學(xué)諾克斯維爾分校政治學(xué)系助理教授

Jacob Otto, 匹茲堡大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士生

【摘要】雇傭軍在國(guó)際與國(guó)內(nèi)安全中發(fā)揮著愈發(fā)重要的作用。為什么領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者會(huì)雇傭私人軍隊(duì)？本文認(rèn)為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者利用私人軍事組織來(lái)預(yù)防政變的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但前提是這些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者與國(guó)際社會(huì)的聯(lián)系比較薄弱。雖然雇傭軍可以分散國(guó)內(nèi)軍事能力，來(lái)作為一項(xiàng)必要的政變預(yù)防功能，但鑒于反對(duì)使用雇傭軍的強(qiáng)有力規(guī)范，它們也使得某些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者面臨國(guó)際社會(huì)的譴責(zé)。我們?cè)诓煌瑖?guó)家和時(shí)期找到了對(duì)本文理論的有力支撐：政變風(fēng)險(xiǎn)高、國(guó)際問(wèn)責(zé)低的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者極有可能雇傭私人軍隊(duì)。本文的理論和發(fā)現(xiàn)為私人軍事組織對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)社會(huì)的重要性提供了獨(dú)特的見(jiàn)解。

【原文】Mercenaries play an increasingly important role in international and domestic security. Whydoleaders hire mercenaries? We argue that leaders employ private military organizations to guard against therisk of coups, but only when these leaders have weak ties to the international community. While mercenariescan diffuse domestic military capacity, an essential coup-proofing function, they also put some leaders at

risk of international opprobrium given strong norms against their use. We find support for our theoryacrosscountries and over time: Leaders with high coup risk and low international accountability are especiallylikely to hire mercenaries. Our theory and findings provide unique insight into the importance of privatemilitary organizations for domestic security. 2. 國(guó)外基地市場(chǎng)（The Market for Foreign Bases）

Renanah Miles Joyce，美國(guó)馬薩諸塞州沃爾瑟姆布蘭代斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授《安全研究》（Security Studies）收錄出版創(chuàng)新性的學(xué)術(shù)稿件——無(wú)論是理論研究、實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)分享還是兩者兼而有之。安全研究包含廣泛的議題，從核擴(kuò)散、核威懾、軍民關(guān)系、戰(zhàn)略文化、種族沖突、流行病與國(guó)家安全、民主政治、外交決策到定性與多方法研究的發(fā)展。2024 年該期刊影響因子為 2.464。

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）127

Brian Blankenshi，美國(guó)佛羅里達(dá)州科勒爾蓋布爾斯邁阿密大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授【摘要】權(quán)力投射是國(guó)家施加影響的主要手段。傳統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為在第三方競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者存在的條件下，國(guó)家會(huì)為國(guó)外基地支付更多的費(fèi)用，但競(jìng)爭(zhēng)影響基地成本的機(jī)制在理論上既沒(méi)有得到充分說(shuō)明，在實(shí)證上也沒(méi)有得到充分的研究。本文測(cè)試了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)影響準(zhǔn)入價(jià)格的機(jī)制：拒絕、擠出和信息機(jī)制。本文使用美國(guó)薪酬和基地的新數(shù)據(jù)以及美國(guó)在吉布提的定性證據(jù)來(lái)研究美國(guó)在非洲的行為。研究結(jié)果表明，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵(lì)措施已經(jīng)擠掉了美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵(lì)措施在確保準(zhǔn)入方面的有效性。本文進(jìn)一步表明，由于美國(guó)努力去限制其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的準(zhǔn)入和吉布提對(duì)本國(guó)地產(chǎn)價(jià)值的了解，隨著其他尋求基地者進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)，吉布提領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人升級(jí)了它們對(duì)美國(guó)補(bǔ)償?shù)囊蟆?/p>

【原文】Power projection is a central means by which states exert influence. Conventional wisdomholdsthat states pay more for foreign bases in the presence of third-party competitors, yet the mechanisms bywhich competition shapes the costs of bases are both theoretically underspecified and empiricallyunderstudied. This article tests three mechanisms by which competition can shape the price of access: denial, crowding out, and information. We study the behavior of the United States in Africa, using newdata onUScompensation and bases and qualitative evidence from the US presence in Djibouti. Our findings suggest

that China’s economic incentives have crowded out the effectiveness of US economic incentives in securingaccess. We further show that Djiboutian leaders escalated their demands for US compensation as other

base-seekers entered the market due to a combination of US efforts to limit its rivals’ access and Djibouti’slearning about the value of its real estate. 3. 恐怖組織的致命目標(biāo)和適應(yīng)失敗（Lethal Targeting and AdaptationFailureinTerrorist Groups）

Bryce Loidolt，國(guó)防大學(xué)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略研究所高級(jí)研究員

【摘要】假設(shè)恐怖組織希望快速發(fā)展，它們必須經(jīng)常適應(yīng)致命目標(biāo)打擊。隨著時(shí)間的推移，恐怖分子頭目可以確認(rèn)逃避或者削弱國(guó)家監(jiān)控能力的對(duì)策。較低水平的特工通常會(huì)阻止他們實(shí)施這些調(diào)整，然而頭目因此必須要強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行。具有分散指揮關(guān)系的小組組長(zhǎng)難以直接實(shí)施監(jiān)控和執(zhí)行合規(guī)性?？芍滟Y源有限的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人也無(wú)法投資官僚主義能力來(lái)約束特工的行為。當(dāng)國(guó)家監(jiān)控能力增強(qiáng)時(shí)，這些組織性缺陷的成本將異常高昂。作者通過(guò)研究烏薩馬·本·拉登總部與巴基斯坦無(wú)人機(jī)行動(dòng)有關(guān)的阿拉伯語(yǔ)書信為本文提供了論點(diǎn)支撐。作者的論點(diǎn)為有關(guān)適應(yīng)性的理論和作戰(zhàn)技術(shù)的強(qiáng)制力做出了一定貢獻(xiàn)。它還表明，先進(jìn)的監(jiān)視和打擊能力可能不足促使未來(lái)的反恐行動(dòng)成功。

【原文】If terrorist organizations wish to thrive, they often must adapt to lethal targeting. Over time, terrorist

leaders can identify countermeasures that evade or erode state surveillance capabilities. Lower-level

operatives will resist implementing these adaptations, however, so leaders must enforce their implementation. Leaders of groups with decentralized command relationships will struggle to directly monitor and enforcecompliance. Leaders with limited resources at their disposal will also be unable to invest in the bureaucraticcapacity to discipline operatives’ behavior. These organizational deficiencies become increasinglycostlywhen state surveillance capabilities increase. I find support for this thesis by examining Arabic language

128

correspondence from Usama bin Ladin’s compound related to the drone campaign in Pakistan. My argument

contributes to theories of adaptation and the coercive power of warfighting technologies. It also suggests that

advanced surveillance and strike capabilities may be insufficient for future counterterrorismsuccess. 4. 中俄軍事協(xié)作及其對(duì)全球安全的影響（Sino-Russian Military Alignment andItsImplications for Global Security）

Oriana Skylar Mastro，弗里曼·斯波格利國(guó)際問(wèn)題研究所中心研究員和斯坦福大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授【摘要原文】What is the nature and impact of Sino-Russian alignment? What are the conditions under

which each is likely to support the other militarily and with what type of support? To answer these questions, this article presents a novel alignment framework that best captures war fighting capabilities and howgreat

powers align and determines the values of each indicator based on English, Chinese and Russian sources. I

argue that China and Russia are significantly aligned and trending towards an even more extensivealignment relationship. However, the scope of their military alignment is limited to facilitating China’schallenge of US hegemony in Asia. Additionally, Russian support comes in the form of enhancing China’sindependent combat capacity and potentially providing support functions in wartime but does not extendtodirect involvement. These findings have implications for the literature on alignment, deterrence calculationsand our understanding of Russian and Chinese strategic thinking. 5. 公眾對(duì)內(nèi)戰(zhàn)后權(quán)力爭(zhēng)奪的支持（Public Support for Power Grabs after Civil Conflict）James Igoe Walsh，北卡羅來(lái)納大學(xué)夏洛特分校政治學(xué)、數(shù)據(jù)科學(xué)和公共政策教授；SamWhitt，海波因特大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授；Jacob Aronson，馬里蘭大學(xué)國(guó)際發(fā)展與沖突管理中心的助理研究科學(xué)家；Jonathan Hall，烏普薩拉大學(xué)和平與沖突研究系副教授兼高級(jí)講師；Paul Huth，馬里蘭大學(xué)政府與政治系教授；Vera Mironova，中東研究所獨(dú)立研究員

【摘要】權(quán)力分享是在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手之間達(dá)成可持續(xù)協(xié)議的公認(rèn)策略。然而，當(dāng)一方奪取權(quán)力時(shí)，權(quán)力分享措施經(jīng)常會(huì)遭到違反。本文研究了伊拉克摩蘇爾地方警務(wù)背景下公眾對(duì)權(quán)力分享與權(quán)力奪取的看法。在一項(xiàng)調(diào)查實(shí)驗(yàn)中，作者在調(diào)查中詢問(wèn)受訪者是否認(rèn)為，在伊拉克和敘利亞伊斯蘭國(guó)(ISIS)占領(lǐng)之后，摩蘇爾的安全在權(quán)力分享與權(quán)力攫取處理下得到加強(qiáng)或降低，即改變了反伊斯蘭國(guó)聯(lián)盟的不同派系所擁有的權(quán)力。在治安和安全問(wèn)題上，公眾更有可能支持權(quán)力攫取，而不是權(quán)力分享。在權(quán)力攫取的情況下，沖突受害現(xiàn)象也具有重要的調(diào)節(jié)作用。與非受害者不同，沖突受害者喜歡通過(guò)內(nèi)部群體的權(quán)力爭(zhēng)奪來(lái)加強(qiáng)當(dāng)?shù)氐淖谂煽刂?、非常重視穩(wěn)定性、甚至歡迎來(lái)自外部的控制，以遏制可能存在分歧的群體之間的權(quán)力分享。本文的研究結(jié)果強(qiáng)調(diào)了將沖突后建設(shè)和平的權(quán)力分享機(jī)制制度化所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)?！驹摹縋ower-sharing is a recognized strategy for reaching durable settlements among rivals. However, power-sharing arrangements are often violated when one side grabs power. We examine public perceptionsof power-sharing versus power-grabbing in the context of local policing in Mosul, Iraq. In a surveyexperiment, we investigate if -individuals believe that security in Mosul, in the aftermath of the Islamic Stateof Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupation, is enhanced or reduced under power-sharing versus power-grabbing

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）129

treatments, which vary the authority held by distinct factions of the counter-ISIS coalition. The publicismore likely to support power-grabbing than power-sharing in matters of policing and security. In the caseof

power-grabbing, there are also important moderating effects of conflict-related victimization. Unlikenonvictims who favor ingroup power-grabbing to enhance local ?sectarian control, victims place a premiumon stability, welcoming even external, out-group control over power-sharing among groups who might beat

odds. Our results underscore the challenges of institutionalizing power-sharing mechanisms for

peacebuilding after conflict. 【編譯：林志俊賴永禎】【責(zé)任編輯：嚴(yán)瑾怡】Security Studies，Vol.33, No.3, 2024

1. 軍事效能與海戰(zhàn)（Military Effectiveness and Naval Warfare）Stephen Biddle，哥倫比亞大學(xué)國(guó)際與公共事務(wù)教授、外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)國(guó)防政策兼職高級(jí)研究員John Severini，約翰-塞韋里尼目前是喬治敦大學(xué)政府學(xué)博士生

【摘要】軍事效率促進(jìn)了政治學(xué)文獻(xiàn)的增長(zhǎng)。然而，這些著作絕大多數(shù)側(cè)重于大陸戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。中國(guó)的崛起凸顯了海戰(zhàn)。文獻(xiàn)的核心結(jié)論是否適用于海戰(zhàn)？我們通過(guò)一個(gè)關(guān)于 1649 年至1988 年間國(guó)家間水面海戰(zhàn)的新數(shù)據(jù)集來(lái)比較海戰(zhàn)和陸戰(zhàn)模式，從而探討這一問(wèn)題。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，海上和陸地的軍事環(huán)境截然不同，這使得海戰(zhàn)結(jié)果對(duì)物資更加敏感，更加快速，也更加片面，因此兩者存在本質(zhì)區(qū)別。然而，在物質(zhì)與非物質(zhì)的相互作用方面也有重要的相似之處。這些特點(diǎn)對(duì)未來(lái)東亞反介入/區(qū)域拒止（A2/AD）戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的政策、海軍資源分配中技能和物資投入的平衡以及軍事效能研究都有重要影響?！驹摹縈ilitary effectiveness created a growth in political science literature. However, this work focusedoverwhelmingly on continental warfare. China’s rise highlights naval warfare. Do the central findings of theliterature hold for war at sea? We explore this question by comparing naval and land combat patterns viaanew dataset on interstate surface naval battles fought between 1649 and 1988. We find essential differencesderiving from the contrasting nature of the sea and land as military environments, which have made naval

outcomes more sensitive to materiel, quicker, and more one-sided. There are, however, also important

similarities involving material–nonmaterial interactions. These features pose important implications for

policy on future anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) warfare in East Asia, the balance of investment in skill andmateriel in naval resource allocation, and research on military effectiveness. 2. 核不使用的盲點(diǎn)：試驗(yàn)（Testing as the Blindspot of Nuclear Nonuse）Ruoyu Li, 約翰霍普金斯大學(xué)政治學(xué)系

【摘要】太平洋激進(jìn)派宣稱核試驗(yàn)就是核使用，這對(duì)國(guó)際關(guān)系（IR）學(xué)科中的核不使用概念提出了挑戰(zhàn)。在應(yīng)對(duì)這一挑戰(zhàn)的同時(shí)，本文還揭示了有關(guān)核試驗(yàn)的學(xué)科盲點(diǎn)，即核試驗(yàn)與核使用不符。我認(rèn)為，斯科特·薩根（Scott Sagan）和肯尼斯·華爾茲（Kenneth N. Waltz）關(guān)于核威懾的辯論以及妮娜·坦南瓦

130

爾德（Nina Tannenwald）的核禁忌框架所體現(xiàn)的關(guān)于不使用核武器的國(guó)際關(guān)系討論是殖民知識(shí)生產(chǎn)的一部分，這種知識(shí)生產(chǎn)否定了殖民地人民的政治能動(dòng)性和人性。本文以美國(guó)在馬紹爾群島進(jìn)行的核武器試驗(yàn)（1946-58 年）為例，對(duì)核試驗(yàn)進(jìn)行了后殖民主義的重新詮釋，從而論證了核試驗(yàn)是核使用的一種形式，特別是核武器的殖民使用。

【原文】Pacific activists’ proclamation that nuclear testing is nuclear use poses a challenge to the notionof

nuclear nonuse in the discipline of International Relations (IR). While addressing such a challenge, thisarticle reveals a disciplinary blind spot regarding nuclear testing that disqualifies testing fromnuclear use. I

argue that IR discussions of nuclear nonuse—exemplified by Scott Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz’s debateson nuclear deterrence and Nina Tannenwald’s nuclear taboo framework—are part of the colonial knowledgeproduction that dismisses the political agency and humanity of colonized people. This article then argues that

nuclear testing is a form of nuclear use, specifically, the colonial use of nuclear weapons, by developingapostcolonial reinterpretation of nuclear testing in the case of US nuclear weapon tests in the Marshall Islands(1946–58). 3. 革命政府、魯莽與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)：第二次卡拉巴赫戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的案例（Revolutionary Governments, Recklessness, and War: The Case of the Second Karabakh War）Arman Grigoryan，利哈伊大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系系副教授

【摘要】革命政治環(huán)境的特點(diǎn)是逆向選擇的壓力。它提升了最激進(jìn)、最易發(fā)生沖突、最樂(lè)于冒險(xiǎn)的類型，而這些人又教育程度低，缺乏執(zhí)政經(jīng)驗(yàn)。他們是庸俗的反唯物主義者，認(rèn)為只要付出足夠的努力和毅力，現(xiàn)實(shí)就可以按照他們的意愿來(lái)改變。革命者擁有宏大的理想和救世計(jì)劃，通常不會(huì)容忍妥協(xié)和討價(jià)還價(jià)。對(duì)他們來(lái)說(shuō)，要實(shí)現(xiàn)這些想法，任何代價(jià)都不算太高。當(dāng)革命者接管一個(gè)與其他國(guó)家發(fā)生沖突的國(guó)家時(shí)，這些傾向很可能也會(huì)影響他們對(duì)沖突的管理，并可能帶來(lái)災(zāi)難性的后果。亞美尼亞革命政府的外交政策導(dǎo)致了 2020 年第二次卡拉巴赫戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和亞美尼亞方面的災(zāi)難性失敗?！?原 文 】 Revolutionary politics is an environment characterized by pressures for adverse selection. It

elevates the most radical, conflict-prone, risk happy types, who in addition are poorly educatedandinexperienced in government. They are vulgar anti-materialists who think reality can be bent to their will

with sufficient effort and perseverance. Revolutionaries are possessed with grandiose ideas and salvationprojects, which typically do not tolerate compromise and bargaining. Nor any cost seems too high tothemfor the realization of such ideas. When revolutionaries take over in a country that has a conflict with another

state, these propensities are likely to affect their management of the conflict as well with potentiallycatastrophic consequences. The argument is illustrated with the diplomacy of Armenia’s revolutionarygovernment, which led to the Second Karabakh War of 2020 and the Armenian side’s catastrophic defeat. 4. 威脅構(gòu)建與強(qiáng)制可信度（Threat Construction and Coercive Credibility）Danielle L. Lupton, 科爾蓋特大學(xué)政治學(xué)副教授

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）131

【摘要】在國(guó)際危機(jī)中，行為體如何發(fā)出可信的威脅？傳統(tǒng)的學(xué)術(shù)研究側(cè)重于威脅的背景如何影響可信度，而本文則考慮威脅本身的構(gòu)建如何影響可信度。更具體地說(shuō)，本文引入了\"威脅理由\"這一概念，并從理論上分析了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者在傳達(dá)威脅時(shí)所選擇的解釋是如何影響其強(qiáng)制性可信度的。本研究采用了聯(lián)合設(shè)計(jì)調(diào)查實(shí)驗(yàn)，以確定威脅的具體性和嚴(yán)重性、公開(kāi)威脅與私人威脅以及威脅理由對(duì)可信度感知的影響。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，更精確的威脅被認(rèn)為更可信，而采用聲譽(yù)理由的威脅可信度較低。有極少量證據(jù)表明，公開(kāi)或私下發(fā)出威脅會(huì)影響可信度。本文還發(fā)現(xiàn)，受眾是國(guó)內(nèi)還是國(guó)際，以及危機(jī)誘因的嚴(yán)重程度都會(huì)影響人們對(duì)可信度的看法。本研究進(jìn)一步加深了我們對(duì)塑造強(qiáng)制性可信度的因素以及決策者如何在國(guó)際危機(jī)中最有效地傳達(dá)其承諾的理解。

【原文】How do actors issue credible threats during international crises? While scholarship has traditionallyfocused on how the context of threats influences credibility, this paper considers how the constructionof thethreat itself affects credibility. More specifically, this paper introduces the concept of threat justificationandtheorize how the choice of explanation a leader uses in communicating her threats can influence her coercivecredibility. This study employs a conjoint design survey experiment to identify the influence of threat

specificity and severity, public versus private threats, and threat justification on perceptions of credibility. This paper finds that more precise threats are perceived as more credible, while threats employingreputational justifications are less credible. There is a minimal amount of evidence that the public versusprivate delivery of a threat influences credibility. This paper also finds that perceptions of credibilityareinfluenced by whether the audience is domestic versus international and by the severity of the instigatingcrisis trigger. This study furthers our understanding of the factors shaping coercive credibility andhowpolicymakers can most effectively convey their commitments during international crises. 5. 逃離癱瘓：應(yīng)對(duì)不對(duì)稱核升級(jí)的策略（Escaping Paralysis: Strategies for CounteringAsymmetric Nuclear Escalation）

Even Hellan Larsen, 挪威奧斯陸大學(xué)政治學(xué)系的博士研究員

【摘要】擁有核武器的國(guó)家在與擁有核武器的對(duì)手進(jìn)行低級(jí)別的沖突時(shí)往往猶豫不決，因?yàn)楹ε乱鸷朔磽?。本文將這種情況稱為 \"次戰(zhàn)略癱瘓\"。核武器國(guó)家試圖擺脫這種癱瘓狀態(tài)的選擇進(jìn)行了分類：反價(jià)值懲罰戰(zhàn)略通過(guò)反價(jià)值核報(bào)復(fù)進(jìn)行威懾；常規(guī)暫停戰(zhàn)略通過(guò)常規(guī)反應(yīng)將進(jìn)一步升級(jí)的負(fù)擔(dān)轉(zhuǎn)嫁給對(duì)手，從而起到威懾作用；損害限制戰(zhàn)略通過(guò)在核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中限制損害的能力進(jìn)行威懾；最后，針?shù)h相對(duì)戰(zhàn)略通過(guò)在所有沖突級(jí)別上的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)制勝能力來(lái)進(jìn)行威懾。為了擺脫次戰(zhàn)略癱瘓，蘇聯(lián)和印度在轉(zhuǎn)向常規(guī)停頓戰(zhàn)略之前，最初依賴于反價(jià)值懲罰。印度未能擺脫癱瘓狀態(tài)，因此開(kāi)始尋求損害限制戰(zhàn)略。相比之下，美國(guó)則奉行針?shù)h相對(duì)的戰(zhàn)略，以消除次戰(zhàn)略癱瘓。

【原文】States armed with nuclear weapons are often hesitant to engage in low levels of conflict against

rivals armed with nuclear weapons for fear of provoking a nuclear response. I refer to this conditionas“substrategic paralysis.” I provide a typology of the options for nuclear weapon states trying to escapethisparalysis. A countervalue punishment strategy deters through countervalue nuclear retaliation. Aconventional pause strategy deters by shifting the burden of further escalation back onto the adversarywithaconventional response. A damage limitation strategy deters through the ability to limit damage in a nuclear

132

war. Finally, a tit-for-tat strategy discourages through a war-winning capability at all conflict levels. Toescape substrategic paralysis, the Soviet Union and India initially relied on countervalue punishment beforemoving toward a conventional pause strategy. India’s failure to escape paralysis triggered a searchfor adamage limitation strategy. In contrast, the United States pursues a tit-for-tat strategy to neutralizesubstrategic paralysis. 【編譯：柳博文】【責(zé)任編輯：李琬瑩】《國(guó)際研究評(píng)論》（Review of International Studies）Review of International Studies，Vol.50, No.4, July 2024

1. 基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施與整體國(guó)家：內(nèi)在關(guān)系、國(guó)家形成過(guò)程及葛蘭西國(guó)家理（Infrastructureandthe integral state: Internal Relations, processes of state formation, and Gramscianstatetheory）

Daniel R. McCarthy，墨爾本大學(xué)社會(huì)與政治科學(xué)學(xué)院講師

【摘要】基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施在國(guó)家形成過(guò)程中占據(jù)核心地位。國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)中物質(zhì)主義的復(fù)興通過(guò)對(duì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施政治和國(guó)家建構(gòu)的深入分析，為我們理解國(guó)家形態(tài)做出了重要貢獻(xiàn)。然而，迄今為止，學(xué)界中與安東尼奧·葛蘭西、尼科斯·普蘭查斯和鮑勃·杰索普的國(guó)家理論傳統(tǒng)相關(guān)的研究尚顯不足。本文通過(guò)與布魯諾·拉圖爾的外部關(guān)系本體論和行動(dòng)者網(wǎng)絡(luò)理論（ANT）的比較，認(rèn)為國(guó)家理論及其內(nèi)在關(guān)系本體論在避免將國(guó)家實(shí)體化的同時(shí)，提供了一種對(duì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施與國(guó)家形成進(jìn)行分析的方法，該方法敏銳地捕捉到了社會(huì)秩序隨時(shí)間推移的再現(xiàn)過(guò)程。通過(guò)發(fā)展葛蘭西的“整體國(guó)家”（integral state）概念，本文強(qiáng)調(diào)了公民社會(huì)、國(guó)家機(jī)器與基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施創(chuàng)建之間的必要相互滲透。此外，本文通過(guò)對(duì)冷戰(zhàn)初期美國(guó)發(fā)展核基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的分析闡明以上概念性論點(diǎn)，并以民防教育計(jì)劃為例，探討了基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施與整體國(guó)家之間的內(nèi)《國(guó)際研究評(píng)論》（Review of International Studies）是由劍橋大學(xué)出版社代表英國(guó)國(guó)際研究協(xié)會(huì)出版且同行評(píng)審的國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)術(shù)期刊，其前身為 British Journal of

International Studies (1975 - 1980)。該期刊致力于反映全球政治的性質(zhì)變化和新興的政治挑戰(zhàn)，旨在為國(guó)際社會(huì)搭建一個(gè)可供辯論的平臺(tái)用以討論當(dāng)下緊迫的全球議題。過(guò)去五年綜合影響因子為 3.6。

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）133

在關(guān)系。理解過(guò)去、現(xiàn)在及未來(lái)潛在的社會(huì)技術(shù)秩序形式的內(nèi)在關(guān)系，對(duì)于重新思考國(guó)際關(guān)系中技術(shù)設(shè)計(jì)政治具有重要意義。

【 原 文 】 Infrastructures are central to processes of state formation. The revival of materialisminInternational Relations has made an important contribution to our understanding of states through careful

analysis of the politics of infrastructure and state building. Yet, to date, engagement with the state-theoretical

tradition associated with the work of Antonio Gramsci, Nicos Poulantzas, and Bob Jessop has been absent. Through comparison with the external-relational ontology of Bruno Latour and actor-network theory (ANT), this article argues that state theory and its internal-relational ontology avoids reifying the state whileproviding an analysis of infrastructure and state formation sensitive to the historical reproduction of social

orders over time. Developing Gramsci’s concept of the ‘integral state’, it emphasises the necessaryinterpenetration between civil society, the state apparatus, and the creation of infrastructure. Theseconceptual arguments are illustrated through an analysis of the United States’ development of nuclear

infrastructures during the early Cold War period, in the internal relations between infrastructure andtheintegral state are explored through Civil Defense Education programmes. Clarifying the internal relations of

past, present, and potential future forms of socio-technical order is an important task for rethinkingthepolitics of technological design in International Relations. 2. 內(nèi)戰(zhàn)中武裝團(tuán)體的形成：“運(yùn)動(dòng)型”“叛亂型”和“國(guó)家分裂型”起源（Armedgroupformation in civil war: ‘Movement’, ‘insurgent’, and ‘state splinter’ origins）Anastasia Shesterinina，約克大學(xué)政治學(xué)系比較政治學(xué)教授、系主任

Michael Livesey，英國(guó)謝菲爾德大學(xué)政治與國(guó)際關(guān)系系博士生

【摘要】非國(guó)家武裝團(tuán)體如何在國(guó)內(nèi)武裝沖突中形成？研究者們已開(kāi)始將武裝團(tuán)體細(xì)分，但我們對(duì)武裝團(tuán)體如何以不同方式出現(xiàn)仍知之甚少。本文結(jié)合社會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)、內(nèi)戰(zhàn)和軍政關(guān)系領(lǐng)域的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)，提出了一種將武裝團(tuán)體的起源分為“運(yùn)動(dòng)型”、“叛亂型”和“國(guó)家分裂型”的類型學(xué)。我們認(rèn)為，在廣泛動(dòng)員、邊緣地區(qū)對(duì)國(guó)家的挑戰(zhàn)以及政權(quán)內(nèi)部碎片化的背景下，不同的沖突動(dòng)態(tài)塑造了不同的武裝團(tuán)體起源。在這些背景下出現(xiàn)的武裝團(tuán)體在初始成員和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層上通常存在差異，而這正是我們關(guān)注的基本組織維度。我們通過(guò)將不同起源的武裝團(tuán)體映射到現(xiàn)有的跨國(guó)數(shù)據(jù)上，并結(jié)合實(shí)例案例繪制類型敘述，展示了這種類型學(xué)的有效性。這一討論通過(guò)超越單一的起源類型或高度細(xì)分的組織分析，關(guān)注更廣泛的沖突動(dòng)態(tài)，推動(dòng)了對(duì)武裝團(tuán)體形成在沖突研究中的重要性的理解。因此，這一進(jìn)展也有助于深入探究武裝團(tuán)體的形成過(guò)程，并揭示其行為模式與沖突動(dòng)態(tài)之間的關(guān)聯(lián)。未來(lái)的研究應(yīng)通過(guò)深入分析武裝團(tuán)體的復(fù)雜歷史，來(lái)比較和考察我們?cè)诒疚闹凶R(shí)別出的不同起源類型。【原文】How do non-state armed groups form in intra-state armed conflicts? Researchers have startedtodisaggregate armed groups, but we still know little about how armed groups emerge in different ways. Drawing on the literature on social movements, civil wars, and civil–military relations, we generateatypology of ‘movement’, ‘insurgent’, and ‘state splinter’ origins of armed groups. We argue that

fundamentally different dynamics of conflict shape armed group origins in the context of broad-basedmobilisation, peripheral challenges to the state, and intra-regime fragmentation. Armed groups that emerge

134

in these contexts in general differ in their initial membership and leadership, the basic organisational

dimensions that we focus on. We demonstrate the utility of our typology by mapping different origins of

armed groups onto existing cross-national data and charting type narratives in illustrative cases. Thisdiscussion advances recent efforts to understand the importance of armed group emergence for outcomes of

interest to conflict scholars by moving beyond either separate types of origins or highly disaggregatedorganisational analyses to broader conflict dynamics through which armed groups form, with implicationsfor how these groups act. Future research should consider different origins which we identify in comparisonthrough an in-depth analysis of armed groups’ complex histories. 3. 國(guó)際政治中的合法治理：邁向合法化的關(guān)系理論（Legitimate governance ininternational politics: Towards a relational theory of legitimation）Wolfgang Minatti，德國(guó)波茨坦大學(xué)博士后研究員，歐洲大學(xué)學(xué)院政治與社會(huì)科學(xué)系博士【摘要】國(guó)際政治中的治理主體如何獲得合法性？目前關(guān)于合法化的研究方法由于預(yù)先設(shè)定了合法性的“來(lái)源”，并將受眾對(duì)正當(dāng)統(tǒng)治期望的變化視為合法化過(guò)程的外生因素，因此無(wú)法充分解釋當(dāng)代國(guó)際和全球政治中治理的復(fù)雜性。而本文將現(xiàn)有的合法化模型與關(guān)系理論相結(jié)合，認(rèn)為要分析制度復(fù)雜性的構(gòu)成，需要重點(diǎn)關(guān)注嵌入治理網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的受眾及其期望。本文還提出了一個(gè)合法化的關(guān)系理論，以強(qiáng)調(diào)合法化背后的機(jī)制：合法化應(yīng)被概念化為一種在行為體之間尋求規(guī)范期望一致性的過(guò)程。治理關(guān)系的一致性程度可能受多種機(jī)制影響，這些機(jī)制在關(guān)系層面及更廣泛的網(wǎng)絡(luò)中運(yùn)作，更高的一致性則會(huì)促成更穩(wěn)定的治理實(shí)踐。由此，該理論通過(guò)發(fā)展研究國(guó)際政治不同背景下的合法化途徑，在合法化研究領(lǐng)域取得了進(jìn)展：它不依賴于預(yù)設(shè)的正當(dāng)性來(lái)源理論，并通過(guò)考慮合法化的內(nèi)生機(jī)制，為理解制度合法性隨時(shí)間的變化提供了一個(gè)改進(jìn)框架。

【原文】How do governing actors in international politics become legitimised? Current approaches tothestudy of legitimation do not fully account for the complexities of governance in contemporary international

and global politics because they pre-specify ‘sources’ of legitimacy and treat change in audienceexpectations towards rightful rule as exogenous to legitimation processes. Instead, this article synthesisesexisting models of legitimation with relational theory to argue that constellations of institutional

complexities necessitate an analytical focus on audiences and their expectations as embedded in governancenetworks. It then provides a relational theory of legitimation, emphasising the mechanisms undergirdinglegitimation: legitimation should be conceptualised as a process of congruence-finding between actors’ normative expectations. A governance relation might be influenced towards greater or lesser congruenceviaseveral mechanisms working at the level of the relation and the wider network, with more congruence givingrise to stabler governance practices. In this way, the theory builds upon legitimation scholarshipbydeveloping pathways to investigate legitimation across the varied contexts of international politics: it avoidsa normative background theory of legitimacy sources and provides an improved frameworkfor

understanding change in the legitimacy of institutions over time by considering endogenous mechanisms of

legitimation.

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）135

4. “民族征服了國(guó)家”：阿倫特視角下的民族國(guó)家內(nèi)部矛盾（‘The nation has conqueredthe state’: Arendtian insights on the internal contradictions of the nation-state）Peter J. Verov?ek，荷蘭格羅寧根大學(xué)歐洲一體化歷史與理論系（Department of History and Theoryof

European Integration）助理教授

【摘要】作為當(dāng)代政治中“主權(quán)主義轉(zhuǎn)向”（sovereigntist turn）的一部分，政治權(quán)力全球化向“超越”或“凌駕于”民族國(guó)家之上的結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型正日益受到質(zhì)疑。盡管這些由有界限的民族對(duì)地方控制的訴求可能是民主的，但在實(shí)證上，它們通常也帶有民族主義色彩?；跐h娜·阿倫特對(duì)“民族征服了國(guó)家”這一論述的分析，本文認(rèn)為，從民主主權(quán)主義向民族主權(quán)主義的轉(zhuǎn)變根植于民族國(guó)家概念內(nèi)部的基本不穩(wěn)定性。在這個(gè)連字符復(fù)合詞中，前者“民族”（nation）基于人們的族裔背景偏向某些特定個(gè)體，而后者“國(guó)家”（state）則是一個(gè)普遍性的概念，要求平等對(duì)待所有人。本文的基本論點(diǎn)是，這些內(nèi)部矛盾有助于解釋呼吁將政治權(quán)力歸還民族國(guó)家的民族主義傾向。本文將以中東歐的“非自由民主國(guó)家”為例，并聚焦于波蘭和匈牙利，闡明以上觀點(diǎn)。

【 原 文 】 The globalisation of political power into structures ‘a(chǎn)bove’ or ‘beyond’ the nation-statehasincreasingly been called into question as part of a ‘sovereigntist turn’ in contemporary politics. While suchdemands for local control by bounded peoples may be democratic, empirically they often also takeanationalist form. Building on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of how ‘the nation conquered the state’, I arguethat

the slippage from democratic to national sovereigntism is rooted in fundamental conceptual instabilitieswithin the concept of the nation-state. Whereas the first term in this hyphenated construct favours certainindividuals based on their ethnic background, the latter is a universal concept that demands the equal

treatment of all. My basic thesis is that these internal contradictions help to explain the nationalist tendencyin calls to return political power to the nation-state. I illustrate these points by drawing on examples fromthe‘illiberal democracies’ of Central-Eastern Europe, focusing on Poland and Hungary. 5. 成為人道主義國(guó)家：對(duì)世界政治中將“地位追求”作為治國(guó)方略的表演性分析（Becoming a humanitarian state: A performative analysis of ‘status-seeking’ as

statecraft in world politics）

Ali Bilgic，英國(guó)拉夫堡大學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)與人文學(xué)院國(guó)際關(guān)系與安全專業(yè)準(zhǔn)教授【摘要】地位追求現(xiàn)象在世界政治中普遍存在，而現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)卻以國(guó)家中心主義和理性主義為主，幾乎完全聚焦于國(guó)家精英，這導(dǎo)致學(xué)界對(duì)“地位追求”的本質(zhì)、作用領(lǐng)域及其作用機(jī)制的理解相對(duì)片面和有限。本文通過(guò)引入表演性框架，對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究方法提出挑戰(zhàn)，并提供了一種研究“地位”的新視角。本文建議用“地位展演”（status performances）替代“地位追求”（status-seeking），并將前者視為治國(guó)方略的一部分。基于后結(jié)構(gòu)主義和酷兒理論，以及國(guó)際關(guān)系中的美學(xué)理論，本文認(rèn)為，地位展演參與了國(guó)家自身作為世界政治主體的生產(chǎn)過(guò)程，因此所有國(guó)家都是“地位追求者”。這種主體生產(chǎn)過(guò)程發(fā)生在多個(gè)政治場(chǎng)域，包括一國(guó)的學(xué)術(shù)國(guó)際關(guān)系話語(yǔ)和媒體中的視覺(jué)呈現(xiàn)。本文結(jié)論指出，沒(méi)有脫離主體的“地位”，且地位永遠(yuǎn)無(wú)法真正達(dá)成，因?yàn)樗偸切枰貜?fù)的表演。該論點(diǎn)通過(guò)分析“土耳其”作為人道主義國(guó)家的地位建構(gòu)過(guò)程來(lái)印證，并展示了這一過(guò)程如何在國(guó)家精英的聲明、土耳其國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)術(shù)研究及視覺(jué)呈現(xiàn)中得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。

136

【 原 文 】 Status-seeking is ubiquitous in world politics, and the literature is currently dominatedbystate-centrism and rationalism, which is almost exclusively focus on state elites. This results in a thinandlimited understanding of what ‘status-seeking’ is, where it works, and how it is effected. This articlechallenges the existing approaches by introducing a performativity framework and offers an overhaul of how‘status’ can be studied. It suggests replacing ‘status-seeking’ with ‘status performances’ that areconceptualised as part of ‘statecraft’ process. Drawing on post-structuralist and queer approaches as well asaesthetics in International Relations (IR), it is argued that status performances participate in the productionof the state itself as a subject in world politics, so all states are ‘status-seekers’. This subject-productionprocess occurs in multiple political sites, including the academic IR discourse in a country andvisual

presentations in the media. It is concluded that there is no ‘status’ beyond the subject, and status cannever

be achieved because it always needs repetitive performances. The argument is illustrated by an analysis of

the production of ‘Turkey’ as a humanitarian state and demonstrates how this is effected in state-elitepronouncements, IR scholarship in Turkey, and visual representations. 6. 烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中的“概念運(yùn)作”之韌性（resilience）：對(duì)其國(guó)際與國(guó)內(nèi)意義的探討（Resilience as a ‘concept at work’ in the war in Ukraine: Exploring its international anddomestic significance）

Janine Natalya Clark，英國(guó)伯明翰大學(xué)法學(xué)院過(guò)渡司法與國(guó)際刑法教授

【摘要】在烏克蘭持續(xù)進(jìn)行的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)背景下，韌性（resilience）這一概念頻繁被西方與烏克蘭領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人提及，這一現(xiàn)象尤為引人注目。本文聚焦于他們?nèi)绾芜\(yùn)用韌性話語(yǔ)，并為現(xiàn)有沖突情境中的韌性研究做出兩項(xiàng)重要貢獻(xiàn)。首先，借鑒 Ish-Shalom 的“概念運(yùn)作”（concepts at work）理論，本文通過(guò)分析一系列提及韌性的演講和政策聲明（來(lái)自西方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人與烏克蘭總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基），揭示了韌性在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中被用于“概念運(yùn)作”的重要性，其使得某些特定形式的國(guó)際與國(guó)內(nèi)政治得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。其次，雖然關(guān)于韌性的研究通常討論該概念在工程學(xué)、生態(tài)學(xué)和心理學(xué)等領(lǐng)域的不同定義和應(yīng)用，但本文指出，各種韌性框架在烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中交織運(yùn)作，突顯了從個(gè)體到系統(tǒng)不同層面的韌性如何在話語(yǔ)上共同作用以達(dá)成特定的政治目的。由此，本文提供了一種從多系統(tǒng)角度思考韌性以及韌性與復(fù)雜性關(guān)系的方法。【原文】In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is striking that there have been many references toresilience, including by Western and Ukrainian leaders. This article is precisely about their use of resiliencediscourse, and it makes two important contributions to existing scholarship on resilience in conflict settings. First, drawing on Ish-Shalom’s idea of ‘concepts at work’ and analysing a selection of speeches andpolicystatements (by Western leaders and President Volodymyr Zelensky) that specifically refer to resilience, it

demonstrates that resilience is a significant ‘concept at work’ in the war, making certain forms of

international and domestic politics possible. Second, while research on resilience frequently discussesdifferent ways that the concept has been defined and approached in fields such as engineering, ecology, andpsychology, this article highlights that diverse framings of resilience have become entangled as the concept

is ‘a(chǎn)t work’ in the war in Ukraine. More specifically, its analysis makes prominent the fusion of different

resiliences at different levels – from the individual to the systemic – discursively working together for

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）137

particular political ends. In this way, it offers a novel way of thinking multi-systemically about resilienceand, by extension, about resilience and complexity. 7. 帝國(guó)主義、反帝國(guó)抵抗與國(guó)際等級(jí)制度的塑造：以 20 世紀(jì)30 年代的波斯為例（Imperial power, anti-imperial resistance, and the shaping of international hierarchies:Lessons from 1930s Persia）

Evaleila Pesaran，劍橋大學(xué)默里·愛(ài)德華茲學(xué)院政治與國(guó)際研究系講師

【摘要】本文探討了支配與抵抗關(guān)系在國(guó)際等級(jí)體系形成中的作用。通過(guò)聚焦由1932 年波斯政府取消達(dá)西（D’Arcy，英國(guó)石油公司創(chuàng)始人）石油特許權(quán)引發(fā)的相關(guān)事件，本文認(rèn)為，盡管西方主導(dǎo)的國(guó)際等級(jí)制度具有韌性，但這種等級(jí)關(guān)系的某些方面通過(guò)反抗事件有所改變。筆者之所以選擇這一案例，是因?yàn)樗軌蛲伙@戰(zhàn)間期是通向新世界秩序的重要過(guò)渡時(shí)期，以及波斯作為當(dāng)時(shí)少數(shù)未被殖民的非西方國(guó)家的特殊性。通過(guò)回顧英國(guó)石油公司（BP p.l.c.）檔案和國(guó)家檔案的詳細(xì)歷史文獻(xiàn)，本文展示了20 世紀(jì) 30 年代的石油爭(zhēng)端事件如何促成了戰(zhàn)間期物質(zhì)、法律和社會(huì)等級(jí)的轉(zhuǎn)變，同時(shí)仍然從總體上鞏固了等級(jí)制度的存在。本文還展示了多邊外交如何取代公開(kāi)的軍事威脅、國(guó)際法框架如何得到擴(kuò)展以及邊緣國(guó)家如何通過(guò)集體數(shù)量獲得力量。最后，本文探討了等級(jí)化的國(guó)際體系的長(zhǎng)期韌性?！驹摹縏his article explores how relations of both domination and resistance have been involvedintheconstitution of international hierarchies. Focusing on events arising from the Persian government’s 1932cancellation of the D’Arcy oil concession, it argues that while Western-dominated international hierarchieshave proved resilient, some aspects of these hierarchical relationships have been altered by episodes of

resistance such as the one under examination in this article. The case study has been chosen because of itsability to highlight the interwar years as an important period of transition to a new world order, as well as thesignificance of Persia as one of the few non-Western countries that remained uncolonised at that time. Thearticle revisits detailed historical documents from the BP Archives and the National Archives to showhowthe events of the 1930s oil dispute contributed to the emergence of shifts in the material, legal, andsocial

hierarchies of the interwar period, while nevertheless reinforcing the existence of hierarchies overall. It

shows how multilateral diplomacy replaced overt military intimidation, the framework of international lawbroadened, and peripheral countries found strength in numbers. Finally, the article considers the longer-termresilience of the hierarchical international system. 8. 后蘇聯(lián)時(shí)期權(quán)力等級(jí)制度的形成：塔吉克斯坦與俄羅斯關(guān)系中的后殖民主義（Post-Soviet power hierarchies in the making: Postcolonialism in Tajikistan’s relationswith Russia）

Karolina Kluczewska，德國(guó)根特國(guó)際和歐洲研究所（GIES）FWO 博士后研究員，英國(guó)圣安德魯斯大學(xué)中東、中亞和高加索研究學(xué)院研究員

【摘要】本文探討了后蘇聯(lián)時(shí)期的權(quán)力等級(jí)制度，它構(gòu)成了世界政治中獨(dú)特的垂直分層體系。通過(guò)分析 1991 年蘇聯(lián)解體后塔吉克斯坦與俄羅斯之間的關(guān)系，本文研究了這兩個(gè)前蘇聯(lián)國(guó)家權(quán)力不對(duì)稱的

138

根本原因、等級(jí)制度的維持和強(qiáng)化方式，以及這些等級(jí)在政治和社會(huì)層面如何被感知和應(yīng)對(duì)。本文認(rèn)為，盡管在蘇聯(lián)時(shí)期沒(méi)有明確的殖民前例，塔吉克斯坦與俄羅斯的關(guān)系仍具有明顯的后殖民特征。后殖民主義并非蘇聯(lián)解體的直接結(jié)果，它是在兩國(guó)融入全球資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)的不同路徑中逐漸形成的，這也使得塔吉克斯坦逐漸處于對(duì)俄羅斯的從屬地位。由此，新的經(jīng)濟(jì)不對(duì)稱放大了蘇聯(lián)時(shí)代遺留的問(wèn)題，并以一種新的等級(jí)制度形式對(duì)其進(jìn)行了重塑?？傮w而言，本文對(duì)后蘇聯(lián)遺產(chǎn)的本質(zhì)以及“后蘇聯(lián)”這一概念的意義展開(kāi)了討論并作出貢獻(xiàn)?？傮w而言，本文對(duì)后蘇聯(lián)遺留問(wèn)題的本質(zhì)以及“后蘇聯(lián)”這一概念的意義展開(kāi)討論并作出貢獻(xiàn)。

【原文】This article explores post-Soviet power hierarchies which constitute a unique systemof vertical

stratification in world politics. It does so by analysing relations between two former Soviet states, Tajikistanand Russia, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. The article investigates the underlyingreasons for power asymmetries between the two countries, the ways hierarchies are sustained and enforced, as well as perceived and navigated at political and social levels. It is argued that Tajikistan’s relations withRussia are explicitly postcolonial without clear-cut colonial precedents in Soviet times. Postcolonialismdidnot automatically result from the Soviet breakdown. Rather, it has gradually emerged because of thetwocountries’ very different paths of integration into the global capitalist economy, which subordinatedTajikistan to Russia. In this way, new economic asymmetries exacerbated Soviet-era legacies and reinventedthem in a new, hierarchical manner. Overall, the article contributes to the debate on the nature of post-Soviet

legacies and what it means to be post-Soviet. 【編譯：崔馨月】【責(zé)任編輯：李琬瑩】《國(guó)際研究季刊》（International Studies Quarterly）《國(guó)際 研究季刊 》（International Studies Quarterly）是國(guó)際研究協(xié)會(huì)（ISA）的旗艦期刊，旨在發(fā)布與國(guó)際研究中重要的理論、實(shí)證和規(guī)范主題相關(guān)的領(lǐng)先學(xué)者研究。本刊發(fā)表 的 文 章 以 某 種 有 意 義 的 方 式 參 與 了 跨 越 國(guó) 家 邊 界的政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)或文化進(jìn)程，旨在提供解釋性難題的答案、展示原創(chuàng)性研究、探索國(guó)際理論中的主題，或以其他方式介入學(xué)科辯論。盡管本刊文章通常具有政策含義——我們鼓勵(lì)作者闡明這些含義，但與它們的學(xué)術(shù)目的相比，這些含義是次要的。

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）139

International Studies Quarterly，Vol.68, No.3, September 2024

1. “如果是外國(guó)的，那就更干凈”：個(gè)人的腐敗觀念和對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家自由貿(mào)易的支持（“If Foreign, Then Cleaner”: Individual Corruption Perceptions and Support for FreeTrade in Developing Nations）

Dihan Shi，圣路易斯華盛頓大學(xué)政治學(xué)系博士生

Guillermo Rosas，圣路易斯華盛頓大學(xué)政治學(xué)教授

【摘要】現(xiàn)有關(guān)于國(guó)際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)輿論的文獻(xiàn)記錄了國(guó)內(nèi)腐敗觀念在大眾對(duì)一系列與一體化相關(guān)的外交政策的態(tài)度形成中所發(fā)揮的作用?；谶@個(gè)先例，本文推測(cè)腐敗觀念也會(huì)影響對(duì)自由貿(mào)易的看法。本文建立了一種啟發(fā)式的態(tài)度形成方法，其中政治精英對(duì)腐敗的個(gè)人看法引發(fā)了對(duì)外國(guó)、公司和產(chǎn)品的積極態(tài)度，將其稱為“外來(lái)線索”。這一暗示促使對(duì)腐敗有較高認(rèn)識(shí)的個(gè)人更加支持自由貿(mào)易?；?8 個(gè)拉美國(guó)家的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)，本文證明，國(guó)內(nèi)腐敗程度越高，對(duì)自由貿(mào)易的支持越大。因果中介分析提供了額外的證據(jù)，表明對(duì)外國(guó)和企業(yè)的積極態(tài)度是腐敗認(rèn)知效應(yīng)發(fā)揮作用的渠道。文章還通過(guò)分析對(duì)一組不同的欠發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和較發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的其他調(diào)查，提供了主效應(yīng)的外部有效性的證據(jù)。本文基于啟發(fā)式的自由貿(mào)易支持模型補(bǔ)充以物質(zhì)自身利益作為貿(mào)易政策領(lǐng)域態(tài)度形成基礎(chǔ)的理論?！?原文 】Extant literature on public opinion in international political economy documents the role that

domestic corruption perceptions play in the formation of mass attitudes toward a range of integration-relatedforeign policies. Based on this precedent, we conjecture that corruption perceptions also affect opinionstoward free trade. We build on a heuristic approach to attitude formation where individual perceptions of

corruption among the political elite trigger positive attitudes toward foreign countries, firms, and products, what we refer to as a “foreignness cue.” This cue drives individuals with high perceptions of corruptiontobemore supportive of free trade. Based on survey data from eighteen Latin American countries, wedemonstrate that higher levels of perceived domestic corruption are associated with greater support for freetrade. Causal mediation analysis provides additional evidence that positive attitudes toward foreign countriesand firms are a conduit through which the corruption perceptions effect operates. We also offer evidenceof

external validity of the main effect by analyzing additional surveys on a distinct set of less andmoredeveloped countries. Our heuristic-based model of support for free trade complements theories basedonmaterial self-interest as a basis for attitude formation in the realm of trade policy. 2. 履 行 國(guó) 際 承 諾 的 司 法 化 和 公 眾 支 持 （ Judicialization and Public Support forCompliance with International Commitments）

Harlan Cohen，福特漢姆法學(xué)院法學(xué)教授

Ryan Powers，佐治亞大學(xué)公共與國(guó)際事務(wù)學(xué)院國(guó)際事務(wù)系助理教授

【摘要】將國(guó)際承諾司法化對(duì)遵守國(guó)際法的激勵(lì)有何影響？本文利用一項(xiàng)美國(guó)公眾調(diào)查中的實(shí)驗(yàn)來(lái)研究這個(gè)問(wèn)題。作者發(fā)現(xiàn)，國(guó)際法院發(fā)出的不遵守信號(hào)正如不遵守理論所預(yù)期的那樣，相對(duì)于來(lái)自外國(guó)當(dāng)事方（即特定爭(zhēng)端中的“受害者”）的不遵守信號(hào)，它提高了人們對(duì)法律義務(wù)的認(rèn)知，并支持恢復(fù)

140

遵守。同時(shí)，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)，法院發(fā)出的信號(hào)在激發(fā)公眾對(duì)恢復(fù)遵守的支持方面，并不比國(guó)際組織或國(guó)內(nèi)政治精英發(fā)出的相同不遵守信號(hào)更有效（也不更無(wú)效）。這些結(jié)果表明，法院并不是唯一能夠影響遵守政治的機(jī)構(gòu)，而且關(guān)于機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)的經(jīng)常激烈的爭(zhēng)論可能不僅關(guān)乎機(jī)構(gòu)形式或標(biāo)簽的沖突，也關(guān)乎機(jī)構(gòu)控制的沖突。

【 原 文 】 What effect does judicializing international commitments have on incentives to complywithinternational law? We study this question using experiments embedded in a survey of the American public. We find that non-compliance signals from an international court work precisely as theories of

non-compliance anticipate, raising perceptions of legal obligation and support for returning to compliancerelative to non-compliance signals from foreign state parties (i.e., the “victims” in a given dispute). At thesame time, we find that signals from courts are no more (and no less) effective in generating public support

for returning to compliance than identical non-compliance signals sent by international organizations or

domestic political elites. These results suggest that courts are not uniquely positioned to shape the politics of

compliance and that the often-rancorous debates over institutional design may be just as muchabout

conflicts over institutional control as they are about conflicts over institutional forms or labels. 3. 粉飾美國(guó)例外論：種族化主體定位與美國(guó)外交政策（Whitewashing AmericanExceptionalism: Racialized Subject-Positioning and US Foreign Policy）Richard W Maass，歐道明大學(xué)政治與地理學(xué)副教授

【摘要】在研究外交政策敘事的新方法以及對(duì)美國(guó)政策制定者將如何管理單極程度較低的國(guó)際體系感到不安的背景下，美國(guó)例外論正在重新引起學(xué)術(shù)界的興趣。這種復(fù)興在時(shí)間上與國(guó)際關(guān)系中對(duì)種族化動(dòng)態(tài)和歐洲中心主義的日益關(guān)注同時(shí)發(fā)生，盡管尚未實(shí)質(zhì)上發(fā)生。本文探討了美國(guó)例外論的核心——美國(guó)外交政策的主流敘事框架——如何反映了對(duì)美國(guó)外交政策的粉飾理解，這種理解被認(rèn)為是滲透到其歷史發(fā)展中的種族化主體定位的產(chǎn)物。在概念化美國(guó)例外論之后，它開(kāi)發(fā)了一個(gè)理論框架來(lái)捕捉種族化的主體定位如何對(duì)一個(gè)國(guó)家在世界上的角色理解進(jìn)行分層。繼續(xù)調(diào)查這一過(guò)程如何根據(jù)內(nèi)在性、無(wú)知和無(wú)辜的認(rèn)識(shí)論塑造了美國(guó)例外論的發(fā)展，產(chǎn)生了例外主義敘事，這些敘事忽視了非白人人口在美國(guó)國(guó)家認(rèn)同構(gòu)建中作為有意義的其他人的地位，并否定了美國(guó)與白人的互動(dòng)。這些群體作為可能削弱其例外論的相關(guān)證據(jù)。即使公開(kāi)的種族主義言論變得不合法，這些粉飾效應(yīng)仍然根深蒂固，為當(dāng)今的美國(guó)外交構(gòu)成了持久的障礙。

【 原 文 】 American exceptionalism is enjoying a revival of scholarly interest amid newapproaches tostudying foreign policy narratives and unease regarding how US policymakers will manage a less unipolar

international system. That revival coincides temporally, though not yet substantively, with growing attentionto racialized dynamics and Eurocentrism within international relations. This article examines howcorestrands of American exceptionalism—the prevailing narrative framing of US foreign policy—reflect awhitewashed understanding of US foreign policy that can best be understood as the product of racializedsubject-positioning that saturated its historical development. After conceptualizing American exceptionalism, it develops a theoretical framework to capture how racialized subject-positioning stratifies understandings of

a nation’s role in the world. It proceeds to investigate how this process shaped the development of American

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）141

exceptionalism in line with epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence, producingexceptionalist narratives that neglect non-white populations as meaningful others in the constructionof USnational identity and that negate US interactions with those groups as relevant evidence that might undercut

its exceptionalism. These whitewashing effects remained embedded even as overtly racist discourse becamedelegitimized, posing enduring obstacles for US diplomacy today. 4. 俄羅斯在歐亞大陸的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位：保持穩(wěn)定還是分崩離析？（Russia’s LeadershipinEurasia: Holding Together or Falling Apart?）

Sean Roberts，溫徹斯特大學(xué)政治和國(guó)際關(guān)系高級(jí)講師

Ulrike Ziemer，溫徹斯特大學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)系社會(huì)學(xué)高級(jí)講師

【摘要】俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)提出了有關(guān)“俄羅斯主導(dǎo)的歐亞大陸”地區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)和追隨者動(dòng)態(tài)的重要問(wèn)題。這些問(wèn)題，尤其是俄羅斯在該地區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的強(qiáng)弱，因現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的模糊性以及俄羅斯與長(zhǎng)期盟友（尤其是亞美尼亞、白俄羅斯、哈薩克斯坦和吉爾吉斯斯坦）關(guān)系的相互矛盾的形象而變得復(fù)雜。這些盟友通常被描述為“命運(yùn)共同體”或注定要更緊密融合的伙伴，但也被描述為“機(jī)運(yùn)共同體”或臨時(shí)的情境伙伴，大致以俄羅斯為中心。本文利用英國(guó)國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)院和區(qū)域一體化組織評(píng)估俄羅斯的區(qū)域領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，對(duì)俄羅斯與區(qū)域伙伴國(guó)家的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了創(chuàng)新的理論和方法探索。正如本文所論證的那樣，俄羅斯主導(dǎo)的歐亞大陸可以理解為區(qū)域國(guó)家間社會(huì)的一個(gè)例子，俄羅斯霸權(quán)是一種社會(huì)賦予的、具有約束力的機(jī)構(gòu)。但由于俄羅斯無(wú)法平衡霸權(quán)的“權(quán)利”與“責(zé)任”，這種霸權(quán)本質(zhì)上是不穩(wěn)定的。烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)并沒(méi)有造成這個(gè)問(wèn)題，但它為該地區(qū)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)過(guò)渡創(chuàng)造了條件。

【原文】The Russo–Ukraine War raises important questions on the dynamics of regional leadershipandfollowership in what may be termed “Russian-led Eurasia.” These questions, in particular, the strengthof

Russian leadership in the region is complicated by the ambiguity in existing literature and competing imagesof Russia’s relations with long-standing allies—notably Armenia, Belarus, KazakhstanandKyrgyzstan—which are often portrayed in terms of a “community of fate” or partners destined for closer

integration but also as a “community of fortune” or ad hoc, situational partners, loosely centered on Russia. This article offers an innovative theoretical and methodological exploration of Russia's relations withregional partner states by utilizing the English School of International Relations and regional integrationorganizations to assess Russia's regional leadership. As argued in this article, Russian-led Eurasia maybeunderstood as an example of a regional interstate society with Russian hegemony serving as a sociallyconferred, binding institution. But this hegemony is inherently unstable owing to Russia's inability to balancehegemonic “rights” with “responsibilities.” War in Ukraine did not create this problem, but it has createdtheconditions for leadership transition in the region. 5. 戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)非法性的連鎖反應(yīng)（The Ripple Effects of the Illegitimacy of War）Joseph O’Mahoney，雷丁大學(xué)政治與國(guó)際關(guān)系系副教授

142

【摘要】最近的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，外交和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)實(shí)踐發(fā)生了系統(tǒng)性變化。征服、和平條約、宣戰(zhàn)和國(guó)家邊界變更已經(jīng)減少或消失。戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)仍然存在，但它們?cè)絹?lái)越成為既成事實(shí)，其結(jié)果往往不被承認(rèn)為合法。如何解釋這種廣泛但看似矛盾的轉(zhuǎn)變？現(xiàn)有的解釋，例如基于領(lǐng)土完整規(guī)范的解釋，并不能充分解釋這些變化。本文使用規(guī)范動(dòng)力學(xué)理論來(lái)表明，所有這些變化都可以解釋為戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)作為解決國(guó)際爭(zhēng)端的不合法方式的“連鎖反應(yīng)”。國(guó)家可以令人信服地為參與暴力行為提供的修辭理由類型已經(jīng)發(fā)生了變化。各國(guó)正在通過(guò)合法性管理行為來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)這種變化的國(guó)際社會(huì)環(huán)境。本文指定了三種類型的連鎖反應(yīng)，即重新構(gòu)建、置換和一致性維護(hù)，分別對(duì)應(yīng)于國(guó)家言論、行動(dòng)和受眾反應(yīng)的變化。本文展示了該理論如何將所有現(xiàn)有數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)一為一個(gè)解釋框架。還將該理論應(yīng)用于和平條約的衰落，以更詳細(xì)地展示連鎖反應(yīng)如何發(fā)揮作用。

【原文】Recent data show systematic changes in the diplomacy and practice of war. Conquests, peacetreaties, declarations of war, and state boundary changes have declined or disappeared. There are still wars, but they are increasingly fait accomplis, and their outcomes are often not recognized as legal. Howcanweexplain this wide-ranging but seemingly contradictory transformation? Existing accounts, such as thosebased on a territorial integrity norm, do not adequately explain these changes. This paper uses normdynamics theory to show that all of these changes can be explained as ‘ripple effects’ of war becomingillegitimate as a way to solve international disputes. The kinds of rhetorical justifications states canconvincingly give for engaging in violence have changed. States are navigating this changed international

social environment through legitimacy management behaviors. The paper specifies three types of rippleeffect, Reframing, Displacement, and Consistency-Maintenance, corresponding to changes in what states say, the actions they perform, and how the audience reacts. We show how this theory unifies all of the existingdata into a single explanatory framework. We also apply the theory to the decline of peace treaties toshowhow ripple effects play out in more detail. 6. 官僚如何代表經(jīng)濟(jì)利益：貿(mào)易調(diào)整援助的黨派控制（How Bureaucrats Represent

Economic Interests: Partisan Control over Trade Adjustment Assistance）Minju KIM，雪城大學(xué)政治學(xué)系助理教授

【摘要】根深蒂固的自由主義主張對(duì)全球化所傷害的工人進(jìn)行補(bǔ)償，但政府補(bǔ)償計(jì)劃經(jīng)常因缺乏響應(yīng)性而受到批評(píng)。本文通過(guò)闡明批準(zhǔn)補(bǔ)償計(jì)劃的第一線官僚來(lái)解釋缺乏響應(yīng)性。作者研究了職業(yè)官僚如何分配貿(mào)易調(diào)整援助（TAA）福利，這是美國(guó)最大的聯(lián)邦計(jì)劃，用于補(bǔ)償因國(guó)際貿(mào)易而流離失所的工人。利用將 TAA 請(qǐng)?jiān)笗鴾?zhǔn)隨機(jī)分配給職業(yè)生涯不同階段的個(gè)別調(diào)查員，作者發(fā)現(xiàn)職業(yè)官僚在共和黨總統(tǒng)任期內(nèi)不太可能批準(zhǔn) TAA 請(qǐng)?jiān)笗⑶腋锌赡芡七t調(diào)查，而民主黨總統(tǒng)任期則不然。然而，這種黨派表現(xiàn)只適用于非終身職業(yè)官僚，并且在勞工和民主黨高度一致期間更為明顯。全球化的政治可持續(xù)性取決于塑造官僚職業(yè)激勵(lì)的制度設(shè)計(jì)。

【 原 文 】 Embedded liberalism prescribes compensating workers hurt by globalization, but government

compensation programs are often criticized for their lack of responsiveness. I explain the lackof

responsiveness by illuminating bureaucrats who approve the compensation programs in the frontline. I

examine how career bureaucrats distribute Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits, the single largest

2024 年第6 期（總第18期）143

federal program in the United States that compensates workers displaced by international trade. Exploitingthe quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions to individual investigators at different stages of their careers, I find that career bureaucrats are less likely to certify TAA petitions and are more likely todelayinvestigations during Republican presidencies relative to Democratic presidencies. This partisanperformance, however, applies uniquely to career bureaucrats who are not tenured and increases inmagnitude during periods of high alignment between labor and the Democratic Party. The political

sustainability of globalization depends on an institutional design that shapes the career incentives of

bureaucrats. 7. 全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中的國(guó)家認(rèn)同與平臺(tái)權(quán)力的局限性（National Identity and the Limits of

Platform Power in the Global Economy）

Tyler Girard，普渡大學(xué)政治學(xué)系助理教授

【摘要】當(dāng)代全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的顯著特征包括經(jīng)濟(jì)部門的數(shù)字化顛覆以及隨之而來(lái)的政治和監(jiān)管沖突。在世界各地，跨國(guó)科技公司已動(dòng)員消費(fèi)者作為這些沖突中的關(guān)鍵盟友，這是它們所擁有的平臺(tái)權(quán)力的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵要素。在本文中，作者將研究非消費(fèi)者身份如何限制這些公司行使平臺(tái)權(quán)力。通過(guò)將平臺(tái)權(quán)力的概念與政治消費(fèi)主義和國(guó)家認(rèn)同的研究相結(jié)合，作者認(rèn)為激活國(guó)家認(rèn)同可以引發(fā)對(duì)有利于跨國(guó)科技公司的政策的反對(duì)，進(jìn)而削弱它們爭(zhēng)取公眾支持的能力。從實(shí)證角度來(lái)看，本文使用了在加拿大進(jìn)行的一項(xiàng)在線、具有全國(guó)代表性的調(diào)查。通過(guò)三個(gè)問(wèn)題領(lǐng)域的小插圖實(shí)驗(yàn)，探討了支持全球監(jiān)管合作和國(guó)內(nèi)政策現(xiàn)狀的決定因素，以及消費(fèi)者和國(guó)家認(rèn)同框架的因果效應(yīng)：銀行、電信和稅收。研究結(jié)果表明，激活消費(fèi)者身份會(huì)持續(xù)改變支持，但國(guó)家認(rèn)同的影響則更具可變性。因此，本文對(duì)數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型和全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中商業(yè)權(quán)力的運(yùn)用的學(xué)術(shù)研究做出了貢獻(xiàn)。

【原文】Among the defining features of the contemporary global economy are the digital disruptionof

economic sectors and the accompanying political and regulatory conflicts. Across the world, multinational

technology firms have mobilized consumers as a key ally in these conflicts, a critical element of the platformpower they wield. In this article, I examine how non-consumer identities can limit the exercise of platformpower by such firms. By synthesizing the concept of platform power with research on political consumerismand national identity, I argue that activating national identity can generate opposition to policies favorabletomultinational technology firms and, in turn, curtail their ability to appeal to public support. Empirically, thisarticle uses an online, nationally representative survey fielded in Canada. I explore the determinants of

support for global regulatory cooperation and the domestic policy status quo, as well as the causal effect of

consumer and national identity framing using vignette experiments across three issue areas: banking, telecommunications, and taxation. The findings reveal that activating consumer identities consistentlyshiftssupport but the effect of national identity is more variable. This article thus contributes to scholarshiponthedigital economic transformation and the exercise of business power in the global economy. 8. 懲罰的政治：獨(dú)裁者為何加入國(guó)際刑事法院（The Politics of Punishment: Why

144

Dictators Join the International Criminal Court）

Leslie Johns，加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校政治學(xué)與法學(xué)副教授

Francesca Parente，克里斯托弗·紐波特大學(xué)政治學(xué)助理教授

【摘要】學(xué)者們普遍認(rèn)為，國(guó)際法和國(guó)際組織通過(guò)幫助獨(dú)裁者可信地致力于問(wèn)責(zé)、個(gè)人權(quán)利和透明度來(lái)促進(jìn)民主。然而獨(dú)裁者通常會(huì)加入條約和國(guó)際組織而不過(guò)渡到民主。國(guó)際法和國(guó)際組織可能會(huì)給國(guó)內(nèi)行為者帶來(lái)不對(duì)稱成本，因?yàn)閲?guó)際規(guī)則通常適用于政府和非國(guó)家行為者，但獨(dú)裁者可以限制這些規(guī)則在國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)際層面的維護(hù)方式。本文認(rèn)為，當(dāng)獨(dú)裁者面臨激烈的國(guó)內(nèi)政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)，他們最有可能加入此類條約和國(guó)際組織。作者利用國(guó)際刑事法院（ICC）來(lái)闡述其論點(diǎn)，該法院擁有廣泛的權(quán)力，可以起訴犯有國(guó)際罪行的個(gè)人，包括危害人類罪、種族滅絕罪和戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)罪。研究表明，國(guó)際刑事法院的調(diào)查和起訴已成為現(xiàn)任獨(dú)裁者針對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)手的工具。文章研究了理論對(duì)多個(gè)結(jié)果變量的影響，包括加入國(guó)際刑事法院的決定、暴力以及當(dāng)權(quán)獨(dú)裁者的生存。證據(jù)表明，獨(dú)裁者在面對(duì)強(qiáng)大的政治對(duì)手時(shí)最有可能加入國(guó)際刑事法院，從而不太可能實(shí)施暴力，更有可能在辦公室生存?！驹摹縎cholars commonly argue that international law and organizations promote democracy by helpingdictators to credibly commit to accountability, individual rights, and transparency. Yet dictators routinelyjoin treaties and international organizations without transitioning to democracy. International lawandorganizations can generate asymmetric costs for domestic actors because international rules often applytoboth governments and non-state actors, yet dictators can limit how these rules are upheld at the domesticandinternational level. We argue that dictators are most likely to join such treaties and international

organizations when they face strong domestic political competition. We illustrate our argument usingtheInternational Criminal Court (ICC), which has extensive powers to prosecute individuals for international

crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. We show that ICC investigations andprosecutions have become a tool for incumbent dictators to target their domestic opponents. We examinetheimplications of our theory for multiple outcome variables, including the decision to join the ICC, violence, and the survival of dictators in power. Our evidence suggests that dictators are most likely to join the ICCwhen they face strong political opponents and are subsequently less likely to commit violence andmorelikely to survive in office. 9. 個(gè)人、國(guó)家分裂與談判策略：來(lái)自歐盟的證據(jù)（Individuals, Disaggregation of theState, and Negotiation Tactics: Evidence from the European Union）Nicola Chelotti，拉夫堡大學(xué)外交和國(guó)際治理講師

【摘要】本文旨在研究領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層以下的個(gè)人在多大程度上、如何以及何時(shí)影響國(guó)際政治的進(jìn)程和結(jié)果。本文通過(guò)分析一組領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層以下的行為者——?dú)W盟外交政策中的外交談判人員——來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。本文首先展示了盡管身處所有官僚層級(jí)，但個(gè)別談判人員實(shí)際上已獲得最終的決策責(zé)任，最突出的是選擇策略。這種對(duì)個(gè)別外交官的賦權(quán)是通過(guò)雙重國(guó)家分解的過(guò)程實(shí)現(xiàn)的：決策責(zé)任已從政治層面轉(zhuǎn)移到官僚層面；然后在后者中，從首都行政部門轉(zhuǎn)移到通常以單一身份參與談判的官員。接下來(lái)，本文根據(jù)歐盟外交官完成的 138 份問(wèn)卷和 17 次訪談的原始數(shù)據(jù)集測(cè)試了三個(gè)個(gè)人特征（經(jīng)驗(yàn)、風(fēng)格和身份）。結(jié)果表明，談判人員的個(gè)人特質(zhì)可以解釋某些但不是全部策略的使用。具體而言，當(dāng)談判者必須以重